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Book 

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C70PH?IGHT DEPOSIT. 



COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 



COLLAPSE 

AND 

RECONSTRUCTION 

EUROPEAN CONDITIONS AND 
AMERICAN PRINCIPLES 

BY 

SIR THOMAS BARCLAY 

w 

AUTHOR OF 

"PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND DIPLOMACY" 

"NEW METHODS OF ADJUSTING INTERNATIONAL 

DISPUTES AND THE FUTURE," ETC. 



M6M.k^t:£Mn 




^WVAD'OIS 



BOSTON 
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 

1919 



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-'1 



Copyright, 1919, 
By Ljttle, Brown, and Company. 



All rights reserved 



NortDooti VirM 
Set up and electrotyped by J. S. Cushiag Co., Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 






©CI.Ar)l555 7 

MAY kQ 1^19 



PREFACE 

It would be pretentious to offer in a short and 
single volume more than suggestions on so vast a 
subject as the political reconstruction of a Europe 
which the continuance of the War beyond any prac- 
tical purpose but destruction has shattered to its 
foundations. 

It is futile now to express regrets that those in 
power turned a deaf ear to the warnings of others 
who had at any rate some knowledge of Central 
Europe, Russia and the Balkans, — to warnings 
as to the probable consequences of the break-up 
especially of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or of 
indifference to the aspirations of the Russian prole- 
tariat, or to the meaning of social democracy and — 
as they are likely to do now — to the danger of 
relying on superannuated and imperfect sources 
of information and methods for dealing with many 
unprecedented problems. 

If Western Governments had not had their eyes 
concentrated on Berlin, they might have under- 
stood, as all who know Central Europe politically 
understand, that if the overtures of February, 
1915, from Vienna had been followed up, the War 
might have come to an end just as it did with the 
Austrian collapse in 1918, without bringing down 
on the heads of all the scaffolding of a state system 
laboriously built up by generation after genera- 
tion of experienced craftsmen and resting on geo- 



vi PREFACE 

graphical and historical foundations which it is 
beyond the power of any congress of peace to alter. 

Empires might have been preserved whicli, what- 
ever their faults, were in process of transformation 
and were better working political entities than any 
cut-and-dried schemes of state formation now on 
the horizon are likely to become except by a process 
of evolution which will probably bring us back 
eventually to something very like what has been 
destroyed. 

A historian and thinker like President AYilson, a 
careful observer like INI. Jules Cambon, a political 
sceptic — in spite of his apparent optimism — like 
Mr. Lloyd George, may exercise a restraining influ- 
ence on the impetuosity of those who think the 
problems of constructive politics can be solved by 
efforts of imagination or the paper schemes of in- 
genious draftsmen. 

I have followed in the distribution of the subject- 
matter a system I have adopted in other books to 
the satisfaction of my readers, — that of confining 
the text of the chapter to controversial matter and 
shimting digression, historical and other, into special 
notes which are consequently sometimes longer 
than the text of the chapter itself. 

The principles laid down by President Wilson 
have been accepted by both sides to the conflict as 
peace preliminaries. They are mutually binding ami 
constitute for the time being the basis of reconstruc- 
tion. Anybody writing at present on the subject 
has no option but to treat them as such. 

T. B. 



CONTENTS 



FAOB 

PREFACE V 

CHAPTBR 

INTRODUCTION 1 

Note: On Imperial Violation of German 

Constitution 15 

I. PAST AND PRESENT 18 

Note: President Wilson's Proposition as 

Accepted by the Allies . . 26 

n. FOREIGN POLICY 32 

Note : On Public Opinion and Foreign 

Policy in England .... 42 

Note : On Interest of British Press on 

Foreign Policy .... 42 

Note : On Germany's and Russia's Geograph- 
ical Situation 43 

III. DIPLOMACY, SECRET TREATIES AND 

NEGOTIATIONS .... 45 

Note: Inviolability of Treaties; Sugges- 
tions FOR Addition to the Agree- 
ment OF 1871 54 

Note: Suggested Agreement as Regards 

Secret Treaties and Clauses . 55 

rV. EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES' FOR- 
EIGN POLICY .... 58 
Note: On Panama Canal .... 77 
Note: On the Mexican Policy ... 85 



viii CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB PAGE 

V. EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS . 88 

Note: On "Open-Door" Policy ... 93 

Note : European Resources of Iron Ore . 97 
Note : On the State of British Trade Lm- 

MEDIATELY BEFORE THE WaR . . 99 

Note: On Effect of " Most-Fa voured-Na- 
tion" Clause in Cojimercial 
Treaties 100 

Note: On Russia and Poland . . . 108 

Note: On Rumania, Serbia and Monte- 
negro 112 

Note: Treaty and Military Convention 
BETWEEN Rumania and the Entente 
Powers 118 

VI. COLONIAL EXPANSION 126 

Note: On Consequences; England's Posi- 
tion AS A Mother of Nations . 134 

VII. CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION . . .135 

Note: On Language as a Political Ques- 
tion 140 

Note: On Alsace-Lorraine .... 142 
Note: On "Readjustment of the Frontiers 

of Italy" 152 

Vm. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION . . .158 

Note: On Immunity from Capture of Pri- 
vate Property in Naval War . 166 

IX. AR^L\MENTS 178 

Note: Suggested Clauses Respecting Na- 
tionalisation of Production of 
Material of War .... 185 



CONTENTS ix 

CHAPTER PAGE 

X. LAW OF NATIONS 186 

Note: On Preambles to Different Inter- 
national Conventions Relating 
TO War and Peace .... 190 
Note: Memorandum of a Scheme for the 
Promotion of Law and Justice 
among Nations by Education . 195 

XI. NEUTRALISATION 202 

Note: Suggested Form of Agreement as to 

Proclamations of Neutralisation 210 

Note : On Some of the German Theories 
Respecting Neutralisation and Its 
Guarantees 213 

Note: On Buffer Zones .... 222 

Xn. THE HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTEN- 
TIALITIES 225 

Note: Draft Suggestions of a Convention 
FOR Improved Organisation of 
Hague Conferences . . . 247 

XIII. BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 251 

Note : On the Problem of Austria-Hungary 253 

Note: On the Ottoman Empire . . . 256 
Note : Allies' Agreement Relating to Con- 
stantinople AND THE Straits and 

for Partition of Asia Minor . 260 

Note: On the Question of Asia Minor . 261 

Note: On Imperial Federation and India . 263 

XIV. A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS . 269 

XV. AMERICA'S MISSION 305 

Note : Some Extracts from President Wil- 
son's Messages (January to April, 
1917) 312 



COLLAPSE AND RFXON- 
STRUCTION 

INTRODUCTION 

The task which the World's War ^ has imposed 
upon statesmen is not only one of reconstruc- 
tion, it is one of reconstruction on such a plan that 
it will eliminate as far as possible causes of war in 
the more immediate future. The pretentious for- 
mula of a "War to end War" is not based on knowl- 
edge we possess from experience either psychological, 
sociological or historical. If, however, the "War 
to end War" is pretentious, the duty of statesmen 
will none the less be to redeem the failure of their 
own generation and approach the future with a 

^ I call the war World's War because it is the English rendering of 
Guerre Mondiale, itaelf probably derived from the German term Welt- 
krieg; neither term is based on English or French analogies. If the 
term Seven Years' War had not already taken a place in history, it 
might have lK;en applicable to the present war, the origin of which 
historians will probably date back to September, 1911, the date of the 
outbreak of the Turco-Italian War, since when the continuity of causa- 
tion has been unbroken. It may come to be called the Great War, 
but if other wars arise almost immediately out of it, as is possible if any 
settlement is attempted which is not sincerely democratic or based on 
geographical and economic necessity, historians may revert to the time- 
honoured method of calling it after the years of its duration. 



« COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

sense of the responsibility they have incurred towards 
posterity. 

The duration of peace, however, is dependent 
rather upon a simultaneous advance of the reason- 
ableness of mankind than upon any artifices of 
statesmen and diplomatists. 

I say simuliani'ouit because just as the slowest 
ship makes the pace of a fleet, so the most back- 
ward nation in the comnnmity of nations makes the 
pace of civilisation. 

But even assuming a relatively high degree of 
civilisation in any one State, the majority may be 
easily swayed by circumstances, oratory, prejudice, 
their mental balance disturbed by over-education, 
the rectitude of their vision vitiated by tradition 
and the different influences which determine the 
character of groups of mankind just as they do that 
of individuals. 

INloreover, those who get possession of power and 
direct a national policy may be ignorant persons who 
have entered political life owing to connections with 
those already in possession or inexperienced persons 
who, having had to perform absorbing menial func- 
tions in politics for the sake of a living, have had no 
experience outside their own parliament or its pur- 
lieus and whose training has been one of obedience 
to the initiative of others. These necessarily form 
the majority in an administration recruited from 
any parliament. 

The game of diplomacy, again, is often practically 
one of irritation and counter-irritation disguised in 



INTRODUCTION 8 

courteous language. Foreign Offices are generally 
too absorbed by immediate and proximate details 
to observe clouds gathering on the horizon. None, 
I may say in this connection, worked harder than 
the British Foreign Office to avert the crisis when it 
burst upon them. It is neither just nor expedient 
to blame men in office when such a crisis arises. 
If subject for Vjlame there is, let it apjply to a system 
which has persisted in all European countries in 
spite of the criticism of able and experienced men who 
have lacked, however, the numbers and prestige to 
overturn a superannuated system of dealing with 
foreign affairs. 

President Wilson's notes and messages drew 
European attention to the difference of the American 
method but did not at once win approval. Some 
European critics treated the American method as 
mere cabotinage and it is only gradually that Euro- 
peans have begun to understand that in America 
foreign policy is not regarded as involving quite 
a different set of democratic considerations from 
domestic policy, in reference to which, in all self- 
governing countries, a government must be and 
remains in constant touch with the people it affects. 

Then again wars are gambles of nations. The 
States which embark on them believe they will be 
successful ; otherwise we must assume they would 
not so act. 

They are seldom unpopular. They appeal to the 
spoliative instincts of mankind because they are in 
the nature of gambling, and if statesmen and writers 



4 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

criminal enough to encourage war are not always 
condemned as they ought to be, they are not dis- 
tinguishable from abettors of gambling hells in a 
well-ordered couununity except in the scale of the 
enormity of the offence. 

And war has the effect on men's minds of all 
great emotions. It seems to paralyse the power to 
reason. The contagion of belligerent emotion, more- 
over, is not confined to the belligerent States; 
it is almost as intense among neutral nations who 
watch the game, and carry on a "war of opinion", 
almost as active as if they were parties to the struggle. 

The expectation that war will fall into desuetude 
with the growth of popidar wisdom and of the 
consciousness that its consequences are not ad- 
vantageous to the majority may therefore not be 
realised, and it is safer to assume that it will not, 
and take precautions accordingly. 

It is true that it was a commonplace before the 
War to speak of a European conflict as sooner or 
later inevital^le. The state of tension in Europe 
bad become unendurable. Industrial life was being 
vitiated by the prevailing imrest : the margin of 
speculation had grown far out of its natural pro- 
portion. The air was charged with tense and 
aggressive currents of feeling, and when war broke 
out it came almost as a relief — like a thunder 
clap after a period of enervating, sultry, storm- 
threatening weather. 

Yet postponement of what seems an inevitable 
event in the history of nations opens up a variety 



INTRODUCTION 5 

of possibilities. Circumstances may change, other 
solutions may occur to statesmen, diplomatists, 
publicists, politicians ; a reaction may set in, the 
tide of public opinion may turn, new afi&nities 
may grow up, a common cause may arise. And 
thus wars may be avoided by mere patience and 
steady, untiring (effort on the part of those in charge 
of the destiny of nations. 

It will be for the future historian when he has ac- 
cess to all the available material still hidden from 
the public eye to form a dispassionate opinion as 
to whether statesmen, and which of them, failed ; 
where the system, if any, broke down ; what were 
the causes of the poor quality currently attributed 
to contemporary statesmanship. All the sciences, 
even astronomy,' may have a voice in the solution 
of its greatest problem, which, after all, is why the 
War took place at all. 

Meanwhile, those who have to deal not with 
history but with construction will have to build wdth 
the materials they possess, insufficient as they may 
be. If they sincerely wish to secure a period of 
peace for posterity they will, nevertheless, have to 
search for causes beyond the immediate occasion 
of the War, for the underlying tendencies which 
preceded it and distinguish between the inflammable 
material and the igniting flame and endeavour to 
counteract the revival of situations which have 
proved so disastrous to mankind. 

A perusal of the diplomatic records issued by the 

* See Professor Raphael Dubois' studies. 



6 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

different Foreign Offices leaves the reader under 
the impression that the War had no justification 
whatsoever. We see in it England and Russia 
making the most strenuous efforts to preserve peace, 
France playing the part of a resigned associate 
of both, ready to take consequences of acts to 
which she was not a party, Belgium the victim of 
unp^'ovoked aggression, Germany trying, down to 
a point, to preserve peace, then vaguely quarrelling 
with Russia, and Austria, on the eve of a settlement 
of the originating grievance, aghast at the course 
being taken by events she had started. In the 
whole tangle of diplomatic despatches and appeals, 
there is nothing which can be singled out as a matter 
justifying war except the violation of the neutralisa- 
tion of Belgium, which came rather as a consequence 
than as a cause of the War. Hence the bewildered 
anxiety with which the Foreign Offices of the bel- 
ligerents all tried to exonerate their respective 
governments from liability for a war which they 
alleged with equal emphasis all round they had been 
doing their utmost to avoid. 

A number of unofficial writers have endeavoured 
to explain how and why the War came about and 
much ingenuity has been exercised to gather from 
the different official books evidence of the guilt of 
the different parties involved. It was the Russian 
mobilisation, says Germany, which brought on 
the calamity. It was Germany, say England and 
France, who, impatient not to let the chance of 
war escape, hurried into it while Austria-Hungary, 
Russia and Serbia were still negotiating a settlement 



INTRODUCTION 7 

and had practically come to terms. It was Eng- 
land, again say later German authorities, who 
might have prevented the war by exercising influ- 
ence at Petrograd. By not doing so, while at the 
same time protesting her devotion to peace, she 
played once more her old double-faced game and 
is really the guilty party, and so on. 

These attempts to saddle blame on each other 
are interesting features for the historian in them- 
selves. It is possible that diplomacy did fail. 
It is also possible that more than one Government 
involved did not bring the maximum of effort 
to bear on the preservation of peace. It is possible 
again that there were arriere-pensees ^ considerations 
of a compensating character, which brought con- 
solation for failure in the effort to preserve peace. 

The different objects which have been put for- 
ward by responsible persons, such as the annihila- 
tion of militarism in Germany, the destruction of 
British maritime supremacy and other ideas only 
show that writers are still groping for reasons. 
Among tendencies antecedent to the War, it may, 
however, be remembered that the German nation 
had drifted into a state of great irritability through 
constant appeals to its patriotism, appeals without 
which the necessary taxation for increasingly heavy 
expenditure on armaments would probably have 
appeared to the German people and their repre- 
sentatives unjustifiable. The Morocco incidents, 
especially the Agadir affair, excited Germans, as 
I know from personal experience, to such demon- 



8 COLL.\PSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

strative anger that in 1911 war was only prevented 
through the direct action of the Kaiser himself. 
The Germans felt that their enormous and well- 
trained army and their expensive and efficient fleet 
had not saved them from a humiliating diplomatic 
defeat at the hands of a country they believed them- 
selves capable of crushing in a six weeks' campaign. 
The intervention of England in 1911 had been a 
warning, but the circumstances in 1914 were dif- 
ferent. It was currently stated that England was 
no longer pledged to support France after she had 
come into possession of her stake under the arrange- 
ment of 1904. In these circumstances, the absten- 
tion of England was expected. Germany, however, 
had forgotten that if she had her grievances against 
England, England was in a state of similar irrita- 
bility owing to the constant increase of the German 
navy and the intimations of German writers re- 
corded by excitable English writers that the object 
of these increases was to dispute British supremacy 
at sea. As regards other countries, in France a 
certain number of wild young patriots and unwise 
older ones thought that to excite German hostility 
was good sport. As a fact, however, France is 
involved in the War only through her alliance with 
Russia, and as regards Russia herself, it is difficult 
to see what problem, difficulty or ambition it was 
possible to solve or realise by a war, whatever its 
result, unless djTiastic objects were concerned, and 
in that case the German declaration of war may 
have been a prolongation of the life of a tottering 
dynasty. 



INTRODUCTION 9 

Still, while actual facts warranting recourse to 
war are conspicuously absent, the War has brought 
tendencies, feelings and ambitions to the surface 
which are now so strongly marked that they can 
only be accounted for by the assumption that they 
have been accumulating energy while in a more or 
less latent condition. This would explain the extra- 
ordinary popularity of the War not only in Germany, 
but in England and even in France and, if I am 
rightly informed, at the beginning also in Russia 
and Italy. I do not, in saying this, mean to suggest 
that the War might not have been averted or that 
it is less a calamity because it appealed to dififerent 
national sentiments. 

As between Germany and England it has been 
waged with an animosity so unprecedented that 
one must look for explanation elsewhere than in 
the more or less factitious hatred begotten of war 
in general. On the German side, it has made 
thinkers whose processes of thought have influenced 
the mind of man throughout the world belie their 
intellectual independence and assume a hostile 
attitude towards a nation whose whole polity stands 
for those rights of independence and justice which 
most of them have themselves championed. Among 
the Anglo-Saxons, it has taken the form of "black- 
guarding" the enemy in a manner quite foreign to 
their traditions of chivalry and sport.^ 

' In a country of voluntary service, allowance must of course be 
made for the fact that appeals for recruiting purposes are necessarily 
highly coloured and that many newspapers actuated by the patriotic 
desire to increase the multitude of our fighting forces may not have exer- 



10 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Fortunately for civilisation and for the good name 
of England and America these exaggerations of 
language were not translated into action and the 
tradition and spirit of their armies in spite of, per- 
haps on account of, its mainly civilian character, 
remained as chivalrous and sportsmanlike as ever. 

The object of war being to bring it to its own 
conclusion, the shorter it is the less inconvenience 
it causes to the commimity and the less ultimate 
slaughter and suffering to the forces engaged. 
Unless the sources from which it can be sustained 
are paralysed and the trade and profit-earning 
resources of a nation ci'ippled so that the war can 
strike at the national revenue, money will flow 
into the treasury and the fighting can continue. 
The civilian, in general, claims relative exemption 
from the evils of war and efforts have been made by 
humanitarians to attenuate the evils of war for 
him; but in every war he is indignant at having 
to suffer at all from its effects. With the develop- 
ment of the interdependence of nations and the 
universal adoption of national military service 
the civilian becomes more and more involved in 
its consequences, and the prospects are that he 
will become rather more than less a victim of them. 

\Mien a duel is fought the seconds stand watch- 
incr everv thrust and parrv to prevent the antag- 
onists in the excitement of the fight from violat- 
ing the rules of combat. But for their vigilance, 

cised all tlie discrimination they would use in peace time in the selection 
of their news. 



INTRODUCTION 11 

the combatants are exposed to losing their self- 
control and disregarding the rules. In war the 
neutrals are the seconds. In this War the seconds 
have not been strong enough to call the combatants 
to order and eventually have joined in it themselves. 
Thus we have had a melee in which the thin voice 
of impotent onlookers has only been a source of 
further irritation to combatants, smarting from 
wounds and the more angry because they felt 
their own inability to recover their reason. 

International law, in so far as it treats of war, 
is essentially the work of neutrals. In time of 
peace all are potential neutrals and owing to this 
much of international law has been codified by 
agreement and these agreements, however much 
they have been violated, are still acknowledged by 
belligerents to be binding upon the parties to them. 
Subject to these agreements publicists try to ascer- 
tain what the practice is and endeavour to bring 
it into such harmony with European morals as 
the character of war permits. 

This was the method of Grotius at a time not 
unlike the present, when war as ruthless as that of 
the World's War was devastating Central Europe. 
When his famous book appeared in 1625, the war 
was ten years old and had still twenty to run. The 
memory of the atrocities, cruelty and extortions of 
the League has descended to posterity and still 
brands with infamy the names of Wallenstein and 
Tilly. They excited the indignation of the man- 
kind of that age, and Grotius, subject of a neutral 
State, produced his famous book as a revolt against 



12 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

the ruthlessness of these military commanders. 
The more humane and generous Gustavus Adolphus 
approved this attempt to attenuate the horrors of 
war. The sack of Magdeburg, the burning of 
the city, and the massacre of twenty thousand 
of its citizens some six years after the appearance 
of "De Jure BelH ac Pacis", however, show, as in 
the recent War, how Httle respect commanders in 
the field have for the requirements of law and 
humanity. 

To deal effectively with the problems involved 
in the consideration of terms of peace calculated 
to avert danger of war in the future, the public 
must constantly bear in mind that a distinction 
exists between the causes and the occasions of 
war. I repeat this, not because I claim to be the 
discoverer of what is obvious when attention is 
drawn to it, but because a whole system proposed 
for insuring the world against the repetition of 
similar catastrophes is based upon the prevention 
of occasions of war instead of upon removal of the 
causes of war. The failure of the peace movements 
of a generation of civilised mankind, in fact, is 
due to concentration of eft'ort on arbitration and 
other methods of dealing with incidents of inter- 
national trouble and not with causes. It seems 
hardly necessary to labour a point on which all 
pathology is based, and statesmen, in dealing with 
the life and polity of mankind, can only follow 
with safety the analogies of individual human 
Ufe. 



INTRODUCTION 13 

In the endeavour to deal with causes the states- 
men of the respective negotiating nations will 
do well to give their adversaries credit for equally 
sincere desires to do their best for their own coun- 
tries. They are all subject to suspicion of each 
other's objects, all necessarily more or less ignorant 
of each other's difficulties and all in charge of under- 
takings involving knowledge, capacity and a sense 
of responsibility out of proportion to any they have 
been able to attain in an official or political career. 
They are subject to fits of alarm and panic like 
other human beings, and just as subject to nervous 
breakdown and hysteria. 

For the discussion of the conditions of permanent 
peace, even patriotism is a disqualification if com- 
bined with ignorance of the subtle influences exer- 
cised by the physical, social, historical and indus- 
trial circumstances of different countries on the 
minds of their peoples and statesmen. 

Assuming that the primary object of negotiations 
for peace is the attainment of a peace which will 
have as permanent a character as the foresight of 
living men can achieve, the following principles 
seem calculated to serve as a basis of effort for its 
attainment : 

1. The avoidance of solutions which create or 
which will or may be reasonably expected to create 
a national grievance or grievances present or future ; 

2. The avoidance of solutions which may reason- 
ably be regarded as having a humiliating character ; 

3. Consideration for reasonable claims of any 



14 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

State which do not essentially curtail the reasonable 
realisation by another State of its geographical and 
economic requirements. 

On these principles the analysis of the situation 
to which the present book is devoted will more or 
less be based. 



NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 

Note on Imperial Violation of German Constitution 

The apparently cynical effrontery of the German 
Declaration of War to France reminded one at first sight 
of the provocation of the Capulets. It read : 

"The German administrative and military authorities 
have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile 
acts committed on German territory by French military 
aviators. Several of these have openly violated the 
neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that 
country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near 
Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel ; 
one has thrown bombs on the railways near Carlsruhe 
and Niirnberg. 

"I am instructed and I have the honour to inform 
Your Excellency, that in presence of these acts of aggres- 
sion the German Empire considers itself in a state of war 
with France in consequence of the acts of this latter 
Power." 

Louis XIV would have said : " C'est mon bon plaisir, " 
but there was a reason for this nonsense not very flatter- 
ing to the political intelligence of those to whom it was 
addressed. The Imperial Constitution (Reichs-Verf as- 
sung) provides (Article 11) that the Emperor "declares 
war and concludes peace in the name of the Empire." 
"For the declaration of war, however, the consent of 



16 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

the Imperial Council (Bundesrat) is requisite, except 
in ease of attack on imperial territory or on the coast." 
Article 63 adds that the whole armed force of the Empire, 
in time of war as in time of peace, is under the orders 
of the Emperor. 

It is not without significance, therefore, that the denial, 
later on, that any bombs were thrown near Niirnberg 
or elsewhere in Bavaria came from the country whose 
concurrence in the War was thus forced. 

Note on Diplomacy during the War 

With the progress of the War the presence in it, as 
regards Germany, of Russia became as accidental as the 
Austro-Hungarian quarrel with Serbia. Her war was 
with Austria-Hungary. With the latter she was carry- 
ing on practically an independent though parallel war, 
in spite of Germany having been the first to throw down 
the gauntlet. It soon became obvious that both Russia 
and Austria-Hungary were likely to have enough internal 
difficulties to occupy them at home to negative any effec- 
tive cooperation as partners of the Western belligerents. 

In the diplomacy of the War, the question for the 
Western belligerents thus came to be whether the loss 
of Russian cooperation would not be more than amply 
compensated by the effect of the collapse of Austria- 
Hungary on the German ability to continue the struggle. 
Hence, probably, the persistent refusal of France, Eng- 
land, and Italy to listen to repeated overtures to enter into 
separate negotiations with Austria-Hungary which might 
have brought the War to an end as early as February, 
1915. 

Whether the diplomacy of the Allies was well-consid- 
ered, judicious or based on accurate knowledge of the state 
of Central Europe, it is premature to discuss. All that 



INTRODUCTION 17 

can meanwhile be said is that judging by impending 
possible consequences it seems probable that they would 
have been less fatal in all the belligerent countries, if 
peace had been made before the calamities of war had 
undermined the foundations of modern European polity. 



CHAFTER I 

PAST AND PRESENT 

*'TiiE past and the present are in deadly grapple 
and the peoples of the world are being done to 
death between them," said President Wilson in his 
speech delivered at the tomb of Washington on 
Jnly 4. 1018. 

lie hud just before stated: "There must now 
be settled once for all what was settled in America 
in the great age upon whose inspiration we draw 
to-day." Washington and his associates had con- 
sciously planned that ""men of every class should 
be free", and the President summed up the ultimate 
goal of American intervention in the words : 

"What we seek is the reign of law based on the 
consent of the governed." 

In the view of America's spokesman, if I read his 
ditl'erent utterances aright, the recent War has not 
been a war for social betterment. It was a war 
for political betterment. Nobody would deny that 
Germany possesses an elementary education, meth- 
ods of promoting research, and a variety of inter- 
mediate stages affording means for the develop- 
ment of the individual which other nations may 



PAST AND PRESENT 19 

envy. Nor would anybody deny that Germany's 
efforts to cope with pauperism and disease have 
been a subject of admiration to the whole world 
of experts in such matters. Nor would anybody 
even deny that German statesmen, and first among 
them Kaiser William II himself, have strenuously 
and unremittingly sought to give every German 
his share in the comforts of life, and, in short, that 
the German people, under the fostering influence 
of an efficient and conscientious government before 
they were plunged into war, enjoyed, along with 
an extraordinary prosperity, social welfare appre- 
ciated universally. 

But what boots all this prosperity and social 
welfare if enjoyed under a system that by a stroke 
of the pen can cast all the progress of generations 
into a whirlpool of devastation; that, by merely 
turning a handle, can open the sluices and sweep 
away in a flood of bloodshed not only the work of 
our own age, but that created by the toil, art and 
wisdom of our forefathers ; that can jeopardise 
not only prosperity and social welfare at home but 
overwhelm in an artificial catastrophe nation after 
nation, bringing ruin, misery and mourning into 
the homes of all mankind ! 

The Kaiser, in a speech delivered a few days 
(June 16) before that of the President from which 
I have quoted above, contrasted civilisation based 
on two different Weltanschauung en — the German 
principle which seeks to promote the virtue and 
value of the individual and the Anglo-Saxon which 
leaves the individual at the mercy of its capitalist 



20 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

ruler. With tlie unconsciousness of the ''benefi- 
cent tyrant" he did not see the real issue. He did 
not seem to know that the Anglo-Saxons have 
borrowed, and gratefully so, much in the realm of 
social progress from Germany and that the present 
struggle is not against Germany, nor against his or 
their social j^rinciples, but is against a system of which 
he has the misfortune to be the presiding genius.^ 

That I take to be the President's message to the 
German people, to whom America comes as a 
saviour as nuich as to the rest of Europe. The 
enemy of all mankind, of universal man, is the 
power to destroy. That power to destroy belongs 
to the past. All arbitrary power to let loose the 
forces of destruction left to rulers and governments 
is a survival of periods when wars were waged in 
the interest of dynasties and peoples were slaughtered 
for causes in which they had no concern ; of an 
age when might was the only right respected as 
between sovereign and sovereign. Populations then, 
as pieces on a chessboard, were moved about as 
suited the fancy of the players, diplomacy laid its 
plans with deceit on its lips, and governments acted 
as if they were not bound in their relations with 

^ Under the heading "O^ipt^ition of the German Government : Friend- 
ship towanl the German Pix^ple" see Fre.sident's me&sage to Congress, 
April i. 1917 : 

"W> are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German People, 
and shall desire nothing so much as the early re^stablishment of intimate 
relations of mutual advantage between us — however hard it may be 
for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our 
hearts. We have borne with their present Government through all 
these bitter months because of that friendship — exercising a patience 
and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible." 



PAST AND PRESENT 21 

each other to respect their engagements and act 
honourably, but as if they were Hcensed to prostitute 
the noblest names and qualities in the service of 
objects long since banished from intercourse among 
civilised individuals. These are the things America 
had entered the "death-grapple" to exterminate. 

A close examination of the fourteen points laid 
down by President Wilson in his address of January 
8, 1918, reaffirmed in the four of that of July 4, 
1918, and the five of that of September 27, 1918,^ 
reveals several underlying principles which may 
be considered as constituting the foundation of 
the President's programme. This programme the 
Allies have adopted with one reservation in its 
entirety. That reservation referred to in Mr. 
Lansing's reply to Germany of November 5, 
1918, relates to the second of the President's four- 
teen points. In the same letter a principle has 
been added, viz. : that of compensation for damage 
done to civilian property. 

A synthesis of the points is therefore indispensable 
to the proper understanding of the matters, ques- 
tions and problems of peace. 

As enunciated in the fourteen and completed 
in the others they may be summed up as follows : 

1. No secret international agreements (1 — also 
one of the five) ; 

2. Freedom of the sea and its channels (2, 12 — 
subject to reservations referred to in Mr. Lansing's 
letter of November 5th) ; 

* See Notes to the present chapter. President Wilson's principles and 
Mr. Lansing's letter confirming their adoption by the Allies. 



22 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

3. Most favoured nation treatment to be general- 
ised (3 — also one of the five) ; 

4. Restriction of armaments (4) ; 

5. Acquiescence of populations in all matters 
affecting sovereignty over them (5, 6 — also one 
of the four) ; 

6. Abolition of the "right of conquest" (7, 8, 
11 — also among both the four and the five) ; 

7. Access to the sea a right of all States (11, 13) ; 

8. All States as settled by the Treaty of Peace 
to be guaranteed an equal right to their independence 
and integrity (14 — also among the four) ; 

9. Racial homogeneity of population to be a 
ground of adjustment of frontiers (9, 12).^ 

These I take to be the principles which have been 
agreed to as such by the Allies. Details are matters 
for negotiation, and by details I mean the appli- 
cation to each individual case of such of the prin- 
ciples as expediency warrants or dictates. Thus, 
principle Number 5 may in some instances conflict 
with principle Number 9 ; Number 3 may not always 
tally with Number 8, some of them may not be 
capable of universal application. Nevertheless they 

^ The President distinguishes between "must" and "should", and 
the first six points, those of general application, he gives as "heads" 
only. 

Belgium "must" be evacuated, but of "French territories" he says 
the invaded portions "should" be restored and the wrong done to France 
in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine "should" be righted. Of 
Italian, Slav, Rumanian, Serbian, Montenegrin. Polish and other 
claims he uses the same conditional "should." Even of the permanent 
opening of the Dardanelles to the ships ;md trade of all nations ho uses 
it. Of the Society of Nations he states it " must " be formed. 



PAST AND PRESENT 23 

constitute the main lines on which it has been 
promised to European democracy a resettlement 
of Europe shall be based. 

Alongside these pledges of the governments of 
the Allies to the democracies of the world there are 
necessarily generalisations or principles ^ to which 
all political effort is as subject as surgery is to nature. 

I have picked out some such generalisations or 
principles which seem to apply to present circum- 
stances and submit them for consideration. They 
are as follows : 

1. The movable or changeable yields to the 
immutable; therefore, in a conflict between racial 
and geographical considerations, the latter neces- 
sarily prevail; 

2. Natural boundaries are such as offer the mini- 
mum of obstacles to their preservation as such ; there- 
fore navigable rivers, being highways of commerce, 
do not afford the requisites of natural boundaries ; 

3. An independent State is entitled to enjoy 

^ If of any practical value at all principles are at best general- 
isations, but the use to which they are generally put in politics is that 
which appears, for the time being, to be in the interest of those whose 
action they seem to justify. 

Louis Blanc, a man of sincere devotion to principles, writing of the 
intervention of France in Spain in 1823, in spite of its cruelty and reac- 
tionary character, said, "lorsque un gouvernement croit representer 
une cause juste, qu'il la fasse triompher partout oil le triomphe est 
possible; c'est plus que son droit, c'est son devoir." ("Histoire de dix 
Ans," Edition de 1846, t. I, p. 112.) 

He was in the middle of a period when cosmopolitanism and inter- 
nationalism were forces of reaction against three powerful autocracies 
which sought to determine the destinies of Europe. His principle was 
just as handy a weapon for the one side as for the other. 



24 COLL.VPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

the ooiisequonccs of its indopciuloiice, such as 
territorial inviohibiUty, its right to determine its 
own form of government, its right of diplomatic 
and consular representation, and its right generally 
to share in the international intercourse of the 
world, subject only to qualifications dictated by 
other principles {\\\ independent States are in- 
ternational persons and entitled to exercise their 
rights on terms of equality with other States) ; 

4. A State which is dependent on other States 
for revenue lacks an element of independence; 

5. A State without free access to the sea is 
dependent on its neighbors and lacks an element 
of independence ; 

6. A State enjoys its right of participation in 
pacific international intercourse subject to its ob- 
servance of its contractual obligations and of the 
principles of humanity, honour and social and 
commercial integrity regarded as essential in the 
conduct of individuals. 

All these principles are necessarily subject to an 
axiom which is self-evident. It constitutes an ele- 
ment of permanency. 

I venture to state it and its corollaries in the 
following propositions : 

Evolution of Slates is subject to the general 
processes of evolution and implies adjustment of 
organisms to environment and a coalescing of 
apposite tissues. 

Checking evolution in progress may bring about 
unforeseen, undesirable and possibly disastrous 
consequences. 



PAST AND PRESENT 25 

Racial, industrial, traditional and political im- 
pulses within any State in course of time have always 
yielded to each other. Compromise is a conscious 
acceptance of such natural adjustment of tendencies. 

Preference should therefore be given, ceteris 'pari- 
bus and where it works without violent resistance, 
to the status quo. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER I 

President Wilson's Proposition as Accepted by 
THE Allies 

The fourteen points of January 8, 1918, were : 

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after 
which there shall be no private international understand- 
ings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always 
frankly and in the public view. 

2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, out- 
side territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except 
as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by inter- 
national action for the enforcement of international 
covenants. 

3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic 
barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade 
conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace 
and associating themselves for its maintenance. 

4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national 
armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent 
with domestic safety. 

5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjust- 
ment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance 
of the principle that in determining all such questions 
of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned 
must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the 
government whose title is to be determined. 

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such 
a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will 



PAST AND PRESENT 97 

secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations 
of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and un- 
embarrassed opportunity for the independent determina- 
tion of her own poHtical development and national 
policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society 
of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; 
and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind 
that she may need and may herself desire. The treat- 
ment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months 
to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their 
comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their 
own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish 
sympathy. 

7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacu- 
ated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sover- 
eignty which she enjoys in common with all other free 
nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve 
to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which 
they have themselves set and determined for the govern- 
ment of their relations with one another. Without this 
healing act the whole structure and validity of interna- 
tional law is forever impaired. 

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded 
portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia 
in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has 
unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, 
should be righted, in order that peace may once more be 
made secure in the interest of all. 

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be 
effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place 
among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, 
should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous 
development. 



28 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

11. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be 
evacuated ; occupied territories restored ; Serbia accorded 
free and secure access to the sea ; and the rehitions of the 
several Balkan states to one another determined by 
friendly counsel along historically established lines of 
allegiance and nationality ; and international guarantees 
of the political and economic independence and territorial 
integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered 
into. 

hi. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman 
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the 
other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule 
should be assured an imdoubted security of life and an 
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous devel- 
opment, and the Dardanelles should be permanently 
opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all 
nations under international guarantees. 

13. An independent Polish State should be erected 
which should include the territories inhabited by indis- 
putably Polish populations, which should be assured a 
free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and 
economic independence and territorial integrity should 
be guaranteed by international covenant. 

14. A general association of nations must be formed 
under specific covenants for the purpose of affording 
mutual guarantees of political independence and terri- 
torial integrity to great and small states alike. 

The four points of July 4 were : 

1. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere 
that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice 
distm-b the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot be presently 
destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence. 

2. The settlement of every question, whether of terri- 
tory or sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of 



PAST AND PRESENT 29 

political relationship, upon the basis of the free accept- 
ance of that settlement by the people immediately con- 
cerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest 
or advantage of any other nation or people which may 
desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior 
influence or mastery. 

3. The consent of all nations to be governed in their 
conduct towards each other by the same principles of 
honour and of respect for the common law of civilised 
society that govern the individual citizens of all modern 
States, and in their relations with one another, to the end 
that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, 
no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries 
wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established 
upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for 
right. 

4. The establishment of an organisation of peace which 
shall make it certain that the combined power of free 
nations will check every invasion of right, and serve to 
make peace and justice the more secure by affording a 
definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit 
and by which every international readjustment that 
cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly 
concerned shall be sanctioned. 

The five points of September 27 were : 

1. The impartial justice meted out must involve no 
discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just 
and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must 
be a justice that has no favorites and knows no standard 
but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned. 

2. No special or separate interest of any single nation 
or group of nations can be made the basis of any part of 
the settlement which is not consistent with the common 
interest of all. 



30 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

3. There can be no leagues or alliances or special cov- 
enants and understandings within the general and com- 
mon family of the league of nations. 

4. And more specitically, there can be no special, 
selfish economic combinations within the league and no 
employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion 
except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion 
from the markets of the world may be vested in the league 
of nations itself as a moans of discipline and control. 

5. All international agreements and treaties of every 
kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of 
the world. 

]Mr. Lansing's letter was as follows : 

Washington, November 5, 1818 

:ti ***** * 

In my Note of October 23, 1918, 1 advised you that the 
President had transmitted his correspondence with the 
German authorities to the Governments with which 
the Government of the United States is associated as a 
belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Govern- 
ments were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and 
principles indicated, their military advisers and the 
military advisers of the United States be asked to submit 
to the Governments associated against Germany the 
necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully pro- 
tect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to 
the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to 
safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the 
German Government had agreed, provided they deemed 
such an armistice possible from the military point of view. 

The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of 
observations by the Allied Governments on this corre- 
spondence, which is as follows : 



PAST AND PRESENT 31 

" The Allied Governments have given careful considera- 
tion to the correspondence which has passed between 
the President of the United States and the German Govern- 
ment. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they 
declare their willingness to make peace with the Govern- 
ment of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the 
President's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and 
the principles of settlement enunciated in his subse- 
quent addresses. They must point out, however, that 
clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the free- 
dom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some 
of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, 
reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject 
when they enter the peace conference. 

"Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his 
address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President 
declared that invaded territories must be restored as 
well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments 
feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what 
this provision implies. By it, they understand that 
compensations will be made by Germany for all damages 
done to the civilian population of the Allies and their 
property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea 
and from the air." 

I am instructed by the President to say that he is in 
agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last 
paragraph of the memorandum above quoted. 

I am further instructed by the President to request 
you to notify the German Government that Marshal 
Foch has been authorized by the Government of the 
United States and the Allied Governments to receive 
properly accredited representatives of the German Gov- 
ernment, and to communicate to them the terms of an 
armistice. . . . 



CHAPTER II 



FOREIGN POLICY 



The policy of a nation necessarily reflects more 
or less the national character behind it. Those 
who direct it are merely average citizens who have 
been selected without reference to any special 
ability from a nmnber of men who had originally' ob- 
tained entrance into the diplomatic service by an 
examination test in average general Isjiowledge. 
After this intellectual test come the influences begot- 
ten of school and family connections on the one 
hand and an average intelligent obedience to higher 
officials who have gone through the same or simi- 
lar tests and training on the other. The traditions 
of any office thus necessarily tend to become stereo- 
typed and the mode of giving effect to them may 
be predicated with relative accuracy by any observer 
who is familiar with the average national intellect 
and more particularly that of the class concerned. 

In England the average intellect is dull but 
honest. School life is based on the development 
of character and a robust sort of honour which 
easily takes the external form of arrogance. The 
reputation abroad of British diplomacy is, however. 



FOREIGN POLICY 33 

and therefore, that though arrogant, it is straight- 
forward, well-meaning and trustworthy. In Ger- 
many diplomacy has endeavoured to follow the 
English example but the basis is different. Early 
training in that country is occupied with the acqui- 
sition of exact knowledge and habits of intellectual 
accuracy and the average German has a much more 
effective culture than the Englishman. The devel- 
opment of character is neglected and boys do not 
acquire in school that individual sense of honour 
which distinguishes English training. In many 
cases they are encouraged to play the part of traitor 
to each other. The master does not respect the 
privacy of the child nor are children expected to 
respect it among themselves. A child who reports 
the evil doings of a companion is not reproached, the 
principle being that the teacher ought to know 
everything about every child to be able to correct 
shortcomings before they grow into habits. 

This method has spread into the whole life of 
Germany. Clerks spy upon each other in offices; 
soldiers, even officers, spy upon each other in their 
daily life, and a faculty for spying has factitiously 
become characteristic of a whole people. Even 
in the exalted entourage of the Kaiser himself, 
there is none of that discreet respect for private 
conversation which is part of the training of the 
upper and higher middle-class Englishman. Yet 
in Germany to be like an Englishman is or was the 
aim of every well-born German. 

Among delusions nursed with admiration in 
Germany and fortified with historical examples 



34 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

is the idea that a ruthless pursuit of self-interest 
is the source of England's success among nations. 
This had developed into the worship of force and 
necessity. Necessity is merely a way of expressing 
that something is highly desirable and the use of 
force is justified to secure what is highly desirable. 
If physical force is not available or applicable, then 
superior cunning takes its place. ^ 

German diplomacy bears the marks of these 
initial shortcomings and while it brings a much 
more exhaustive and more accurate knowledge 
to bear in the treatment of international questions 
than the English, it falls far short of it in the faculty 

' A German manufacturer once showed me a card-box of handker- 
chiefs he had manufactured. Inside the box was a card bearing the 
words "Made in England" with initials. This had been inserted by 
the middleman. My friend did not condemn him as a rogue but ex- 
plained to me that the only way to get Germans to buy certain goods 
was to pass them off as English. Necessity justified tlie roguery or, 
as my friend said to call it, the stratagem, for the goods, he said, were 
certainly of better quality than could be had for the price had they been 
really "made in England." 

Another case of similar roguery was practised by one of the largest 
firms of electrical apparatus manufactiu"ers. They formed a small 
English company with an English name and paid a couple of English- 
men salaries to act as directors. They then issue<l their machines with 
the name of this English firm. The disk which bore its name was so 
fi>rmed that the words "Made in Germany" could be clipped off while 
lea\-ing the disk intact. The obvious object of this was to cheat the 
ultimate purchaser into thinking he bought a machine of English manu- 
facture. "Necessity", said the manager. The English purchaser 
wanted a good quality of machine. He had the mistaken notion that 
he could get this only from an English house. They created an English 
house to satisfy him and they merely used the addition to the disk to 
pass the Customs. The purchaser obtained a better article than he 
could have bought for the money if it had been made in England. He 
was not robbed. Far from it. He was merely humoured ! 



FOREIGN POLICY 35 

of inspiring a sense of its honesty, or respect and 
consideration on the part of others. 

From the point of view of general culture the 
French diplomatist is superior to both the English 
and German and he has the intellectual and social 
gifts of most Frenchmen which make him a favourite 
in every milieu into which he tumbles. As a diplo- 
matist he is "to the manor born" and if the pursuit 
of diplomacy were exclusively one of making friends 
for one's country, which it largely is, the French 
diplomatist would be easily first. In dealing with 
diflSculties when they arise, however, French diplo- 
matists are not equal to the cool-headed and obstinate 
Englishmen or to the accurate but more or less 
unscrupulous diplomatists of Germany. 

The diplomacy of the United States is based on a 
different principle from that of England, France 
or Germany, viz. : that of more or less permanency 
of the staff and subjection of the diplomatic chiefs 
to the party system. An American ambassador 
or minister plenipotentiary, like a member of the 
Cabinet, is regarded as having a close connection 
with the presidential policy and as such he is cho- 
sen from among his trusted political supporters. 
Though they have not always been successes, the 
same may be said of carriere diplomatists, while 
many of the American diplomatists have shown a 
greater ability for the understanding of their coun- 
try's material interests. The system of permanent 
counsellors, moreover, has proved its value and is 
worthy of accentuation as regards both prestige and 
rewards. 



36 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Wliile diplomacy is affected by training and 
class environment, national characteristics have 
their share in foreign policy generally. Thus na- 
tional sentiment plays a great part in the decisions 
of statesmen, who not only use it against one another 
as an excuse or disguise for pretensions not based 
on right or reason, but also in just cases of claim. 

National sentiment is the reason of the nuiltitude 
and while statesmen have responsibilities which 
forbid their sacrificing permanent interests to pass- 
ing waves of sentiment and pledging the future 
to the fluctuating feelings of contemporary crowds, 
they cannot neglect them without danger of being 
carried off their feet. It is, therefore, a part of 
the business of a statesman to utilise public senti- 
ment for the national interest or draw it into chan- 
nels in which it can flow oft' without jeopardising 
any permanent national interest. 

National ideals begotten of national sentiment 
like all other manifestations of national mentality 
are subject to the processes of evolution. Their 
seeds are planted by some contagious emotion, 
they grow in intensity to their full bloom and then 
their vitality declines, while more robust ideals 
of like origin, struggling into fruition, take their 
place. 

National ideals, be it said to the honour of mod- 
ern civilisation however, are the outcome of a high 
level of collective thinking. The American Declara- 
tion of Independence was a splendid vindication 
of the rights of peoples, but it was not a national 



FOREIGN POLICY 37 

manifestation. It was rather a manifestation in 
favour of the preservation of local liberties against 
encroachments of a central administration. To 
ascribe the French Revolution to any ideal, either 
specific or general, is to confuse cause and effect. 
Nothing we know of the French Revolution justifies 
the conclusion that it was anything but a revolt 
like the many revolts which have produced organic 
changes in national polity. Collective thinking 
was a reaction which succeeded the French Revo- 
lution as a part of the political revival of which it 
was the starting point. Successive reactions in 
France, Germany, England and the Netherlands 
during a period of peace after the upheaval produced 
a sort of racial crystallisation. Men speaking the 
same language began to be conscious that they 
had something in common ; the migration of agri- 
cultural populations into industrial centres and 
the growth of the newspaper made them articulate. 
With the building of railways the processes were 
accentuated ; nations as such began to exist and 
nationalism as a political idea forced itself on the 
attention of political thinkers. 

For half a century writers competed with each 
other in the interpretation of what was now appealed 
to as pubhc opinion. 

Since then we have passed through stages of 
State unification according to race and language. 
Dynasties gradually became mere adjuncts of 
this national development and now a new conscious- 
ness of the incompatibility of hereditary sovereignty 
with the freedom of self-government has suddenly 



38 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

led to the capsizing of the whole monarchical 
system in three empires without an attempt to 
save it. 

With the weakening of authority grew up the 
theory of the continuity of foreign policy — a 
continuity expounded by Lord Rosebery and ma- 
terialised by Sir Edward Grey but practised in 
France long before either. It seems destined to 
undergo the transformation which the undertaking 
of governments to abandon secret diplomacy implies. 

Foreign offices have always had traditional poli- 
cies, simply because they "descend" from official 
to official and involve the least individual initiative. 
No doubt if an incoming Ministry considers that 
the policy of its predecessors exposed the country 
to dangerous or costly difficulties, it is not likely 
to be guided by any theory of continuity or to 
refrain from a critical examination and balancing 
of the advantages and disadvantages of any previous 
line of conduct; and a strong Foreign Minister 
can shake off superannuated traditions and stereo- 
typed attitudes towards other countries. But 
after a Foreign Minister has been inhaling a Foreign 
Office atmosphere for a certain time, he seems, in 
spite of himself, to become sooner or later inoculated 
by it. Thus, even a far-seeing statesman like the 
late Lord Salisbury, when he was approached, in 
1901, by a very distinguished Frenchman as to 
placing the relations of his country and France 
on a permanent footing of amity, curtly replied : 
"C'est de I'utopie." It was the superannuated 



FOREIGN POLICY 39 

tradition of the British Foreign OflSce to regard 
France as an uncertain quantity, "one thing one 
day, another thing another ", with a pohcy as 
fluctuating as her governments, and a poUtical 
pendulum swinging wildly and sending the world 
round at far too great a speed for its good. 

The Foreign OflBce official is necessarily more or 
less bound by knowledge collected from the diplo- 
matic missions abroad. The chiefs of such mis- 
sions, however, seldom have any opportunity, even if 
they remain long enough in any post, of obtaining an 
intimate acquaintance with the country to which 
they are accredited. As a rule they are the last 
to know what is happening of importance to them 
because they are conspicuous.^ 

Exceptions, of course, there have always been. 
Lord Lyons was one, another was Lord Lytton, 
who had a keen understanding of French character. 
Nevertheless he did not succeed in breaking the 
continuity of British policy towards France or in 
reacting against the obvious Franco-Russian policy 
which a recent French "yellow book" has shown 
to have been in process of secret formation unsus- 
pected by him and the continuity of which, by the 
way, might have exposed France to disaster but for 
the accession to it of England, against whom the 
policy was more or less calculated to operate. 

It is barely twenty years since the relations be- 
tween Great Britain and France underwent this 
change. Popular feeling, which had been whirling 

^ A French diplomatist once described his position to me as that of 
a man going about with a danger warning on his top hat. 



40 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

round a vortex of indignation and hatred, as if 
the two nations were moved by subterranean forces 
as uncontrollable as those of unconscious Nature 
itself, exhausted itself and on the wave of reaction 
a new feeling was fostered by an active agitation 
which brought about a break in the continuity 
of the policies of both France and England and saved 
both from the horror of a war as terrible as the one 
which has just been brought to a close. 

The rise of Germany was a new and inconvenient 
factor in the official scheme of British policy. That 
she had a foreign policy at all, not to speak of a 
*'Welt-politik", which had to be reckoned with, 
aroused a sort of unconscious indignation at dis- 
turbance of time-honoured habits of political thought 
and the older foreign offices tried to deal with old 
problems which had existed before Germany as a 
*'Welt-staat" came upon the scene, without taking 
her into consideration. 

More suppleness, more accurate knowledge, more 
publicity, a wider-spread public interest in foreign 
affairs, a greater influence of the back benches of 
parliaments in external relations would possibly 
save nations from repetition of some errors, but 
the insistence by democracy on parliamentary 
control is the most promising reform on the horizon, 
because it may counteract the danger of drifting 
into those "spirited" foreign policies which ingen- 
ious, ambitious but irresponsible heads of depart- 
ments are prone to cultivate in the privacy of their 
offices and in which often a political chief finds 



FOREIGN POLICY 41 

himself entangled before he has mastered the details, 
complications and reactions of the national interests. 

One of the most dangerous consequences of 
detachment of diplomacy from parliamentary con- 
trol is the discretion left to Foreign Offices to enter 
into secret engagements binding States to coopera- 
tion and pledging their future often even without 
reference to the Cabinet itself, as we have seen re- 
vealed in the above-mentioned French "yellow 
book" on the Franco-Russian alliance. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER II 

Note on Pubuc Opinion and Foreign Policy in 
England 

The influences which atTect British pubhc opinion in 
international pohcy at present seem to be: 

(1) The Foreign Othce itself, which has a sort of 
traditional line of conduct in regard to each country and 
question, and of which the Foreign Minister is the spokes- 
man ; 

(^'2) The responsible Press which looks for guidance 
to the Foreign Oflice clerks to whom its writers have 
access ; 

(3) The more or less competent critics who examine 
questions freely in the reviews and a few men\bers of 
the House of Parliament who take an interest in such 
subjects tmd some of whom, though possessing more than 
usual competency, are heard, occasionally at any rate, 
witJiin the Houses themselves. 

Note on Interest of British Press in Foreign 

POIJCY 

In his valuable volume entitled "Common Sense in 
Foreign Policy", page 4, Sir Harry Johnston observes: 

"The new press has concerned itself more and more 
with questions of Foreign Policy. Leading iirticles and 
communiques, inspired by the highest authorities in 
England and potentates abroad, have begim. with the 



FOREIGN POLICY 43 

new century, to appear in other journals as well as in 
the Times: In the Daily Telegraph, Daily Chronicle, 
Morning Post, Daily Mail, Daily Graphic, Standard, 
Westminster Gazette, Pall Mall and Star; In the Man- 
chester Guardian, Yorkshire Post, Scotsman, Northern 
Whig of Belfast, Birmingham Post, Western Morning 
News and Liverpool Courier." 

Note on Germany's and Russia's Geographical 
Situation 

Germany was sandwiched in between England and the 
Russian Empire. Both held positions which the War 
is not likely to change essentially, because of their situa- 
tion both demographically and geographically. The one 
has an overflowing population in an overcrowded area 
and the other an immense area, thinly peopled. Ger- 
many was becoming overpeopled but her overflow tended 
rather westwards than eastwards, because German indus- 
trial education turned out artisans more in demand in 
highly civilized than among under-civilized peoples, 
not to speak of their own preference for countries not 
subject to either political or religious persecution. 

As regards Russia, it may be useful to consider her 
geographical position in connection with her foreign policy. 
Russia is ice-bound for several months of the year. Arch- 
angel is closed to traffic from September to April, Kron- 
stadt from December to April and Vladivostock sees its 
shores covered with a thin crust of ice from December till 
April, though the Peter the Great Gulf on which it stands 
does not freeze. 

Russia's attempt to get into the Pacific at Port Arthur 
was frustrated by Japan, her attempts to reach Con- 
stantinople were frustrated by the Western Powers, and 
to reach the Persian Gulf by England. 



44 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Russian statesmen, obliged to keep foreign war in 
reserve for the maintenance of autocracy, have made 
it a principle of their foreign policy to seek an outlet 
to ports accessible to navigation throughout the year, 
and owing to lack of opposition to expansion eastwards 
across Northern Asia, Russia has extended her dominion 
across the vast continent to the ocean. 

Russia is now confronted on the eastern as well as 
on western sides by Powers which are in greater need 
than she of colonisable areas for their growing popula- 
tions. On the east as on the west, she is being driven 
from the sea. This lateral pressure may bring Russia 
to concentrate her policy on the historic effort south- 
wards. The dangers to the future of closing the valves 
of expanding population or trade are too obvious to 
require emphasis and are still too vague to be dealt with 
in detail. It is to the interest of the future that they 
shall not be overlooked. 



CHAPTER III 

DIPLOMACY, SECRET TREATIES AND NEGOTIATIONS 

President Wilson has evidently concluded after 
careful examination of numerous historic cases 
that secret clauses hidden from the public view 
and entered into for the purpose of disguise of some 
kind are a danger to peace and has therefore pre- 
scribed among his conditions of peace : 

"Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after 
which there shall be no private international under- 
standings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed 
always frankly and in the public view." 

The President no doubt had more especially 
in view the different agreements between Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, the more or less secret na- 
ture of which excited distrust throughout Europe 
at the time and led to the dividing of Europe into 
two hostile camps under the guise of a "balance of 
power", which less acute historians had not per- 
ceived had never led, either in Greek times, or in 
Italy when the idea was revived, or in the eighteenth 
century in northern Europe, or, as has now been 
shown, in our own times, to the assurance of peace 
but always ultimately to war. 



46 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

And with that independence which characterises 
him, the President has no doubt had misgivings 
as to what may have been the eti'ect of the secret 
clauses annexed to the Anglo-French agreement 
of 1904, which potentially negatived the effect 
of the agreement published to the world. As it is 
possible that the President had these clauses, which 
affected the trade of the LTuited States, as they did 
all other trades, also in view, I may remind the 
reader that they related to Egypt and Morocco 
and that the two contracting powers agreed that 
any alteration of status of the one Power, viz. : 
Great Britain in Egypt ; or of the other, viz. : France 
in Morocco, would release them from their reciprocal 
self-denying engagements. In other words they 
foreshadowed the protectorates and practical annexa- 
tions which have now been effected. 

He has now further material for reflection in the 
revelations made in the new French "yellow book" 
as to secret engagements between the French and 
Russian governments which were hidden for several 
years entirely from the public view, and the exact 
nature of which has only just been made known. 

Apart from the fact that to conceal any inter- 
national engagements binding a nation is an insult 
to its intelligence, concealment is a violation of a 
first principle of democratic government, viz. : that 
national consent, direct or indirect, can alone 
pledge it to action. No doubt the advocates of a 
different view maintain that in the process of evolu- 
tion democracy necessarily inherits the practices 



SECRET TREATIES AND NEGOTIATIONS 47 

of foreign offices and diplomacy and thus also gives 
tacit consent to that practice till deliberately can- 
celled. Mr. Wilson would, no doubt, reply : It 
is time to cancel it deliberately. But, before 
finally making up our minds to pole-axe the abom- 
ination, let us look a little more closely into the 
subject and try, at any rate, to avoid regretful 
precipitation. 

It must, I think, be conceded that the object 
of secrecy is necessarily to conceal an ultimate 
purpose, object or contingency from the knowledge 
of others whose interests might lead them to raise 
objections, or take up some antagonistic attitude. 
Merely to suspect or have good reason to suspect 
the existence of secret clauses, though their precise 
character be unknown, may therefore lead, even 
oblige other governments to take action or prepare 
to take action to protect their interests and defeat 
the suspected purpose. 

Who, for instance, knows whether possible secret 
understandings between the German and other 
governments with a view to appeasing the former 
after discovery of the secret clauses of 1904, sus- 
pected understandings which at the time excited 
the Portuguese Government and shortly afterwards 
startled the Italian Government, were not at the 
bottom of Italy's anxiety to set up a fait accompli 
against any attempt to frustrate another secret 
understanding which had recognised her priority 
in the Tripolitaine whenever it should be available, 
and did not lead her, with such unseemly and unjust 
precipitation, into the war with Turkey? 



48 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Without much casuistry it would be possible 
to connect these secret agreements, imderstandings 
and eventualities with one another and evolve out 
of them a sequence of cause and effect culminating 
in the complete breakdown and present discredit 
of European diplomacy which instead of averting 
bungled into mere bludgeonry. 

One more word about secret clauses before we 
pass to another aspect of secrecy : It is difficult 
to keep them secret for long. Any one who, like 
myself, has made a lifelong study of diplomacy 
and its methods, especially as an outsider unbound 
by Foreign Office restrictions, will testify that 
there is no such thing as absolute secrecy. The 
fact that several persons are necessarily "in the 
know" or more or less "in the know" soon begets 
a rumour. The rumour spreads, the suspected 
clauses grow in magnitude with the effect to justify 
apprehension, and eventually they lead to that 
vague unrest to which international trouble can 
nearly always be traced. President Wilson is 
right to place them at the top of the scale in his 
attempt to summarise the matters affecting the 
future peace of the world. 

When President Wilson says "diplomacy shall 
proceed always frankly and in the public view", 
he has no doubt in mind the American system of 
addressing Congress and the nation at every step 
in the progress of any matter of foreign policy, a 
system of which he himself is not only a consistent ex- 
ponent but has shown himself a consistent practiser. 



SECRET TREATIES AND NEGOTIATIONS 49 

Interpretations may have warranted the idea 
that President Wilson aimed at the suppression 
of diplomatic action and that, in connection with 
negotiations for peace there must be no privacy. 
This is certainly a misconstruction. The Presi- 
dent cannot but know that in the course of a war 
or even in the midst of any ordinary heated inter- 
national controversy, argument in public is neces- 
sarily tinged with its glow and it is in the detached 
coolness of privacy and even secrecy alone that pre- 
liminaries and details can be effectively discussed. 

I have been so often behind the scene of such 
diplomatic preliminaries that I can bear witness 
to a practice which we might call a method, were 
it not simply the necessary consequence of cir- 
cumstances beyond need of an act of volition. 

The first step to peace in the course of a war is 
the prise de contact. This may be through a common 
neutral friend or through two friends technically 
enemies. Several efforts of this kind had been 
made during the recent conflict. If they have 
failed, it has been through faulty selection of men, 
error in the choice of the moment, or through at- 
tempting to start negotiations before the prise de 
contact was firm. To make a prise de contact effect- 
ual, it is essential that it shall be absolutely secret, 
covered by some different object which conclusively 
explains it, such as meeting to arrange exchange of 
prisoners or their treatment, or to -deal with Red 
Cross understandings, or for any other purpose, 
official or private, which can serve to disguise the 
object. Any open proceeding would obviously 



50 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

create false hope and might seriously interfere 
with the national morale, which as every one knows 
counts for much in the prosecution of war. 

The prine de contact satisfactorily established, 
the belligerents can talk with one another and seek 
jointly the bases of negotiation. If these secret 
non-binding agents are two old friends, as may 
be — as ought to be — the case, they will know 
one another well enough to venture on frankness. 
The secret history of wars of the past has shown 
the difficulty of reaching even elementary bases 
of negotiation. It took ten years of such efforts 
to bring the Powers engaged in the Thirty Years' 
War down to the point of signing preliminaries. 
For before preliminaries are signed by accredited 
agents of their governments, the prise de contact 
must have eventuated in pourparlers of an imbinding 
character leaving negotiators and governments alike 
perfectly free, and this may involve many secret 
meetings before the propitious moment arrives 
when suitable draft preliminaries can be submitted 
and agreed to. Thereafter only can the official 
diplomacy safely step on to the stage. 

It is not likely that President \\'ilson was opposed 
to a procedure which is also that of any important 
business operation in private life. All he probably 
had in mind was that no secret agreements be made 
finally binding upon nations without their knowledge 
and consent. The experience of late years and 
modern notions of democratic government cannot 
but encourage the President to insist on this public- 
ity in the interest of civilised mankind. 



SECRET TREATIES AND NEGOTIATIONS 51 

Between secrecy and publicity there arc many 
stages of privacy and discretion of a relative character 
and responsible Ministers take opportunities of lift- 
ing the veil in answers to questions in Parliament, 
communications through newspapers and speeches 
on the platform or at banquets. By a strange sur- 
vival and anomaly, however, the British Parliament 
is practically the only parliament of any nation hav- 
ing pretensions to be regarded as "free" in President 
Wilson's sense that exercises no parliamentary con- 
trol over the most momentous issues which can en- 
gage the lives, treasure and honour of a people. 

It is true that there has been a revolt among 
younger and more progressive members of Parlia- 
ment against leaving momentous international issues 
to the uncontrolled discretion of their respective 
Foreign Offices. 

The only consequence down to now of this revolt 
has been to induce politicians to pay more attention 
than they have hitherto done to foreign affairs. 

In France, in 1902, for the purpose of enabling 
private members to take an active part alongside 
the Ministers in the preparatory part of legislation 
and the examination of suggestions and amend- 
ments, sixteen grand committees were appointed, 
among which practically all the special work of 
Parliament was divided up. One of these deals 
exclusively with foreign affairs, protectorates and 
colonies. Members of it, it is true, complain 
that they are not consulted more frequently or 
more consecutively, but they, nevertheless, keep 
a close watch on the work which is in train at the 



51 COLL.VPSE .VND RECONSTRUCTION 

Quai D'Orsay, and all proposed troaty ongago- 
meuts a 10 necessarily referred to the coniniittee 
under Fi-endi parliamentary procedure. Though 
this is done generally only after the country is 
practically pledged, the nunnbers of the coniniittee. 
all the same, obtain post Juk' experience of the special 
work allotted to them, and can receive ministerial 
explanations, when there may be doubt or hesita- 
tion, which it would be ditiicult to furnish in public. 
This in turn covers to some extent the foreign minis- 
ter's responsibility. Nothing prevents him. more- 
over, from anticipating criticism even in the course 
of negotiations by conference with the committee. 

In the United States Senate, the Foreign Relations 
Committee is in still closer contact with tlie State 
Department, and by no means confines itself to 
registering the acts of the Secretary of State. So 
strongly do American statesmen and politicians 
view the need of parliamentary control over foreign 
atfairs that no clause in the American Constitution 
is more jealously enforced than that which requires 
Senatorial approval for all international engage- 
ments of the I'nited States. Senatorial debates 
on such matters are usually conducted with closed 
doors, and nothing is more interesting to the British 
visitor to the Capitol than the frequency of these 
secret executive sittings. 

Recent events seem to slunv the desirability of the 
institution of a special committee of the House 
of Commons for foreign relations, which, recruited 
without party preference, should be able to com- 
municate its views as a whole, as well as the views 



SECRET TREATIES AND NEGOTIATIONS 53 

of individual mombors of it, to the Foreign Secretary 
as a mailer of rigid and not as one of mere sulYer- 
ance. There are many members of Parliament 
who luive business interests in different eouidries 
vvliieh bring them into close contact with these 
countries, and enable them to obtain a greater 
personal experience of British interests in connection 
with tliem than ])nblie oflicials, however efficient, 
ever have a chance of obtaining. The fact that a 
certain number of competent representatives of 
the country in the House of Commons were J^aying 
special and eft'ective attention to the national 
interests abroad would have a reassuring effect 
among the electorate. Such a committee, moreover, 
would serve as a nursery for the training of a cer- 
tain number of members of Parliament in foreign 
affairs, and this again would enable these mem- 
bers to create throughout the country a greater 
and more intelligent interest in our foreign relations. 
The public has undoubtedly begun to feel, especially 
in the north of England, that foreign affairs are 
conducted in a manner not suited to the repre- 
sentative character of the institutions of a self- 
governing country. The cooperation of an advi- 
sory committee of Parliament would certainly help 
the Foreign Office to bring British foreign policy 
into closer harmony with the national feeling and 
interests, and it would meet to a great extent charges 
of the inadequacy of diplomacy, when, as often, it is 
bound to fail, not through its incompetency, but 
tlu-ough the ignorance of those who have the dicta- 
tion of the policy to be pursued. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER III 

ixv101-\b1l1ty of treaties 
Suggestions for Addition to the Agreement of 1871 

Whereas allegations of violation of treaty engagements 
are snbject to so many qualitieations and counter allega- 
tions that all the H. C V. may confess to some measure 
of guilt in the past, and whereas for the future they all 
soleumly once more pledge themselves to strict observance 
of all Treaty engagements and agree to revive and uphold 
the protocol signed in London on January 17, 1S71, 
which is as follows : 

The Plenipotentiaries of North Germany, of Austria- 
Hungary, of Great Britain, of Italy, of Russia, and of 
Turkey, assembled today in conference, recognize that it 
is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power 
can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty 
nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the con- 
sent of the (Contracting Powers by means of an amicable 
arrangement. 

In faith whereof the said Plenipotentiaries have signed 
the present Protocol. 

Whereas, however, it is not reasonable to bind States, 
under the more or less rapidly changing circumstances 
of the modern world to perpetual observance of all the 
engagements they may cuter into with other States; 

Whereas it is one of the connnonplaces of diplomacy 
to allege the absence of any moral cogency binding a 
Party to a Treaty obtained under duress ; 



SECRET TREATIES AND NEGOTIATIONS 55 

Whereas among the sanctions which have been proposed 
or suggested for enforcing observance of international 
agreements, none can liave the weight of a solemn under- 
taking made freely before the whole world present and 
future to honestly and conscientiously observe such 
agreements and in case of un workability or obsolescence, 
or desirability of release, to resort to some procedure for 
the revision of such agreements ; 

Whereas, therefore, to enable States to revise inter- 
national agreements or any clauses thereof, not on juridical 
grounds but on grounds of expediency, alteration of cir- 
cumstances, ethnical, demographic, commercial, social, 
liygienic or other ; 

It is agreed to make the following addition to the 
Protocol of 1871, viz. : 

If any of the H. C. P. shall desire on any ground what- 
soever to so liberate itself from any Treaty engagement 
or to obtain a modification thereof, it shall give notice 
accordingly to the other or all other Contracting Parties 
with a full statement of the grounds upon which such 
release or modification is demanded and the Contracting 
Parties shall within reasonable time reply thereto. 

In case of any difference of opinion the respective 
statements shall be submitted for advice and recommenda- 
tion to some authority to be created under the Constitu- 
tion of the Society of Nations. 



Suggested Agreement as Regards Secret Treaties 
AND Clauses 

Whereas the object of secret treaties or clauses is 
to conceal from parties other than those immediately 
concerned objects likely to excite the opposition of such 
others or be prejudicial to their interests ; 

And whereas when they come to light they necessarily 



56 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

cause resentment and are a cause of international em- 
bitterment ; 

And whereas the possibiUty of entering into such 
secret clauses or treaties is a cause of international dis- 
trust and the bare suspicion thereof may be a cause of 
taking precautions against them and this reciprocal action 
accentuates bad feeling wherever it may exist ; 

Whereas, nevertheless, the affairs of nations can only 
be conducted in accordance with the practice of negotia- 
tions between individuals, but whereas, a reputation for 
honesty in business averts distrust, suspicion and bad 
feeling and induces a frank and friendly attitude even 
where the solution of differences may be difficult, there 
is equal reason to believe the effect of such conduct 
in the transaction of business between States would be 
similar ; 

Whereas, however, there may be secret agreements 
which are merely secret in the sense that they are of no 
concern to others but those immediately interested and 
these are not to be regarded as agreements deliberately 
concealed from other States and are beyond the scope 
of this present undertaking and pledge ; 

Whereas it is a principle of the sovereignty of the 
people that its future action shall never be pledged 
without its knowledge ; 

Whereas even merely informal moral or ad referendum 
engagements pledge a nation's honour; 

It is agreed as follows : 

The H. C. P. solemnly pledge themselves not to enter 
into any secret agreements which shall be contrary in 
effect or sense to agreements made with other States or 
to agreements communicated to or made known directly 
or indirectly to other States ; 

And they further solemnly pledge themselves to regard 



SECRET TREATIES AND NEGOTIATIONS 57 

honesty, truth and sincerity In international concerns 
and in the observance of international undertakings, even 
verbal promises, as a principle of conduct sacred to the 
maintenance of national honour and they agree, in case 
of any alleged violation of such principle, to the submission 
of the question to a Court of Honour or some other author- 
ity to be instituted in connection with the Society of 
Nations. 



CHAPTER IV 

EVOLUTION OP THE UNITED STATEs' FOREIGN POLICY 

Washington's famous Farewell Address is a 
much used and much abused document. Frag- 
ments of it are often quoted and from time to time 
the text is twisted into arguments more or less 
foreign to its nature. For more than a century it 
has served, in fact, as a guiding line for all the 
Presidents. As the basis of American foreign 
policy, it is necessarily the starting point of any 
study of this policy. Its language is so simple, 
clear and dignified and its counsels are so apposite 
to the present scheme that it would be mere super- 
erogation to attempt to present it in any paraphrased 
abridgment or any but its own form. I therefore 
quote the whole of that part of it which is essential 
to this work : 

"Here," said Washington, "perhaps, I ought to 
stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which cannot 
end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger, 
natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion 
like the present, to offer to your solemn contempla- 
tion, and to recommend to your frequent review, 
some sentiments, which are the result of much 
reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and 



UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 59 

which appear to me all-important to the permanency 
of your felicity as a People. These will be offered 
to you with the more freedom, as you can only see 
in them the disinterested warnings of a parting 
friend, who can possibly have no personal motive 
to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encour- 
agement to it, your indulgent reception of my senti- 
ments on a former and not dissimilar occasion. 

"Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every 
ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of 
mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attach- 
ment, 

"The unity of Government, which constitutes 
you one people, is also now dear to you. It is 
justly so; for it is a main pillar in the edifice of 
your real independence, the support of your tran- 
quillity at home, your peace abroad ; of your safety ; 
of your prosperity ; of that very Liberty, which you 
so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee, that, 
from different causes and from different quarters, 
much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, 
to weaken in your minds the conviction of this 
truth ; as this is the point in your political fortress 
against which the batteries of internal and external 
enemies will be most constantly and actively (though 
often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of 
infinite moment, that you should properly estimate 
the immense value of your national Union to your 
collective and individual happiness ; that you should 
cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attach- 
ment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and 
speak of it as of the Palladium of your political 



GO coi.L.vrsi: am> uixoNsrui c riox 

safety ami prosperity; watohiui;" for its prosorvation 
willi jealous anxiety; diseoiiutenaueing whatever 
may sui;i;est even a sus[>ieioii. that it c:u\ in any 
e\"iMit be abandoned; and indignantly frowning 
upon the tirst dawnini;' of every at ten>pt to aUenate 
any pi>rtiiM\ of our eountry from the rest, or to 
tMifeeble the sai'red ties whieh now Hnk togi^ther the 
various parts. 

"For this you have every iuihieement of sympathy 
and interest. C^iti/.ens. by birth or ehi>iee. of a 
eonunon country, tliat eountry has a richt to eou- 
i'enlrate your atVeetious. The name of American, 
wiiicli beK>ni::s to you. in your national capacity, 
must always exalt the just pride of Patriotism, 
more than any appellation ilerivcd from local 
discriminations. \Vith sliuht shailes of ditVerence, 
you have the same relijiion. manners, habits, anil 
political principles. You ha\e in a common cause, 
fouiiht and triumphed together; the Independence 
ami Liberty you possess are the work of joint coun- 
sels, anil joint etVorts. of common dangers. sutVer- 
iugs, and successes. . . . 

"It is important, likewise, that the habits of 
thinking in a free country should inspire caution, 
in those intrusted with its administration, to contine 
themselves within their respective constitutional 
spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of 
one department, to encroach upon another. The 
spirit of encroachment tcTids to consolidate the 
powers of all the departments in one. and thus to 
create, whatever the form of government, a real 
despotism. A just estimate of that love of power. 



UNITED STATES' lORETCN POLICY Gl 

jiri<l |)r()ii(*n('s.s lo jihiisc II, which prcdorninalcs in 
llic Imrn.iti liciirl, is ,sii(Ii(i<'rit to sjiiisfy us of lliir 
irulli of iJiis position. Tlic necessity of recif)rocHl 
checks in the exercis(; of f)olitical power, by (Jividing 
and distrihiiting it into different dei)osit()ries, and 
conslituling each th(^ (iuardian of Pnhhc Weal 
against invasions hy the otliers, has been evinced 
by experiments ancient and modern ; some of them 
in our own country and under our own eyes, 'i'o 
preserve them must be as necessary as to institute 
them. If, in the opinion of tire people, the dis- 
tril)uti()n or modification of the constitutional 
powers b(^ in any particular wrong, let it Ix; (;or- 
rected by an amendment in the way, wliich the 
constitution designates. But let there be no change 
by usuri)ation ; for, though this, in one instance, 
may b(! tlie instrument of good, it is the customary 
weaj)on by wJiieh fr(;(; governments are destroyed. 
The precedent must always greatly overljalance 
in fxTmanent evil any partial or transient benefit, 
which the use can at any time yield. . . . 

"Observe good faith and justice towards all 
Nations ; cultivate peace and harmony with all. 
Religion and Morality enjoin this conduct ; and 
can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin 
it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, 
at no distant period, a great Nation, to give to man- 
kind the magnanimous and too novel example of a 
people always guided by an exalted justice and 
benevolence. Who can doubt, that, in the course of 
time and things, th(! fruits of such a plan would 
richly repay any temporary advantages, which 



62 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

might be lost by a steady adlierence to it ? Can it 
be, that Providence has not connected the perma- 
nent felicity of a Nation with its Virtue? The 
experiment, at least, is recommended by every 
sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas ! 
is it rendered impossible by its vices ? . . . 

"Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence 
(I conjure you to believe me, fellow citizens,) the 
jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly 
awake ; since history and experience prove, that 
foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes 
of Republican Government. But that jealousy, to 
be, useful, must be impartial ; else it becomes the 
instrument of the very influence to be avoided, 
instead of a defence against it. Excessive partiality 
for one foreign nation, and excessive dislike of 
another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger 
only on one side, and serve to veil and even second 
the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, 
who may resist the intrigues of the favorite, are 
liable to become suspected and odious ; while its 
tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence 
of the people, to surrender their interest. 

"The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to 
foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial 
relations, to have with them as little political 
connection as possible. So far as we have already 
formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with 
perfect good faith. Here let us stop. 

"Europe has a set of primary interests, which 
to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence 
she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the 



UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 63 

causes of which are essentially foreign to our con- 
cerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to 
implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary 
vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combina- 
tions and collisions of her friendships or enmities. 

"Our detached and distant situation invites 
and enables us to pursue a different course. If we 
remain one people, under an efficient government, 
the period is not far off, when we may defy material 
injury from external annoyance ; when we may 
take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality, 
we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously 
respected ; when belligerent nations, under the 
impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will 
not lightly hazard the giving us provocation ; when 
we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided 
by justice, shall counsel. . . . 

"In offering to you, my countrymen, these 
counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare 
not hope that they will make the strong and lasting 
impression I could wish; that they will control 
the usual current of the passions, or prevent our 
nation from running the course which has hitherto 
marked the destiny of nations. But, if I may even 
flatter myself, that they may be productive of 
some partial benefit, some occasional good ; that 
they may now and then recur to moderate the fury 
of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of 
foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures 
of pretended patriotism ; this hope will be a full 
recompense for the solicitude for your welfare, by 
which they have been dictated." 



(U COLLAPSE AND RECONSTKUCTION 

Wlioovor has carofiilly road this pohtical "tosta- 
nionr* of the tirst rivsiclont of the State which had 
just boon ovoatod will know nioro of tho I'nitod 
Statos' poHoy than may bo gathorod from any othor 
sonroo. Washington's suocossors havo drawn as 
nuioh inspiration from it as from tho Constitution 
itsolf. Whon tho Cuban AVar liroughl tho annoxa- 
tion of tho rhihppinos, authors and poHtioians on 
both sidos appoalod to it. but novor at any limo 
was tho morally lunding natm-o of tho Farowoll 
Aildross oallod into quostion. In tho oaso of tho 
rhilippinos tho issuo was wholhor tho Unitod Statos 
should abandon for transient advantagos tho porn\a- 
nont advantago of thoir goographioal situation on 
a continont oomplotoly dotaohod from tlu^ othor 
hirgo oontinont which extends from the western 
extremity of Europe through Asia to Japan. 

Mr. ^Yilson. like all his predecessors, has sought 
in tho Farowoll Address directions for guidance, 
in circumstances as critical as they n\ay bo docoptive. 
Washington had advised avoidance of any inter- 
ference or partiality in F.uropoan wars as a funda- 
mental principle from which it would bo dangerous 
to depart, of any partiality which might cause men 
to see danger on one side while seconding artitice 
or influence on tho othor. lie had foreseen tho time 
when the I'nitod Statos might havo to ailopt the atti- 
tude necessary to onforoe rospoet for tho neutrality 
they might havo to dtvlare. when belligerent nations 
wonhl not lightly hazard the giving of provocation, 
when tho Unitod Statos might havo to choose peace 
or war as thoir inlorost guided by justice might entail. 



UNIIT.D STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 65 

These counsels of wisdom are at ilie back of all 
President, Wilson's jironouncenients, behind all liis 
actions and liesilations, and Press connnentaries 
or criticisms have been rather commentaries on or 
criticisms of general ])rinciples of American policy 
than of the particular ])olicy of the man who for 
the time being is the Chief of the Executive Power. 

This policy of detachment and noninterference 
in European affairs necessarily implied the corollary 
that it was not expedient to allow European Powers 
to imjiort into America their ambitions and quarrels. 
It became the privilege of President INTonroe to 
give expression to this principle in the course of a 
message to Congress on December 2, 1823. It 
seemed opportune, he said, clearly to assert as a 
principle of the United States' foreign policy the 
proposition that "the American continents by the 
free and independent condition which they have 
assumed and maintain are henceforth not to be 
considered as subjects for future colonization by 
any European power. We owe it therefore to 
candor and to the amicable relations existing between 
the United States and these powers to declare that 
we should consider any attempt on their part to 
extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere 
as dangerous to our peace and safety. W^itli the 
existing colonies or dependencies of any European 
power we have not interfered and shall not inter- 
fere. But with the Governments who have declared 
their independence and maintain it, and whose 
intlependence we liave on great consideration and 



(U> COLLAPSE AND KKCONSirvLC^ llOX 

tMi just principles, ackmnvloilged, >vo could not view 
any interposition for the pnrpose of oppressing 
them or eonlroUing in any other manner their des- 
tiny l\v any European power in any other liglit than 
as the manifestation of an unfriendly tlispositiou 
to\Yard the United States." 

This declaration of President ^lonroe, known as 
the iNIonroe Doctrine, was made at a tin\e when the 
French Ciovernment was preparing an expedition 
to Spain, ^fr. Canning, then British Secretary for 
Foreign Atfairs, signilicd his country's intention to 
remain neutral on certain conditions, among which 
was the one that France should not attempt to 
annex any of the Spanish Colonies. The French 
expedition resulted in the reinst a lenient of the 
legitimist dynasty in Spain, Fearing a possible 
union between the two related dynasties, dreat 
Britain deelarcil that, though she would not inter- 
vene between Spain and her American colonies, 
she nevertheless consiilered that help given by 
any foreign l^ower to Spain's expedition against 
tliese colonies would constitr.le a new question in 
reference to which Ilis ]Majesty's Government 
would take sucli decision as Great Britain's interest 
required. 

]Mr. C^anning had already informed the United 
States' ^Minister in London, then INlr. Rush, of a 
proposal he had in contemplation to make after 
the l^vnch expedition to Spain, with a view to the 
holding of some congress, meeting or conference for 
the settlement of matters aifecting South America. 
In his convcrsatious on the subject with Mr. Rush, 



IJNirKl) SI AIRS' forei(;n rOlJCY G7 

Mr. Canning i)roi)0.sc(J iJuiL the United States Gov- 
crnnicnl, sliould u^rce wilh llie Government of (Jlrcat 
JJrilaIn lo ])role,sl .'igaliisl. any aelion wlileli miglit 
endanger the n(;w Soutli American repuhlics. Mr. 
lliish, wliile a(hnil ling that any attempt on the part 
of France and tlie (^ontinenlal Alliance to reassert 
Euroj)ean supremacy over the new rei)u])lics would 
he "an act of national injustice disclosing a very 
aJjirmiiig progressive amhillon", wiis nevertheless 
of I lie o])inion that to join Great IJritain in tlie 
proposed protest would seem contrary to the tradi- 
tional policy of the United States of standing aloof 
from European })()lltlcal affairs. Mr. Canning was 
insist(Mit. The Unlled States were the master 
power on llie American continent. They were 
in close relalion with Sj)aiiish America l)y their 
geograi)hical i)osition as well as witJi Europe by 
their intercourse ; and they were also hound to 
the new States of South America by political ties. 
Wjis it possible that they could stand aloof while 
the fale of these new Slates was being settled by 
Europe? Had not a modification taken place 
in the United States' i)Osition towards Europe, 
which Euroi)e itself was bound to recognise? Were 
the great political and commercial interests hang- 
ing on the fate of the new continent to be debated 
and directed in tin's hemisphere without the co- 
oi)eration or even the knowledge of the United 
States? Were they to be debated and directed 
without some prior agreement between the United 
States and Great Britain, the two leading commercial 
and maritime powers of the two worlds ? 



On ivcoipt of ^Iv. Kiish's dospatchos, IVcsidont 
^loiiroo sont ^Ir. Canning's oorrosponilonco to Mr. 
JotVorson anil ^[r. Madison, the most eminent 
Anioriean statesmen of the ilay, to ask their advice. 

JNlr. JetVerson's reply throws a eerlain light on 
the present poliey to whieh. without laying too 
nuieh stress on it. I nevertheless eall the reader's 
attention. 

The qnestion was the most important that had 
been snbmitted for his consideration sinee the 
i|Ui\stion of independence. "This c^ne," said he, 
"made ns a nation and the other will set om* com- 
pass and point to the eonrse we are to follow across 
the seas of time lying before ns ami never eonld 
we have sailed towards onr goal in more propitions 
eircnmstances. Ouv tirst fnndamental maxim nnist 
be never to obtrnde npon Knropean dispntes; onr 
second, never to sntl'er Knrope to meddle with 
cisatlantic atfairs. North and Sonth America 
have a series of interests ilistinct from those of 
Europe and which are proper to itself. For that 
reason, Enrope and America nnist have separate 
and distinct systems; while the former labonrs 
to become the seat of despotism, onr etVorts shonld 
certainly tend to make onr hemisphere the home of 
liberty. 

"C>ne nation, especially, eonld distnrb ns in the 
prosecntion of this goal and she now otVers to gnide, 
to help and accompany ns. l>y acceding to her 
reqnest we shonld detach her from Knropean com- 
binations, we shonhl throw that nation's weight 
in the scales of free i:;overnment and, at one stroke. 



UNriEl) STATES' FOREIGN POLICY OJ) 

we sliould einaiicij)aio Ji continent wlncli otherwise 
ml^lil liinguisli for ii loii<^' lime in unecrlMiiily jind 
dillieulLies. (jieat IJriUiin is tlie nation wliieli can 
do us most harm among the nations of the worhl, 
whereas, if slie is with us, we need not fear the wliole 
world. Tt is ini])orlant, tluTefore, for us to enter- 
tain willi (Ircjit IJrilain i(>lali()ns of eorchal friend- 
ship and nolln'ii^' wonld licl]) lo liglilen I lie ties of 
afl'eclion so nnieh as to fi^hl once more in the same 
cause. Not that I wonld pm-ehase its friendship 
by taking j)art in its wars. Hut tlie war in which the 
present ])roj)osal could involve us, if war were to 
come of it, would nol he I^'.ngland's war hul ours. 
The object is to iulroduce and to establish the 
American system of kee])ing away from our con- 
tinent all foreign Powt^-s, of never allowing European 
Powers to meddle with our peoples' affairs. It is 
a question of vindicating our own princij)le not of 
departing from it, and if, in order to facilitate the 
realization of this scheme, we can create a division 
in the European camp and bring on our side its 
most powerful member, we nuist surely do so. But, 
I am entirely of Mr. Camiing's opinion that this 
step will ])revent war rather than y)rovoke it. The 
moment Great Britain would be taken away from 
their side and thrown on this one, the whole of 
Europe combined would not dare to undertake such 
a war, for how indeed could these Powers attack 
either of these two enemies, without some superior 
fleet. And we must also not neglect this oppor- 
tunity to enter our j)rotest against the other vio- 
kitions of the rights of all nations perpetrated as a 



70 COLLAPSE .VXD RECONSTRUCTION 

result of the interference of any one whatsoever 
.in his neighbour's home affairs, these violations so 
shamelessly begun by Buonaparte and now con- 
tinued by the Alliance which dubs itself *Holy* 
and which is as little respectful as he was of justice." 
Mr. Madison shared Mr. Jefferson's views in 
another letter which is not so important. 

For the purpose of this article it is unnecessary 
to retrace the vicissitudes through which the prin- 
ciples in question have passed, nor need I recall 
the United States' attitude in the crisis created by 
the French intervention in Mexico. The ]Monroe 
Doctrine could only become a hard and fast rule of 
American policy after the consolidation of central 
government after the close of the Civil War. 

It is sufficient to say that the policy of noninter- 
vention in European affairs and its corollary, the 
Monroe Doctrine, have been the keystone of the 
foreign policy of the United States for a century 
devoted to the internal development of unparalleled 
material resources. 

"Up to the jiresent," said Mr. Olney in his famous 
despatch of August 7, 1895, on the Venezuela 
question, '* we have been spared in oiu' history the 
evils and burdens attendant upon immense armies 
and all the other accessories of large war establish- 
ments, and this exemption has contributed in no 
small measure to our national greatness and pros- 
perity as well as to every citizen's interest." 

This is no exaggeration of the advantages the 
United States have drawn from a situation which 



UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 71 

enables their Government to keep aloof from the 
rivalries and difficulties of Europe. 

Mr. Olney further says: "The United States 
ai'e practically sovereign on their continent, their 
word is law for those subjects on whom they impose 
their intervention. And why is it so ? It is not 
merely an effect of their friendship or of their 
good will ; it is not by reason of their standing as 
a highly civilized power, nor because wisdom, 
justice and equity are the invariable characteristics 
of the United States' actions. It is because, in 
addition to all other motives, their inexhaustible 
resources, combined with their isolated position, 
make them masters of the situation and invulner- 
able towards every one of the other Powers either 
singly or in coalition." 

To be supreme on the American continent amidst 
weak though turbulent neighbours while preserving 
its immunity from burdens similar to those under 
which European States are groaning is quite a natural 
wish on the part of the chief American Power. 

Thence springs the foreign policy of the United 
States, — that is, noninterference in extra-Ameri- 
can affairs and intervention in American affairs 
wherever a European interest is asserted. 

It is easy to foresee fm-ther consequences of a 
policy which is passing at the present moment 
through a period of active evolution without going 
to the length which Mr. Olney foreshadowed for it 
in his despatch of August 7, 1895. 

"Three thousand miles of ocean," said he, "which 
separate these continents make any permanent 



7"^ COTT.VrSF WD KFCOXSTKUCTTON 

political union botwoon an American and an Euro- 
pean State unnatural and inopportune." 

The question was asked in Kui^land at the time 
whether the emancipation of the European colonies 
in America could ever luxxune part of the foreign 
policy of the l^iited States. 

The Uispano-American War brought about a 
situation which did not seem entirely to agree 
with tlie Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless President 
Roosevelt in a sptnvli delivered in 101-2 on the 
results of the Hispano-American War det^larcd : 

"The Monroe Doctrine is simply a statement 
of our very tirm belief that the nations now existing 
on this continent nuist be left to work out their 
own destinies among themselves and that this 
continent is no longer to be regarded as the coloniz- 
ing ground of any European Power. The one 
Power on this cimtinent that can make the power 
etVective is. of course, ourselves, for in tlie world 
as it is. a nation which advancvs a given doctrine, 
likely to interfere in any way with other nations, 
must p*.>ssess tlie power to back it up, if it wishes 
the doctrine to be respected." 

We now come to our own tin\es, the eve of the 
opening of the Panama Canal. 

On August '2, 101^, the United States Senate 
adopted the following resolution proposed by Sena- 
tor Lodge by a majority of tifty-one votes to four. 

"Resolvei-i that when any harbor or other place 
in the American continent is so situated that the 
occupation thereof for naval or military purposes 



UNTIED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 73 

mipht threaten the coiriinunications or tlic safety of 
the United Slaies, the (lovernnient of the United 
States could not see williout ^rave concern the 
possession of sncli harbor or oilier phice by any cor- 
poration or association which has such a relation 
to another (Jovernnient not American as to give 
that (lovernment pniclical power of control for 
national ])urposes." 

This action of the Senate gnnv out of the report 
that a stretch of territory boniering on Magdalena 
Bay, Mexico, nn'ght be acquired by the subjects 
of a foreign country and thus through control by 
their own national Government become tlie base 
of permanent naval or military occupation. In 
supi)ort of the resolution Senator Lodge said : 

''The declaration rests on a much broader and 
older ground than the Monroe Doctrine. This 
resolution rests on the generally accepted prin- 
ciple that every nation has a right to protect its 
own safety. It is its duty and right to intervene." 
The Senator added that the opening of the Panama 
Canal gave to Magdalena Bay an importance that 
it had never before possessed, the Panama routes 
passing in front of it. 

The political situation of the United States had 
undergone an im])ortant alteration by the annexa- 
tion of the Philippine Islands which was already 
a departure from the principles enunciated by 
Washington. The opening of the Panama Canal 
was an event of still greater importance in the 
evolution of the United States' foreign policy. 



74 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

This canal was bound to have upon the United 
States' policy an effect analogous to that of the 
opening of the Suez Canal upon British foreign 
policy. The utilisation by overseas trade of 
the Suez Canal resulted in organic changes in the 
construction of ships which no longer had to cross 
vast stretches of ocean without putting in at any 
port on the way. But especially the new route to 
India brought about an alteration in a commercial 
system which adapted itself to new markets. The 
closing of the Canal for a few days, nay, for a few 
hours, might entail loss not only material but also a 
dislocation of methods and schemes on which the 
regular exercise of Imperial control in India and 
elsewhere is built up. The result was the Egyptian 
question, the main-mise on Egypt and finally its 
annexation. 

The Panama Canal cannot but produce a similar 
transformation of a commercial system hitherto 
based on totally different traffic conditions between 
the two shores of the Atlantic continent, and new 
interests which the closing of the canal would 
threaten with disaster. Now, between the United 
States territory and the Panama Canal there is a 
large State which for several years has been unable 
to restore itself to a condition of internal peace. 
One need only study the history of the Suez Canal 
to perceive what may be the possible development 
of American collateral policy interests in connec- 
tion with the Panama Canal. It will necessarily 
affect the relations of the United States with their 
nearer neighbours. 



UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 75 

The reader has seen in this brief analysis of the 
evokitiou of the United States' foreign policy a 
relationship between the notion of detachment from 
European affairs and that of de facto hegemony 
on the American continent. He has seen that the 
desire to keep the American continent free from the 
necessity of creating permanent armies and to avoid 
the European evil of militarism had given birth to 
both the Washington and Monroe declarations. He 
has seen principles, new circumstances, shake the 
foundations of these. The Great War was a new 
circumstance of still greater cogency. 

On the one hand, the United States had to con- 
sider the possibility of a defeat of Great Britain 
which would not only have completely upset the 
political and economic condition of their overseas 
trade but would have threatened their hegemony 
on the American continent and their control of the 
Panama Canal. Successes on land of either of 
the European belligerents had, it is true, a senti- 
mental, even warm sentimental interest for the 
United States but so long as the maritime supremacy 
of Great Britain remained intact, the American 
people confined their interest to helping the Allied 
Powers keep up a defensive war Ciipable of pre- 
venting the Central Powers from extending their 
conquests. By their financial resources and their 
industries, the United States did this to the extent 
of their private means. When the maritime su- 
premacy of Great Britain seemed threatened by 
submarine warfare, a large number of new poten- 
tialities had to be considered. 



76 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

This was one of the situations President Wilson 
had now to examine. There was also a nearer 
contingency which he had to consider : the possible 
aUiance between Germany and Mexico, an alliance 
which, as is now known from the correspondence 
which has been captured, had been contemplated 
and which might always materialise. I lay no 
stress on consequences too obvious to require ex- 
planations. 

By the declaration of war, President Wilson at 
one and the same time made the United States* 
hegemony on the American continent effective, 
upheld in its entirety the Monroe Doctrine and 
insured the protection of the Panama Canal. As 
regards Mexico, the existence of an adequate Ameri- 
can army reduced it, in fact, to a condition of practi- 
cal vassalage which brought to an end a perilous 
state of things of which some short-sighted politicians 
did not realize the gravity. 

The declaration of war was therefore but the 
last step in the policy of a century, and those who 
think that it throws over that policy and constitutes 
a "new departure" will do well to shake off that 
illusion. The only unaccountable and disconcert- 
ing "departure" from the safe and well-considered 
policy of the founders was the annexation of the 
Philippines, which we may some day learn was due 
more to sentimental reasons than to more trust- 
worthy considerations based on permanent interests 
and the established principles of American general 
policy. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
Note on Panama Canal ^ 

One need only notice on the map the shape of the 
Guh' of Mexico and compare it with the shape of the 
Caribbean Sea in order to be convinced that, whereas 
the Gulf of Mexico as a consequence of American domina- 
tion over Cuba has become a lake which the United 
States have the means of closing, the Caribbean Sea 
could only be closed by acquiring some form of domina- 
tion over a number of islands at present belonging to 
different Powers. It follows that, as regards the sending 
of forces, in all possible hostile combinations, for the 
defence of the Panama Canal, it would be necessary 
either to go through Mexico or to cross the Gulf of Mexico. 
Moreover, in case of war, it would be impossible to con- 
template an effective barrage of the Caribbean Sea in 
spite of the possession of the island of Porto Rico. There 
are, it is true, railways across Mexico but only some sec- 
tions of railway systems in the other States of Central 
America. The problem of providing means of defence 
for the canal, in fact, has become by reason of events in 
Mexico more acute, but it is not confined to Mexico. 

That the creation of this new waterway would bring 
about changes in the relations between Spanish America 

1 Translated by Mr. A. Wright, from Sir T. Barclay's "Le President 
Wilson et revolution de la politique ^trangere des Etats-Unis." 
Armand Colin, Paris, 1918. 



78 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

and the active and somewhat restive States of the east 
of the Union, was too obvions not to occasion anxiety 
on different sides. This anxiety seems to express itself 
rather in respect to poHtical than material interests. 
In tliis connection, the following observations by a 
writer (P. A. Monjas) in "Espana y America" (1911) 
are interesting : 

"That the United States, in constructing the canal, 
have no purely commercial object in view, is evident 
from the considerable disproportion between the enormous 
cost of the work and the small importance of their mer- 
chant service, as also from the fact that they have con- 
nected the two shores of the canal by railways, some of 
which, for instance the Tehuantepec Railway, constitute 
a great danger, and lastly from the further fact of the 
rapid completion of the Panamerioan. 

"What is then the end which is being pursued by the 
White House Government in protecting the emancipa- 
tion of Panama and in expending without reckoning 
such considerable amounts in order to realise the colossal 
scheme first evolved by Ferdinand de Lesseps? Simply 
to convert this strategical point into a veritable arsenal 
for war, a permanent threat for the peoples of Latin 
America, more particularly for those of South America, 
and to show in the world's face that it has laid the founda- 
tions for further conquests. 

"It has been shown, hundreds of times, that the com- 
mercial exchanges between the Northern Colossus and 
the Southern nations are unequal; stress has been laid, 
ad nauseam, on the advantages of all kinds for the Euro- 
pean traders in Brazil. Argentine, Chile, Uruguay and 
other producing coimtries, and on the fact that in spite 
of the opening of the canal, distances will continue more 
favourable for the old continent. How' then can one 



UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 79 

explain the enthusiasm of the United States? Did the 
Washington Government then, as some persons have 
alleged, undertake this work with so much energy in the 
interests of the Republics of Latin America, out of purely 
commercial altruism? If so, why these fortifications 
and these excessive duties which affect equally Europeans 
and South Americans ? 

"The commercial waterway so patronised at the outset, 
let us be allowed to say it without hesitation, has lost its 
character and has been transmuted into a strategical 
and military measure. 

"South American statesmen must not close their 
eyes to the danger arising out of the opening of this 
new waterway in the hands of an imperialist govern- 
ment. . . . 

"Once the Panama Canal is open, who will be able 
to prevent the United States from exercising their power- 
ful influence over the Southern Pacific, just as they exer- 
cise it now over the West Indies Sea ? . . . 

"The fortifying of the Panama Canal, in violation 
of all usage and customs recognized in International Law 
is a danger and a threat to the Republics of Spanish 
America. It is not sufficient to say that preponderance 
in these seas is necessary to check the voracity of other 
nations and more particularly of Japan. Those are pre- 
texts invented by the Government and Press of the United 
States, in order to mislead credulous souls. Such acts 
of sovereignty constitute an infraction of the Monroe 
Doctrine and the modern tendency of the United States 
is Imperialist. From defenders, they have become cum- 
bersome protectors. 

"The peoples of South America must prepare for the 
future and compose their quarrels in order to form one 
block in the interest of their race and of their dignity. 



80 COLL.\PSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

for that is the only way for thoin to make themselves 
invinciblo aiul unassailable. 

"The South Auieiiean family united in a supreme desire 
for freedom in tlie defence of a race shall not be van- 
quished by the Yankee's formidable squadrons nor by 
the dollars of their multi-millionaires ; whereas if divided, 
it will drift further and further from the ideal of its destiny 
and the Northern octopus shall slo^Yly and surely erush 
it in its frightful tentacles. It will thus work at the dig- 
ging of its own grave. 

"Let us say Nvhat we think. The Pananui Canal will 
for a long time be the source of sensational rumours. 
The fortitications theme was scarcely exhausted before 
tlie problem of the acquisition of the Galapagos Islands 
arose; then came the attempt by President Arosemena 
to ei\tcr into pourparhm with Colombia, and on all 
sides one sees dangers, some real, some imaginary, as 
soon as the presence of the star-spangled Hag is signalled 
in the Pacitic. 

'* Time will confirm once more the radical transformation 
which the Monroe Doctrine has undergone and the naivete 
of certain South American statesmen and of a part of the 
South American Press who remain imdisturbed when 
conquerors are at the doors of l>yzantium." 

Similar alarm has been shown by M. D'Estournelles 
de Constant in his interesting work on **Les Etats Unis 
d'Amerique", Paris, 10l:> (new edition, 1017). It 
seems however to me to overlook a situation which I 
have pointed out in the text.* 

M. n'Kstournclles de Constant says: "In Panama, 
in the Philippines, the Americans could have restricted 
themselves to a useful and magniticent mission ; they 

' "1^ Piw^ident Wilson ot revolution de ,1a politique ^trangere des 
Etat^-Unis." Anmud Coliu, Paris. IDIS. 



UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 81 

went beyond ; in Panama tlu^y liave assumed liabilities 
without limit and i'ruii^lit with peril for every one; tliey 
have assiinu^d tlie nisponsibilily of" a route where every 
aceident of a purely administrative order will be fatally 
eiilar^'(Ml ovvinj^ to tlu'ir political domination and will 
assume a poliLieal eliaraeter. What a blow to the civiliza- 
tion and to the higher interests of the United States ! 
What bravado and senseless (iu(;.st for impoj)ularity ! 
(!an one imagiiu^ th(i ships of all countries wliicli for forty 
years have been freely sailing through the Suez Canal, 
henc«;forward filing past the guns of the American forts! 
Wliat a startling dill'erence of treatment! What a 
shock to every one's mind ! It is by pretensions of that 
kind, by blows of Might superseding Right, that Germany 
did so much harm to herself in universal opinion; and 
now we se(; the American democracy falling into this 
imperial mistake even before it has an army and the 
necessary maritime squadrons to supj)ort such an attitude. 

"Tliese precautions, alleged to have been taken in 
the interest of American commerce, will do it harm. The 
Panama ('anal should be an iiu[)rov<'ment on the Suez 
Canal : it should have been not in the hands of one Power, 
that is to say in the hands of one Goverrnuent and one 
day perhai)s in the hands of a coterie, but rather under 
the safeguard of all. 

"An unfortified l*anajna Canal would have been still 
more neutral, still less threatened, and hence, better de- 
fended by general interest than the Suez Canal. 

"Let us suffer this belittling of a great scheme; let 
us submit to these fortifications more humiliating still 
for those who impose them than for those who accept 
them. But let us follow the consequences of this Ameri- 
can mistake. Under the ])retext of protecting a neutrality 
which had nothing to fear from anybody, the United 



82 COLLAPSE .\ND RECONSTRUCTION 

States are going to inflict upon thoniselvos garrisons, 
squadrons which will call for other squadrons and so 
forth. That is not all. Provision had to be nuuie for 
the bill to be jKiid ; and, in order to lind the enormous 
sums which all these precautions will cost the United 
States, they had to go further along the road of violation 
of every one's rights ; imder the jn-etext of giving prefer- 
ential treatment to a few national navigation companies 
vet unborn, they had to get ready to extort from foreign 
ships ditl'erential taxes which in some cases will be pro- 
hibitive, and from which the United States alone will 
derive any profit; this is the boycotting of international 
commerce on its way through : taxes, guns, nothing will 
be wanting to greet it in this canal .^oi-diiiant universal" 
(p. 497). ^ 

As regards the relations between England and the 
United States iu the western hen\isphere and the Panama 
Canal, IVIr. Coolidge (A. C. Coolidge, "Les Etats-Unis 
Puissance Mondiale", Paris, 1008, pp. oOO ft seq.) points 
out that these relations are not confined solely to the 
questions concerning Canada ; apart even from the 
Great Dominion, Great Britain occupies in the New 
"World a position which the Americans constantly have 
to take into accoimt. '*In the coralliferous Bermuda 
Islands fortified and almost impregnable, she possesses 
an excellent base for operations whence a hostile fleet 
could threaten the whole American coast from Maine 
to Florida. ^Nlore to the south the Bahanui Islands group 
commands the entrance to the Florida Canal ; Jamaica 
stands as a sentinel in front of any canal which might 
go through Nicaragua or Panatna ; the British possessions 
in Guyana and the Lesser Antilles command the exit from 
the Caribbean Sea. In short, all these posts make a 
formidable chain. The Bermuda Islands are isolated 



UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 83 

and have given rise to no quarrel. The United States 
may be annoyed at their being in possession of the Eng- 
hsh but there is nothing to be done. They have rather 
turned their attention towards the Caribbean Sea and 
the neighbouring waters where during nearly the whole 
of the nineteenth century they have had keen rivalry with 
the English — a rivalry which has only just come to 
an end. 

"When the Panama Canal is at last completed, New 
York as well as the ports of the Mexican Gulf will be 
much nearer the western shores of South America ; they 
will also be able to communicate with Australia and the 
Far East in much more advantageous conditions than 
to-day. What will these advantages exactly be? It 
is difficult to say ; distance does not prevent Bremen 
from competing with Marseilles in the same regions, but 
this is a factor nevertheless which must be reckoned 
for something. It is easier to see what the American 
fleet will gain : the canal will enable it to concentrate 
its forces rapidly in either of the great oceans, and as a 
neutral line of water communication, it would be invalu- 
able if one was at war on both sides at the same time. 
Even now American supremacy is solidly established 
in the Mexican Gulf and the Caribbean Sea. It might 
take umbrage at the arrival of the Canadians in these 
waters, but they need not make it a serious case. If 
Great Britain again wished to become a rival of the 
United States in that part of the world, she no longer 
has the means. Although their present situation is 
satisfactory, certain signs warrant the belief that the 
United States will not be satisfied with it. I^d by the 
impulse of natural forces and hereditary traditions rather 
than by deliberate purpose, they must, it seems, fortify 
their position in these waters." 



84 roi.i.ArsF wn KFCONsiKirru'»N 

l>t\Mdoi\t UiHv^ovolt. oti his siilo. txvalls that in the 
past mo.<t of the iuohiIhm's of the ditTetxMit C\>i\givssos 
have Ihvu opiHv<<tHi always to I ho r^wnstruotioii of tho 
tUvt and to tho fortitioatiou of tho raivama (.\'mal. "Thoy 
thoii^^ht thoy woro aoting woll, but." ho aihis with his 
usual vorvo. "thoy shautofuUy botrayocl tho national 
duty, thoy showtnl thonxsolvos tho n\ost daniivriMis ononiios 
of tho l\opublio. If tho Amorioan ^xvplo wish to supv^^rt 
suoh ^H^litioians. lot tluMU givo up tho oanal. givo it haok 
to Tananuu or pn\sont it tv> Japan, to CuTuuniy. to F.ng- 
land or to ai^v nation w1k> is jiwornod by nion. not by 
ounuohs I Ix^i thoni givo up also tho Monnv Pootriuo 
«nd tu> lonsivr pnMoiul that thoy prv'itov't lifo and proporty 
in Moxi*.v I In short, lot us Kwnuo a ^Vostorn China. 
and in woaknoss and inipotoniv wait for tho d;iy whou 
our torrilory shall W split up Ivtwivn nion^ onorjiotio 
raiH^s I But if wo iiitond to play our ][vvrt as a gn^it nation, 
to bo rx\idy to dofoud our own intotx'sts and to W \isoful 
to othors. lot us u\ako up our nui\ds what wo ought to do 
and ct^t rtwdy to do it I Svnith of tho txpiator, on a lino 
noariuji" on In^th sides the Taixanxa Canal, wo no loncor 
iKwl «.\M\».xTn oursolvos alxnit tho Monrw Pootriuo. 
Braril. Chile and tho Argeixtino art^ onpablo of upholding 
this dvX'trine for the whole of Soul)\ .Vinorioa. ox^vpt 
in the extrxMuo ixorthoni parts, (.'oiisidor for inslan«.v 
tho ease of tho Arctnitino. As in Switzerland. t\»ilitary 
sor\ iix' thort^ is cvnipnlsory, whioh SiX'ially and indus- 
trially has Ihvu of nvuoh Ivnotit. It has also given the 
State an ann\* of abu^vst half a million n\on : although 
the [H^pulation is not one ninth that of the l"uitt\l States. 
The ArgtMitino is inuoh n\ore ready to defend its territory 
in ease of sudden attaok by a powerful enemy. \Yo shoidd 
do well to join itjs soIkx^I aud to learu the le^ou it gives 



UNITED STATES' FOR ETC N POLICY 85 

"llourf we tM"c<I only l'<'<I niixicty an to llio Monrfu; 
I )<)(•! riiM' wIhti il. coiM-criiH IIh* ;ii)i)rOiu;Fi(*.s lo tlic I'anaina 
('aii;il ; llial is lo s;iy IIm; l.crrilorij'.s Ih-Iwcch our Hoiil,li<'rii 
frontier ;mmI IIk; (rrjualor. VV*- m<-c<| not, worry jim to 
lliiH (loclriiM; JIM rcf^jirds (lanad.-i,, for, laxl. year, (lariada 
Hliow<r<l ilHrIf infiiiilcly slronj^cr lliari us." Clla'Aularc. 
IlooH(;v<5ll. "Ii<i Devoir <lo rAin/;ri(juc en Face do la 
Guorrc", pi). IfKJ f'< vrv/.) Taris, IJ)I7. 

NoTio ON Till'; Mkxk'an IV>i.u;y 

The Mcxicjin <JIH^sl,i«)rl, in contradiHlinetion from the 
Panama ('anal qncHlion, is a (jij(!st,ion of foreign policy 
for th(! IJnilcd Slaters. In Mi)it,(! of the Presidcril-'H d(!(;lara- 
lions iis to I h»; iionintcrvi'iilioniMl, rh;iriicl,<;r of his (jov- 
crtim(Uil,, il, involves proMcnis of ;i(lj;i(cn(y of <;xccptional 
^niviiy. 

IA)r those wh') ni:iy know nollnng of the jnat,t.(;r, a few 
ol)S(!rvations on this sul)je<;t may possi})ly bo useful. 
'I'hey will foriri ii eoniplem(^nt if) what 1 have already said 
on [.\n' I'anania (pieslion. 

The Mexican revolution was a constitutional and 
lilxTal reaction .-if^'ainst tlu; dictatorship of I'orfirio Diaz, 
who lia<l Ix'cn in i)owcr from 1H7() to lOII. llnd<;r his 
(jovernnient , which liiul hccn pres(M-v(!d hy force and 
intrif^ue, the country as a whole had enjoy(rd consider- 
al»l<- prosperity. Popnhir will, howev(T, had Ix'cn su[)- 
prcssed by the classic nuithods of military despotisms. 

After thirty-five years of dictatorship, Di;i/ was over- 
thrown hy I^VaiH'isco Madero, the l<;a(J(T of ii, secessionist 
group of the lilx'nd iirid progressist parties who had him 
elected in the place; of Diaz. 

Unerln, had been a geruMal under the orders of Madero. 
After a ten-days' battle iu the city of Mexico against 



86 COLU\rSE AND KECONSriUX HON 

Madoro's nvlvorsarios. ho siuldonly soiztxl power and 
caused the arrest of Madero. who was killed in the 
National Palace. 

Tluerta then assumeil onice. which he retained fn.>m 
Vebruarv. 11>1^>. to July. lt>14. Public rumour a«.vused 
him of boiuc favourable to forxngu iutcn,\<ts supported by 
a section of European diplomacy. 

In the north, llvierta met with resistan(,v on the part 
of Veuustiano C^irrauzA who had been a Stniator and who 
at that mon\eut was Governor of the state ^^provini-x^"! of 
Coahuila. Carran/.a. after a confused struggle in which 
various inteivsts eiuleavourtxi to amalgiimatc. Kvame 
lV\<idcnt. President llnerta then tix^k refuge in the 
I'nited States, where he died. 

As in the case of Huerta and ^Lulero. Carranza's 
general. Villa, took advantage of his chief's c'ontidentx"' 
to oppose him. Zapata, another general, also separated 
from him and these two leaders of bands, assisteil by Felix 
Diaz, who had fought against ^ladero, are still chiefs of 
armed factions. 

Carranza, who alone enjoys some civil authority as a 
parliamentarian and administrator among those who led 
the rtnolution. was i\x"ogt\i/<.\l as soon as possible i^Octo- 
ber IP. lOlo"* by the Government i^f the I'nited States. 
It is a dc facio government, the legitimacy of which has 
not yet Invn ratitied by an eUvtion, but as such it has 
been reoognizevl by all or nearly all the governments of 
South America, by Japan and by all the great European 
Powers. 

In the course of the struggle, numerous Americans 
were killed, wounded or ill-trtwted and material interests 
of American citizens sutTered. V^ven the tlag of the 
United States was insulted. Hot-headed patriots '\x\ the 
I'nited States wishcxi to embark on a war with Mexico, 



UNTFED SIAIEH' FOREIGN POUCHY 87 

to visit on tlic inno(;cnt tlic crimes of the K"'''.y. The 
Government, liaving u greater responsibility than opposi- 
tion leaders, was wise enough not to do anyt[iing which 
niighl, have r(^sull,ed in the creation of a coaHtion of the 
various Mexican j)arties for national deferice, and have 
inevitably brought back a inilitary dictatorship. Presi- 
dent Wilson's electors were thankful to him for not hav- 
ing launched the country into an adventure the ol)ject 
of which would have been the supi)ort of a cause contrary 
to all lh(^ traditions of the great American republic and 
which (;()uld only have created grievances in a neighbour- 
ing State. (See T. JJarclay's "Le Presichwit Wilson 
et revolution de la politicjue etrangere des Etats-Unis." 
Annand ('olin, Paris, 1918.) 



CHAPTER V 

EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 

I AM not concerned with any meanings of a 
domestic character which may be hidden behind 
the third of President Wilson's theses. It was 
addressed to the world generally and the plain 
meaning of the verbal statement is what binds 
the responsible political chiefs who have accepted 
its terms as those to which the Allies are committed. 

The third of the President's theses contains two 
propositions. The first is "the removal, so far as 
possible, of all economic barriers." The words "so 
far as possible" 'reduce it to a mere pious wish, 
an expression of the President's personal leaning to 
"free trade" and disapproval of monopolies whether 
delibepate or practical of all kinds, as he has, in 
fact, more or less explained. 

The second part is affirmative, viz. : "the establish- 
ment of an equality of trade conditions." Free 
trade ig equality of trade conditions, but equality 
of trade conditions is also consistent with a protec- 
tive tariff, provided no preference under it is given 
to one importer as against another. It means 
most-favoured-nation treatment and as a definition of 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 89 

that treatment the President's words ought to 
mean nothing else. In the view of every authority 
judicial or political, except the United States Su- 
preme Court, it does mean nothing else. 

To give effect to it in the Treaty of Peace "among 
all the nations consenting to peace", to use the 
President's phrasing, the nations "associating them- 
selves for its maintenance" will have to agree to 
a "most-favoured-nation clause" without arriere- 
pensee, or a clause so precise that there will be no 
possibility of going behind it and alleging that such 
a clause "does not prevent special concessions." ^ 
The clause to carry out the President's proposal 
as endorsed by the Allies will have to state that it 
does prevent special concessions. 

"Equality of trade conditions," as propounded by 
the President without any specific qualification 
would exclude "boycotting" as a sanction against 
any nation guilty of backsliding, and it is a barrier 
against the adoption of several of the resolutions 
of the Economic Conference of Allied Governments 
of June, 1916, especially of clause B II. These 
resolutions were adopted before the United States 
had become a belligerent and President Wilson 
is free to regard them as obsolete, if it so pleases 
him. The obnoxious clause reads as follows : 

"Whereas the war has put an end to all treaties 
of commerce between the Allies and Enemy Powers, 
and it is of essential importance that during the 
period of economic reconstruction the liberty of 
none of the Allies should be hampered by any claim 

* See Whitney Robertson, S. C, decisions. 



90 COT.LAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

put forwaril by Enoiny Po^^•ors to most-favoured- 
nation tivatnuMit, the Allies aiiivo that tho benefit 
of this treatment \vill not be granted to those Powers 
during a number of years, to be fixed by mutual 
agreement among themselves. 

''During this number of years the Allies imdertake 
to assure eaeh other, so far as possible, compensatory 
outlets for trade in ease consequences detrimental 
to their commerce should result from the applica- 
tion of tlie undertaking referred to in the preceding 
clause." 

The French Government apparently sees no 
antinomy between this strangely impractical clause 
and President Wilson's third point, seeing that as 
receiitly as September, 1018. it "denounced" {i.i\ 
gave notice of cancellation oO the l^"anco-Swiss 
treaty of connnerce of October '20, ll)0(). witli u 
semi-othcial explanation which says: "In June, 
191(>, the Economic Conference in Paris put on 
record the wish of the Entente Powers to refuse 
the enemy the benefits of the most -favoured-nation 
treatment for the years following the conclusion 
of peace. The Government had to be prepared 
for the economic war after the war of arms has 
ceased. Followitig the principle and to facilitate 
its application, the VVench Government in a cir- 
cular of April, lOlS, proposed to ilenounee all exist- 
ing treaties of commerce containing the most-fa- 
voured-nation clause. Hence the denunciation of 
the Fi'anco-Swiss treaty." This is out-IIeroding 
Herod, for as the Temp^i (September 10, IDIS"! ob- 
serves, the Economic Conference did not propose 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 91 

to begin operations by penalising neutral countries. 
Merely denouncing tin; treaty, howciver irritating 
it may be to the Swiss, does not however neces- 
sarily mean that the denunciation will b(^ a(;ted 
ui)oii and, as in the case of England's imports into 
France under a special most-i'avoured-nation re- 
gime which has existed since 1892, Switzerland may 
be granted most-favoured-nation treatment by act 
of Parliament without a treaty. 

But the point remains that the French Govern- 
ment does not consider itself bound by President 
Wilson's third proposition, although it has joined 
in the chorus of acceptance of the whole of his four- 
teen and other [)ropositions, with the single reser- 
vation dealt with in the analyses of point number %} 

I am not aware that the decisions of the Economic 
Conference were preceded by any inquiry into the 
needs or opinions of business men among any of 
the Allied nations. The signatories of the docu- 
ment are all politicians or diplomatists and it is 
still open to govenmients to ascertain what the 
English, French or Italian manufacturing interests 
think of the resolutions before giving the remotest 
effect to suggestions not only untested but in abso- 
lute contradition to the American attitude, an 
attitude I believe to be in accordance with the feel- 
ing of the bulk of the business interests of the coun- 
tries concerned. 

In dealing with other questions of after-war 
trade the resolutions of the Economic Conference 

» See p. 31. 



92 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

are still more antagonistic to President Wilson's. 
If I understand the different utterances aright and 
read correctly the motives of the American people 
for being in the War at all, it is that they wish 
to put an end to the causes of war and not to create 
new ones or continue the struggle under the mantle 
of a factitious peace. The President expressed 
this view most emphatically in his speech launch- 
ing the fourth Liberty Loan at the end of September 
last. The response to the Loan is the answer of 
America. 

"There can be," he said, "no leagues or alliances 
or special covenants and understandings within 
the general and common family of the league of 
nations"; and more specifically, "there can be no 
special, selfish economic combinations within the 
league and no employment of any form of economic 
boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic 
penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world 
may be vested in the league of nations itself as a 
means of discipline and control." 

"Economic rivalries and hostilities," says the 
President truly indeed, "have been the prolific 
source in the modern world of the plans and passions 
that produce war. It would be an insincere as 
well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them 
in definite and binding terms." And as if to em- 
phasize this couj) de grace he adds that the common 
purpose of enlightened mankind has taken the place 
of national purposes and the counsels of plain men 
those of statesmen who "must follow the clarified 
common thought or be broken." 



NOTES TO CHAPTER V 

Note on "Open-Door" Policy 

The habitable parts of the world are a limited area, 
exclusion from any of which is a diminution of the avail- 
able markets of the nations excluded. Every Power 
is, therefore, rightfully interested in the prevention of 
such exclusion. 

The United States Government in 1899 called attention 
to the subject as regards China, without, be it said how- 
ever, going into any question of principle. 

In a communication to the Foreign Office, dated Sep- 
tember 22, 1899, Mr, Choate reminded Lord Salisbury 
that the British Government, while conceding to Ger- 
many and Russia the possession of "spheres of influence 
or interest" in China, in which they were to enjoy special 
rights and privileges, particularly in respect of railroads 
and mining enterprises, had at the same time sought 
to maintain the "open-door" policy, that is, to secure 
to the trade and navigation of all nations equality of 
treatment within such "spheres." The maintenance 
of this policy, Mr. Choate said, was equally desired by 
the United States Government. Though the latter 
would not commit itself to the recognition of any exclusive 
rights of any Power within, or control over, any portion 
of the Chinese Empire under such agreements as had 
been made, it could not conceal its apprehension that 
difficulties might arise between the Treaty Powers, 



94 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

imperilling the rights secured to the United States by 
its Treaties with China. His Government thought that 
danger of international irritation might be removed by 
declarations being made by each Power claiming a " sphere 
of interest" in China, in some form to this effect: 

"1. That it will in no wise interfere with any Treaty 
port or any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere 
of interest' or leased territory it may have in China. 

" 2. That the Chinese Treaty Tariff for the time being 
shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all 
such ports as are within such 'sphere of interest' (unless 
they be free ports), no matter to what nationality it 
may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected 
by the Chinese Government. 

"3. That it will levy no higher harbour dues from 
another nationality, frequenting any port in such 'sphere', 
than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality — 
and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, 
or operated within its 'sphere' on merchandise, belong- 
ing to citizens or subjects of other nationalities, trans- 
ported through such spheres, than shall be levied on 
similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals 
transported over equal distances." 

There was strong reason, Mr. Choate continued, to 
believe that the Governments of Russia and Germany 
would cooperate in such an understanding. Under a 
recent Ukase the Emperor of Russia had declared the 
port of Talienwan open to the merchant ships of all 
nations during the whole term of the lease under which 
it was to be held by Russia, and Germany had declared 
Kiao-Chao a "free port." 

On September 29, 1899, Lord Salisbury replied that 
the policy consistently advocated by Great Britain was 
one of securing equal opportunity for the subjects or 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 95 

citizens of all nations in regard to commercial enterprise 
in China, and that from this policy H. M. Government 
had no intention or desire to depart. 

On November 30, 1899, Lord Salisbury informed Mr. 
Choate that H. M. Government were prepared to make 
a declaration in the sense desired by the United States 
Government "in regard to the leased territory at Wei- 
hai-Wei and all territory in China which may hereafter 
be acquired by Great Britain by lease or otherwise, and 
all spheres of interest now held or which may hereafter 
be held by her in China, provided that a similar declara- 
tion be made by the other Powers concerned." 

Before January 5, 1900, all the powers concerned had 
subscribed to the declaration in question, which thus 
became binding among them. 

In further confirmation, and no doubt with a view to 
giving still greater precision to the above principles, the 
British and German Governments on October 16, 1900, 
signed the following agreement : 

"Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Im- 
perial German Government, being desirous to maintain 
their interests in China and their rights under existing 
Treaties, have agreed to observe the following principles 
in regard to their mutual policy in China : 

"1. It is a matter of joint and permanent international 
interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China 
should remain free and open to trade and to every other 
legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all 
countries without distinction ; and the two Governments 
agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese 
territory as far as they can exercise influence. 

"2. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the 
Imperial German Government will not, on their part, 
make use of the present complication to obtain for them- 



96 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

selves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, 
and will direct their policy towards maintaining undi- 
minished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire. 

"3. In case of another Power making use of the com- 
plications in China in order to obtain under any form 
whatever such territorial advantages, the two Contracting 
Parties reserve to themselves to come to a preliminary 
understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for 
the protection of their own interests in China. 

"4. The two Governments will communicate this 
agreement to the other Powers interested, and especially 
to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, Russia,, and 
the United States of America, and will invite them to 
accept the principles recorded in it." 

This agreement was simultaneously communicated 
by the British and German Governments to the Powers 
mentioned in Clause 4. The principles "recorded in it" 
were duly accepted by them all. 

The "open-door" question was brought up again in 
connection with Morocco. Under Article IV. of the 
joint declaration of April 8, 1904, signed on behalf of Great 
Britain and France, it was agreed that "the two Govern- 
ments, being equally attached to the principle of com- 
mercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare 
that they will not in those countries countenance any 
inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or 
other taxes, or railway transport charges. . . . This 
mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty 
years." 

Negotiations between France and Germany, which 
arose out of a controversy in respect of the same subject 
matter, resulted in the signing, on September 28, 1905, 
of a joint note concerning the matter to be submitted 
to the Conference on Morocco affairs, which included the 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 97 

"fixation of certain principles for the purpose of preserv- 
ing economic freedom", in other words, the "open door" 
generally without any restriction as to time. 

At an earlier date. Article I. of the General Act of 
the Berlin Conference of 1885 on the regime to be applied 
in the Congo basin, declared, "The trade of all nations 
shall enjoy complete freedom." 

It is seen that the principle of the "open door" has 
already been consistently applied in connection with 
certain non-European areas. As these areas are practi- 
cally the only areas which of late years have come within 
the scope of European regulation, the cime seems to be 
approaching when the principle might be declared to be 
of general application. 

From the point of view of diminishing the possible 
causes of conflict among nations, the adoption of the 
principle as an international contractual obligation would 
be of great utility. While putting an end to the injustice 
of exclusion, it would obviously reduce the danger of 
nations seeking colonial aggrandisement with a view 
to imposing exclusion, and thus one of the chief tempta- 
tions to colonial adventure would be eliminated. (From 
Sir T. Barclay, "Problems of International Practice 
and Diplomacy." London and Boston, 1907.) 

European Resources of Iron Ore 

Germany and Austria have large resources of good 
iron ore, but the rate of their production is not suflScient 
to supply the needs of the iron smelting works and Ger- 
many supplements her supplies from Sweden, France, 
Spain and Algeria. 

Poland has resources of ore estimated at about 600, 
000,000 tons. Much of it goes to Silesia. 



98 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Russia is not very rich in iron ores. In the Ural 
Region there are 4S9 mines but no single deposit appears 
to be of any great magnitude. In Central Russia the 
resources are estimated at some 780,000,000 tons but many 
of the deposits are thin and cannot be profitably worked. 

Sweden : The Lapland region, as far as explored, is 
estimated to contain 1,158,000,000 tons of good iron ore. 
Central and Southern Sweden about 134,000,000 tons of 
ore of different grades. 

In 1894 the total French production of iron ore was 
3,700,000 tons of which 3,000,000 was raised in Meurthe- 
et-Moselle, and the Briey field contributed only 9,000 
tons of the whole. In 1913 the output had risen to 
22,000,000 tons of which the Briey district contributed 
15,000,000. 

The resources are estimated by Nicou ^ as follows : 

Nancy, 200,000,000 tons 

Longwy, 275,000,000 tons 

Briey, 2,000,000,000 tons 

Crusnes, 500,000,000 tons 

Down to 1914, 650,000,000 tons had been extracted 
from the Lorraine mines, or an amount equal to one eighth 
of the quantity remaining. 

There are other sources in Normandy, Anjou and 
Brittany (see Nicou's report). 

The Normandy deposits extend over the departments 
of Calvados, La Manche and I'Orne and are second in 
importance among the iron-producing districts of France. 

Of the importing countries the returns of 1913 showed 
that the United Kingdom imported 8,000,000 tons of iron 
ore, Belgium 4,400,000 tons, France 1,400,000 tons, 
Austria 942,000 tons, the United States 2,600,000 tons 
and Germany 14,000,000 tons. 

^ Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, 1914. 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 99 

Of exporting countries France sent out 10,000,000 
tons (plus Algeria 1,350,000), Spain 9,000,000, Sweden 
6,400,000 tons. 

Note on the State of British Trade Immediately 
Before the War 

There is a widespread and rather mischievous impres- 
sion, not only among certain ignorant German patriotic 
writers but also in France and America and even among 
some Englishmen, that England joined the Allies against 
Germany on the economic ground that her manufacturers 
were ousting us from our greatest markets, that if the 
War had not stopped her, the trade of the whole world 
would soon have been in her hands and we should have 
had to take a second and diminishing place in the markets 
of the world. 

The facts of British trade do not in the least bear 
out this apprehension. 

Taking the totals of British trade during the ten years 
from 1904 to 1913, the exports from the United Kingdom 
to foreign countries rose from £188,000,000 to £330, 
000,000 and to our own colonies and protectorates from 
£112,000,000 to £195,000,000 through a steady gradua- 
tion culminating in these jBgures. The figures of the 
three years preceding the War, so far from showing any 
relaxation of the progression, show the contrary, as the 
following official table of exports (Consignments of the 
Produce and Manufactures of the United Kingdom to 
Foreign Countries), demonstrates: 

To Foreign Countries To British Possessions To Protectorates 

1911 £295,000,000 £159,000,000 £454,000,000 

1912 £310,000,000 £177,000,000 £487,000,000 

1913 £329,000,000 £195,000,000 £525,000,000 



100 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

In the same period our exports to Germany of produce 
and manufactures of the United Kingdom increased 
from £25,000,000 to £40,000,000. Of these £40,000,000 
the analysis shows that £'-27,000,000 consisted of articles 
wholly or mainly manufactured in the United Kingdom. 

That our imports from Germany increased in a larger 
proportion does not prove that we were losing, seeing 
that our total export trade was increasing, as we have 
seen, all the while enormously and our trade had never 
during the ten years immediately preceding the War 
been so prosperous as in 1913. 

Note on Effect of *' Most-Fa voured-Nation " 
Clause in Commercial Treaties ^ 

The most-favoured-nation clause is one which it has 
become customary to insert in treaties of commerce, 
providing that if any reductions of tariff or other advan- 
tages are granted by either co-contracting State to any 
third State, the other shall have the benefit of them. 
In Europe this clause has been uniformly treated as 
applying to all reductions of tariff without distinction. 
The United States interpretation, on the other hand, 
distinguishes between reductions of a general character 
and reductions made specifically in return for reductions 
by some other State. The latter do not come within 
the operation of the clause, and a co-contracting State 
is only entitled to obtain extension of them to itself by 
granting similar concessions. In other words, special 
concessions to any co-contracting State are only allowed 
gratuitously to a third co-contracting State, when nothing 
is given for them, the clause not covering advantages 
granted in return for advantages. 

* From Sir Thomas Barclay's " Problems of International Practice and 
Diplomacy." London and Boston, 1907. 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 101 

In a despatch of July 17, 1886, to the American Minister 
in China, Mr. Bayard explained the American view in 
the following terms: "In its commercial aspects the ex- 
pediency of an unqualified favoured-nation clause is 
questionable. The tendency is towards its formal qual- 
ification, by recognising in terms what most nations hold 
in fact and in practice, whether the condition be expressed 
in the clause or not, that propinquity and neighbourliness 
may create special and peculiar terms of intercourse not 
equally open to all the world; or by providing that the 
most-favoured treatment, when based on special or 
reciprocal concessions, is only to be extended to other 
Powers on like conditions." 

This is still the United States view, as is set out in a 
luminous article in the November (1905) number of the 
North American Review, on "The Alternative of Reciproc- 
ity Treaties, or a Double Tariff", by Mr. John Osborne, 
chief of the Bureau of Trade Relations, State Department, 
and late Secretary of the Reciprocity Commission, a 
gentleman eminently competent to describe the con- 
temporary American standpoint. Mr. Osborne main- 
tains that "it is evident that the gratuitous extension to 
third Powers of commercial advantages exchanged in 
reciprocity between two countries is absolutely incon- 
sistent with the true principles of reciprocity as under- 
stood in the United States; it would not only seriously 
impair and even tend to destroy the value of the original 
grant, but it would also involve duty reductions upon 
the entirety, or, at least, the bulk of importations from 
the world, of the articles of merchandise affected, thus 
constituting a serious sacrifice in national revenues." 

This is an argument of policy, and not one, properly 
speaking, of interpretation or construction. No strictly 
judicial argument can be urged in support of the Ameri- 



102 COLIArSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

can view. Whether n rednetioii "bought", as it were, 
by a couuter-redvietion is atVoeted by a "most-favoured- 
nation" clause depends, from a judicial point of view, 
solely on the wording of the clause. 

There seemed to be a possibility that this wouUi become 
the judicial construction in America under a decision of 
the Ignited States Supreme Court (Bartram v. Robertson), 
but the question a few months later came up again in 
Whitney v. Robertson (Supreme Court of the United 
States, 1SS7, H-t United St-ates. 190), when the ofhcial 
view, on the contrary, was strongly endorsed. The 
plaiutirt's in tlie action were merchants doing business 
in the city of New York. They imported a large quantity 
of sugars, produce of the island of San Domingo, similar 
in kind to sugars produced in the Hawaiian Islands, 
which were admitted free of duty under a treaty with 
the government of those islands. The treaty provided 
for the importation into the United States, free of duty, 
of various articles, "the produce and manufacture of 
those islands, in consideration, among other things, of 
like exemption from duty, on the importation into that 
country, of smidry specified articles which are the produce 
and manufacture of the l^iited States." The tirst two 
articles of the treaty, which recited the reciprocal engage- 
ments of the two countries, declared that they were 
made in consideration "of the rights and pri^•ileges" and 
"as an equivalent therefor", which the one conceded 
to the other. The plaiutiti's relied for a like exemption 
of tlie sugars imported by them from San Domingo upon 
Article IX. of the treaty with the Dominican Republic, 
which is as follows: "A'o higher or other dutij nhall be 
imposed in the importation into the United States of 
any article of growth, produce, or manufacture of the 
Dominican Republic, or of her fisheries; and no higher 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 103 

or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into 
the Dominican Rejxibhc of any article the growth, produce, 
or manufacture of the United States or Du'.W fish(;ries, 
than are or shall be payable on the like articles, the growth, 
'produce, (yr manufacture of any other foreign coijntry, 
or its fislieries." In JJartram v. Robertson, the Supreme 
Court had held that brown and unrefined sugars, the 
j)roduce and manufacture of the island of St. Croix, 
a Danish possession, were not exempt from duty by 
for(;e of the treaty with Denmark, though similar goods 
from the ITawaiian Islands were thus exempt. The first 
article of the treaty with Denmark provided that the 
contracting parties .should not grant "any particular 
favour" to other nations, in rcsjject to commerce and 
navigation, which should not immediately become com- 
mon to the other party, who should enjoy the same freely 
if the concession v)ere freely made, and upon allmving the 
same compensation if the concession V)ere conditional. 
Article IV. provided that no higher or other duties should 
be imposed by either party on the importation of any 
article of its produce or manufacture, into the country 
of the other party, than were payable on like articles ^ being 
the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country. 
The Su{>reme Court had held that — 

"Those stipulations, even if conceded to be self-execut- 
ing by the way of ,a proviso or exception to the general 
law imposing the duties, do not cover concessions like 
those made to the Hawaiian Islands for valuable considera- 
tion. They were pledges of the two contracting parties, 
the United States and the King of Denmark, to each 
other, that in the imposition of duties on goods imported 
into one of the countries which were the produce or manu- 
facture of the other, there .should be no discrimination 
against them in favour of goods of like character imported 



104 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

from any other country. They imposed an obhgation 
upon botli eouutries to avoid hostile legislation in that 
respect. But they were not intended to interfere with 
special arrangements with other countries founded upon 
a concession of special privileges." 

In Whitney i\ Robertson, counsel for the plaintiffs con- 
tended that the omission from the treaty with the Republic 
of San Domingo of the Danish-American provision as to 
free concessions, and concessions upon compensation, 
precluded any concession in respect of commerce and 
navigation by the V. S. Government to another country 
without that concession being at once extended to San 
Domingo. The Supreme Court, however, held that 
the absence of this provision did not change the obliga- 
tions of the United States; that Article IX. of the treaty 
with San Domingo was "substantially like Article IV. 
in the treaty with the King of Denmark." It was a 
pledge of the contracting parties that there should be no 
discriminating legislation against the importation of 
articles which were the growth, produce, or manufacture 
of their respective countries, in favour of articles of like 
character imported from any other country, but " it had 
no greater extent." "It was never designed to pre- 
vent special concessions, upon sutHcient considerations, 
touching the importation of specific articles into the 
country of the other." *'// would require the clearest lan- 
guage io ju.^tifij a conchtsiou that the U. S. Government 
intended to preclude itself from such engagements with 
other coimtries. which might in the future be of the high- 
est importance to its interests." 

With all respect to the great authority of the decisions 
of the Ignited States Supreme Court, the language of the 
Treaty in question seems of the clearest, and diametrically 
opposed to its ruling. 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 105 

The treaty regulating the trade relations between Great 
Britain and the United States (July 3, 1815), continued 
in force and reported in an official return to the British 
Parliament, Commercial No. 4, 1907, to be in operation 
between the two countries down to January 1, 1907, 
is practically in the same terms, providing that — 

"No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the 
importation into the territories of His Britannic Majesty 
in Europe of any articles of growth, produce, or manu- 
facture of the United States, and no higher or other duties 
shall be imposed in the importation into the United States 
of any articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of 
His Britannic Majesty's territories in Europe, than are 
or shall he payable on the like articles, being the growth, 
produce, or manufacture of any foreign country" (Art. 
H). 

The form adopted in the treaty between Great Britain 
and Uruguay of July 15, 1899, leaves nothing to con- 
struction ; it specifically restricts the application of the 
clause : 

"It was also agreed that the stipulations contained 
in the Treaty which is to be renewed do not include cases 
in which the Government of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay 
may accord special favours, exemptions, and privileges 
to the citizens or products of the United States of Brazil, of 
the Argentine Republic, or of Paraguay in matters of com- 
merce. Such favours cannot be claimed on behalf of 
Great Britain on the ground of most-favoured-nation rights 
as long as they are not conceded to other States. It is, 
nevertheless, understood that the said special favours, 
exemptions, and privileges shall not be capable of applica- 
tion to products similar to those of Great Britain, nor 
be extended to navigation." 

The same may be said of the Franco-German Treaty 



106 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

of Frankfort (May 10, 1871). Article II. of that treaty 
provided as follows : 

"The treaties of commerce with the dift'erent States 
of Germany having been annulled by war, the French 
and German Governments will base their commercial 
relations upon the system of reciprocal treatment on the 
footing of the most favoured nation. 

"This rule shall not apply, however, to the farours 
which either of tlie Contracting Parties, by commercial 
Treaties, has granted or shall grant to States other than 
the following : — England, Belgium, Holland, Switzer- 
land, Austria, and Russia. . . . 

"Nevertheless, the French Government reserves to 
itself the faculty to establish on German vessels and 
their cargoes, tonnage and flag duties, under reserve 
that these duties shall not be higher than those which 
arc imposed upon vessels and cargoes of the above men- 
tioned nations." 

The German-Austro-TIimgarian Treaty of Commerce 
of December (5, 181) 1, amended and completed by that 
of January 25, 1005, provides that no more favourable 
condiiions in ra^pect of "import, cvporf, or /ran.^vV" chtties 
ifhaU be granted by either Contracting Party to a third Power 
than are accorded to the other Party, and that any con- 
ceiisions of this kind made to a third Power ,^haU at once 
be applied to the other (Art. II.), any dispute relating to 
this provision to be referred to arbitration (Art. XXIII.). 
This seems equally clear in the contrary sense. 

In Europe the American \iew has found a supporter 
(semble) in Professor F. de Martens, who considers tliat 
a distinction must be made between a case where a 
commercial advantage is granted purely and simply, 
and a case where there is simply an exchange of bons 
proc^de^ or a dedommagement. "In the former case alone 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 107 

have other States a right to claim the same advantage. 
To grant it in the second would be contrary to the prin- 
ciple of the reciprocity of commercial obligations." 

The same opinion was also arrived at much earlier by 
a distinguished French writer, M. Hautefeuille, who, 
in answer to the question of whether the condition of 
being treated as the most favoured nation only carried 
the advantages existing at the time of the signature of 
the treaty, or comprised those which should be subse- 
quently conceded to another State, answered that the 
clause must be considered as implying everything that 
existed at the moment when signed, })ut that it could 
not be considered to extend to anything later in date.^ 

It is evident that it will be necessary in future treaties 
of commerce to be careful to provide against the possibility 

' The forms of most-fuvoured-nation clauses vary considerably. 
That of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain 
and France of February 28, 1882, runs : 

"Each of the High ('ontracling Parties engages to give the other 
immediately and unconditionally the benefit of every favour, immunity, 
or privilege in matters of commerce or industry, which may have been 
or may he conceded by one of the High Contracting Powers to any third 
nation whatsoever, whether within or beyond Europe." 

The British Treaty of Commerce with Honduras of January 21, 
1887, provides : 

"The High Contracting Parties agree, tiiat in all matters relating 
to commerce and navigation, any privilege, favour, or immunity what- 
ever which either contracting party has actually granted or may hereafter 
grant to the subjects or citizens of any other State shall be extended 
immediately and unconditionally to the subjects or citizens of the other 
contracting party; it being their intention that the trade and naviga- 
tion of each country shall be placed in all respects by the other on the 
footing of the most favoured nation" (Article I.). 

The Anglo-Rumanian Treaty of August 13, 1892 : 

"The subjects, vessels, and goods, produce of the soil and industry 
of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the dominions 
of the other all privileges, immunities, or advantages granted to the moat 
favoured nation" (Article I.) 



108 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

of a construction which might frustrate the very objects 
for which most-favoured-nation clauses are resorted to, 
namely, to prevent any third Power from enjoying special 
admtitages. Meanwhile the interest of stable inter- 
national relations requires that the sense of the existing 
terminology of the clause should be defined.^ 

Note on Russia and Poland 

President Wilson demands the evacuation bj' Germany 
of all Russian territory. The rest of his sixth proposition 
is in the nature of an appeal to the Allies to give Russia 
a chance of righting herself. 

The only question I need deal with is that of evacua- 
tion. 

It is obvious that the President to-day would not 
take the same view as nearly a year ago, when there was 
a prospect of a properly elected Republican government 
being in a position to take over the territory which had 
been wrested from Russia. The President's views may 
also have undergone change as regards the right of Fin- 
land, the Bailie provinces and possibly the Ukraine 
themselves to determine what shall be their form of 
government and by what external allegiance, if any, 
they may be willing to curtail their autonomy. Evacua- 

^ Droit International (1SS6), ii.. p. oii. "At the present day, when 
national intei-ests are so entangled and complex," says M. Lehr, "it 
is always a serious matter to bind oneself in advance by a clause which 
is vague and general, and the eventual bearing of which cannot be esti- 
mated. There have been several instances in the course of the last few 
years in which a Power in the negotiation of a treaty has been in the 
necessity of refraining from granting concessions, because being ex- 
tended by \-irtue of the clause, without any compensation whatever to 
a whole series of other countries, they would have been disastrous to 
the national industry." See Ernest Lohr, Revue de Droit International, 
1893, p. 315. 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 109 

tion which might only mean the imposition of a worse 
provisional regime than at present can hardly be one of the 
President's present conditions. We may rely, I think, on 
his general principles and analogies as regards the settle- 
ment of all matters relating to the ex-provinces of Russia. 

As regards Poland there is nothing more tragic than 
the history of the Poles, one of the most gifted races of 
Europe and the most unhappy, victims of rival Powers 
which have never left them alone for a hundred and fifty 
years. 

In 1772 at the time of the first partition, Poland con- 
sisted of the Kingdom of Poland properly speaking and 
the Duchy of Lithuania. The Kingdom included in 
the north Posnania or Great Poland, Little Poland with 
Warsaw and Cracow, and Royal Prussia with Danzig; 
in the south Red Russia or Galicia and in the southeast 
Little Russia. The first partition gave Galicia to Austria, 
Royal Prussia, with the exception of the cities of Danzig 
and Thorn, to Prussia, and a part of Lithuania to Russia. 
On the second partition in 1793 Prussia got Great Poland 
with Danzig and Thorn, and Russia the half of Lithuania. 
The third partition in 1795 gave the rest of Lithuania 
to Russia. 

Napoleon was the next manipulator of the unhappy 
country. The treaty of Tilsit (1807) created the Duchy 
of Warsaw and made Danzig a free city. In 1809 Galicia 
and the Duchy of W^arsaw were united. Lastly came 
the Congress of Vienna which more or less confirmed 
the pre-Napoleonic conditions but gave Danzig to Prussia. 
The three Powers agreed to grant constitutions suitable 
to the three Polish provinces. Austria alone kept her 
word. 

It is calculated that the present population of Russian 



110 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Poland is 0.400.000, of Austrian Poland (Galicia), 4.500.000 
and of Prussian Poland l^in Posnania, Upper Silesia and 
scattered through East Prussia generally'), 3,500.000. 
Among these are perhaps two or three millions of Jews. 

AYith Poland President Wilson deals in a special prop- 
osition (Number 13). Poland, he says, (a) should be 
an independent State politically and economically, (b) 
should include territories inhabited by indisputably 
Polish populations and (c) should be assured "free and 
secure access to the sea." 

The second of President AYilson's Fourth of July prop- 
ositions lays down that matters whether of sovereignty 
or of political or ecx)noniic relationship are subject to the 
principle of acceptance by those immediately concerned. 

Then, the first condition to be imposed in connection 
with Poland is that the Poles alone shall decide as to 
their own destiny within the area of what was formerly 
Russian Poland. 

As regards Prussian Poland the application of the 
same principle is less simple. It has not in fact been 
detached from Prussia by conquest or revolt. Xor have 
we conclusive evidence that there is any desire on the 
part of the Prussian Poles to be detached from Germany 
as a whole. I say "as a whole", because there is an 
obvious ditYerence between forming part of a backward 
political entity like Prussia and having autonomy within 
a progressive empire. Xor do I perceive any practical 
need of ascertaining the feelings in regard to separation 
of people who do not seem to have hitherto agitated 
for more than a reasonable recognition of the right to 
use their own language and be employed in the adminis- 
tration of their own districts. On the other hand Prus- 
sian Poland has furnished to Prussia as Ireland has 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 111 

furnished to England, in spite of a widespread spirit of 
disaffection, an exceptionally large proportion of political 
and diplomatic genius. 

The same may be said of the gifted race in reference 
to Austrian Poland where, moreover, the Poles enjoy 
constitutional freedom, have their own university and 
are not known to have been desirous in any appreciable 
degree of severance from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 

President Wilson demands that Poland shall be an 
independent State economically as well as politically. 
When we enter the domain of economics we are no longer 
in that of ideals and idealists but in that of the interests 
of industry and commercial prosperity. In these matters 
to be fenced in by neighbouring countries, by customs 
barriers, protective systems and the treacherous devices 
agricultural interests are in the habit of concocting to 
keep rivals at bay, may have material disadvantages. 
On the other hand, to have free access to neighbouring 
markets and the protection of a powerful confederation 
in those beyond seas may weigh considerably in the 
balance of commercial and industrial interests against 
political ideals. 

To meet the difficulty he must have foreseen in this 
respect, perhaps to evade it, the President demands 
"free and secure access to the sea." 

Between Poland and the part of Prussia inhabited by 
Poles and the sea there is a wide band of territory which 
is German. Danzig, in the time of Poland's political 
glory, it has been seen, was part of Poland. It was at a 
time, however, when racial and linguistic questions 
played no part in the destinies of nations and populations 
were handed from State to State as if sovereignty and 
ownership were synonymous. Danzig, like Konigsberg, 



112 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

has always in modern times been a German city and its 
Hinterland and all the Hinterland of the coast to a long 
way inland is Germanic not Polish. I do not for a moment 
suppose that the President proposes to detach either 
Danzig or Konigsberg from Germany. If so, then the 
only method of obtaining access to the sea would be by 
obtaining the use of a free harbour or dock such as Ger- 
mans had arranged at the outbreak of the war to begin 
constructing at Rotterdam, a dock more or less on the 
lines of that which Germany possesses in the free City 
of Hamburg. This is not "free and secure" access in 
the full sense of the words, but it might be a workable 
independence. The same principle of free docks might 
also be applied in a number of other cases similar to that 
of landlocked Poland, such as that of landlocked Switzer- 
land which may some day obtain from the French Gov- 
ernment the use of such an independent dock at Mar- 
seilles. The same principle might be applied in still 
other familiar cases. Baron Aehrenthal, the then Austro- 
Hungarian foreign minister, authorized me in 1908 to 
propose it as a solution to Mr. Milovanovitch, the Ser- 
bian foreign minister, who replied that Serbia would have 
first to build a railway and she had neither money to 
build one nor enough exportable goods to bear the ex- 
pense of its upkeep if it were built. 

The principle, however, having once been admitted 
into the commercial polity of modern peoples, it may be- 
come, as a compromise, an additional method of meeting 
certain international difficulties. 

Note on Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro 

President Wilson classes in his eleventh proposition 
Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro together, but their 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 113 

position in the Balkans and in their relations to the present 
War are not the same. 

Serbia is the victim of an aggression. Rumania entered 
the War for purposes set out in her official records, which 
were still more deliberately than those of Italy purposes 
of conquest. 

Montenegro, an "outpost of Russian mischief in the 
Balkans" as it has been called, seems to have no par- 
ticular desire, according to competent opinion, to be de- 
tached from Serbia to which it belongs geographically, 
ethnographically, historically, linguistically and especially 
sympathetically . 

The three States in question must necessarily be dealt 
with separately and, to follow out an examination of 
their respective position in logical order, let us begin with 
Montenegro which belongs in every respect to the Serbian 
sphere, so much so that not very long ago it was alleged 
that an intrigue was pending to place the Montenegrin 
sovereign on the throne of Serbia and thus unite the two 
countries after the fashion of Scotland and England of 
old! 

The size of a State is no criterion of the magnitude 
of its sense of political responsibility. It may be more 
powerful in proportion to its political inferiority. This 
has been the case with Russia. Or from its very minute- 
ness it may be a danger to its neighbours as a result 
of its geographical inaccessibility and political irresponsi- 
bility. This has been the case with Montenegro. 

The question of whether Montenegro would be able 
to meet the obligations of independence without the assist- 
ance of Russia is a fair subject of inquiry. 

On the other hand, the grant of representative govern- 
ment in the place of the present existing absolute mon- 



114 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

archy, as part of the modern system with which Presi- 
dent ^Yilson is seeking to endow Enrope, is a democratic 
advantage which the people of Montenegro might not 
have the fnll benefit of, withont the economic expansion 
which would be obtained by broadening its area of un- 
fettered markets. 

The JNIontenegrins have never had any experience of 
self-government and under the guidance of their fellow- 
countrymen of Serbia they might be a source of strength 
to that country and contribute a share in some respects 
not unlike that Scotland has contributed to England, by 
their rough mountainous country and more adventurous 
nature, to the common benefit of two countries of the 
same race and language at present merely separated by 
an artificial political boundary. 

Serbia is a country of great promise. It has an able- 
bodied, healthy population, mineral resources, a fertile 
soil and all the elements that in cooperation bring pros- 
perity and social betterment to a people, but one : She 
is hemmed in by rivals who have a surplus of the same 
agricultural produce to dispose of as herself — pigs, 
cereals, poultry, eggs, etc., which on one pretext or another 
they do their best to exclude from their own area as well 
as from the outer world. Facilities for transport which 
the Hungarian Government, owner of the Hungarian 
railways, might have granted were never afforded and, 
on the contrary, as regards the Serbian pigs, their exclu- 
sion, from time to time, was decreed on the ground of their 
being tainted with trichinosis, an allegation the truth 
of which was denied absolutely by the Serbs. An outlet 
southward or eastward if it did not meet with similar 
opposition from rival interests was checked by transport 
difiiculties of an equally deterrent character. 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 115 

The obvious remedy for this state of things was access 
to the sea, and such access could only be obtained by 
expansion westward to the Adriatic or southward to 
Salonica or such arrangements by treaty as would secure 
outlets not dependent on intervening foreign authorities. 

Men like Baron Aehrenthal, who sought to conciliate 
rather than, like certain Magyar patriots, to exasperate 
her, saw the danger which might some day follow from 
this "bottling up" of legitimate Serbian economic aspir- 
ations. In 1908 he authorized me, when on a visit to 
Belgrade; to suggest to the Serbian Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Milovanovitch, whom I had met the previous year 
at the Hague and with whom I was on terms of friend- 
ship, that a leasing arrangement might be made for the 
construction of a Serbian railway to the Adriatic. Mr. 
Milovanovitch, who was one of the ablest of then living 
Balkan statesmen, told me he wished people would let 
Serbia alone, let her work at her destiny by herself and 
only interfere when asked. She had neither the money 
to build nor the produce to feed a railway of her own to 
the sea. This, however, did not prevent the continuance 
of international intrigue at Belgrade behind the back 
of Mr. Milovanovitch. Nor did it prevent the encourage- 
ment by Russian emissaries, protected by the Russian 
legation, of violent Serbian patriots, and European opinion 
became a great deal more excited over the Austro-Hun- 
garian decree of annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina than 
the Serbs themselves in whose interest the agitation was 
or was supposed to have been fomented. 

One of the curses of Serbia throughout her history 
has been that her capital is not only on her frontier, but 
is on a navigable river. Of all conceivable frontiers 
only a busier thoroughfare than a navigable river can be 
a worse one, for the obvious reason that unless it is 



116 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

closed to navigation a navigable river is a countvling 
seanu a bond, a junotiou, and the interest of the inhabi- 
tants of its banks is the removal not the ereatiou of any 
restraints to trade ai\d iutereourse. There are. no doubt, 
politieal fauaties who pursue ideals iletaehed from the 
material interests of peoples but history lias no instances 
of a majority of any ei>mnumity eonseiously sai'ritleing 
their obvious interest to the allruistie ambitions of idea- 
logues. The anomaly is HcctM\tuated by the fact that 
Belgraile. capital of Serbia, is conutvted by a bridge with 
the Ihmgarian town of Sendin. Revolutionary intrigue 
in both has always been fi>stcred by this facility of escape 
from either, a circumstance which has begotten much 
of the ill-ftvling whit-h for a generation has vitiated the 
relations between the neighbouring governments. The 
Serbian Administration, whenever dithenlty arose, emi- 
grated to Nish. the ancient Serbian capital, as it did 
on July '27, 101 1. on handing even an acqniesctnit reply 
to the Austn^-Hungarian Government. 

All observers of international atVairs are familiar with 
the battle instinct of piracy and contraband lalled "Tes- 
prit lie frontiere." In tlic course of time it stvms to 
evolve into a bliml hatred that makes no distinctions and 
admits no palliatives. The Belgrade press has always 
retlected this spirit and Serbia has been martyrised most 
unjustly for excess of word and act due merely to this 
"esprit de frontiere." Whatever arrang"ements of the 
new frontiers of Serbia are n\ade this consideration in 
the interests of permanent peace should not be lost sight 
of. 

Rmnania. like Serbia, has a homogeneous population. 
She ditfers from Serbia, however, in not belonging to any 
of tlie Slavonic groups. The Rumanians speak a Latin 



KCillAIJTY OK I'lfADIC CONDITIONS 117 

ton^no niul luivc preserved n fi,()<)(l (Ie;il of llie pride Jind 
reserve ol" llio Jlonum eoiKjuerors from wlioin lliey cluiin 
dosc(Uil. 

Itiiiriiiiii;i lijul j^ri<'ViUie<'S !i|i,;iiiisl. l)ol,li Slav Jirid Mji|f- 
yjir. ^J'lie. J{.iissi;in (iovermiK'iil,, lo repay lier for I Ik; 
ussislanee slie rendered in llie 'I'ureo-Jlnssian War of 
1S77 and lier hrilliaiil. and liislorie euplnri" of Plevna, 
look ferliKi IJessurabia from her und j^nvv. lier l.lie I)o- 
hrudjji swamj) in its place, a wrong whieli never (;eas(!d 
lo rankle in llie Hnmanian bosom lill ^(^ssaral)ia, was 
recently n'sLortui Lo lier. Against the Magyar the griev- 
ance is that a large Rumanian lliougli sornewliat mixed 
jtopnlalion li<vs across tlu^ frontier in Transylvania.. 
Soiillivvard, to«), in Macedonia, linmanians liavt; settled, 
for like tlu^ Slavs, llioy move and migrate io and fro in 
eommnnities. 1 1 is <'slimal<'d lliai as many as I, ()()(), ()()() 
of Knmanians iirc under JIungarian rul(% that there are 
!^, ()()(),()()() ill IJessarahia who from 1H7K were under Rus- 
sian rule, and I hat sonu; 500, ()()() are S(;a,lt(Te(] throughout 
Macedonia, while Rtnnania as a State has a j)oj)ulation 
of oidy 7,r>00,000. 

The diUicully Ihroiighout Tliingary is Ihat th<^ j)opula,- 
lion is not homogcMieous ; wilhin thirty miles of IJudapest 
lluTC are Slovak, Riunanian, and (icrman settlements 
where not a word of Magyar, the official language, is 
spoken. Th<; Rumanian settlemcuits grow Ihicker in 
j)opulatIon the nearer they are to the frontier till they 
form the majority in eastern 1^-ansyIvania. 

To bring all outer Rumanians within the fold could 
only be cIVected by deliberate ex(rhanges of poi)ulation 
and r<\sistanc<^ to the wandering instincts inherit(;d by 
these comnmnities of ICastern Kuropi^ from more or less 
nomad ancestors. 

This does not, however, ai)j)ly to a rectification of 



lis roi.i.vrsK ANn KKa^NsrinrnoN 

frv'>T\tior in osistoni rrnnsylvnnia whoro the pi^pulntion is 
praotioall^v all Uuinauinn ami whii*l\ is so vlistitiot from 
Magyar and Slav aliko that thon^ is no rt^ason linguistic, 
ethnographio or stviologioal against vlotaohing it (rou\ 
i\ count rv to wliicli it owes m>t even the indulgcuiv of 
luMug goverutHl in a language it nmlerstauils. 

To .\.nglo-Sa\ot\s questions of I'.astern l\uropc. espi'^ 
cially those <,\>nnecte«,i with the couununal instincts of 
ratvs so ilitTenMvt. stvin. more or less, involved in mystery, 
and in fact the mon^ they are appr\>aehed and understood, 
the gnNiter s«.vn\ to grow the ditViculties of solution and 
the remoter the ho|H\s of stvnring ai\y permanent peaci> 
amid the tlux and nMlux of the instable racial elements 
composing the populations and political entities of Austria- 
Hungary and the Balkans. 

TliF.ATY AM"* MUJTAKY CONVENTION PF-TWEEN 
KVNLVNIA ANn TUK IaTVNTK 1\>W KHS ' 

Treaty 

Article 1. Fraiuw Cm\it Britain. Italy and Russia 
guaranlvv the territorial integrity o{ the Kingilou\ of 
Rumania within the whole extent of its present frontiers. 

Artich' "i. Rumania \nulertakes to declare war upon 
at\d to attack Vustria-llungary in th.e couilitions stipu- 
latcvl in the military t'onvention ; Runtania also under- 
takes to bivak otY. as and from the declaration of war. 
all tvoi\omic and (.vmmercial intercourse with the enemies 
of the WWcd Towers. 

.tr/;',-/(- S. Frauiv. Cm\it Britain. Italy and Rujssia 
recogni/e Rumania's right to annex the territories of 
the .Vuslro-llungarian monarchy emnneralctl in Article i. 

1 IVjvnslittM for i\\c .-withv^r by :\lr. .\. >Vri^)jlit. 



EQUALITY OF IHADK CONDITIONS 1 IJ) 

Arlide 4. 'I'lic^ l)<)unduri<!H of l.lio Iv.rnlorU-H inenlionwl 
in I lie I'orcjJioiri^ iii(icl(! an; jih follows: 

'riic hoiindary liiu* hIiuII .slarl, upon llir I'riilli ;i,L Ji 
|)oinl. of l\\c |)rc,s<!nL fronlicr Ix'twcon ItiiHsia jiikI lluinania 
near Novos(;lil,/,a jumI will K<* "[' '-''•'^ '"'vc;!' to Uic (jiilifMan 
fronlicr iil l.lic condiMMu^i; of llu; IViilli and Ihe ilc.ri'.moH. 
Tlirn il, will follow IIm? fronl.i<'r of (iiilicia and liukovina 
and llial, of (iaiicia and HuriKJiry Lo l,li(* Sto^ r)oinl (Flill 
\iir»r>). TImmkh! il, will follow lli<i line of .s<^paraLioii of 
iJu; wJi,t(!rs of l,Ii(^ Tis/a and of I.Im; Ti/o in ord(M' Lo r(;a<;li 
llic Ti.sza aL llu; vill.'if^e of Tn^hw/a al)ov(5 llic i>oinl of 
(.•onfliJ<;nc(^ wil.li Llu'Ti/o. r'roni l.liis point, it will tU'Scciul 
the thalweg; of tlu; 'i'isza to a point four kilornctrcM holow 
its couiUwucv. with tlic Szainos, tli<^ village of Vasan^s- 
Nanieny to l)(^ included in llinn;uii;i,. It will then jiPO- 
ceed in s\. Honth-soutllW(^sterly direction uj) to a |)oint 
six kilonH;tn!S east of the town of l)(!})rec//en. From 
thiit point it will contiinie to tli<! (!risch at a jioint three 
kiloin(!tres below the junction of its two affhu'nts (the 
White Oisch and the Ra|)id (hisch). It will th(!n join 
the Tis'/a on a levcd with tlu; Al^yc; village, north of 
Si^zKedin, i>assin{^ west of the villag<;s of Oosliaza and 
lJek(;ssanison, describing a small curve three kilometres 
east of the hitter village, r'rom Algye, the line will 
descend the thalweg of tlu; Tis/;!, to its confluence with 
the Danube^ and lastly will follow tlu^ thalweg of the 
Danube^ to the pr(!S<'nt fronti(;r of Rumania. 

Rumani;i, undertakes not to ereet any fortifications 
in front of Helgrjidc! within a zone to be siibsequf^ntly 
.settled and to keep within the said zone only such forces 
as may be necessary for j)olice scrvi<;es. 'I'he royal 
Rumania (jovernment und(!rtakes to indemnify Serbian 
subje(;ls of lli<; IJanat region who, al)andoning their 
property, would wish to emigrate within two years of 
the conclusion of peace. 



HO COLLAPSE A\D RECONSTRUCTION 

Article ."). Runuiuia on the one part, and Fraiioo. 
Great Britain. Italy and Knssia on the other nndertake 
not to eonchule a separate peaee or the general peaee 
exeept jointly and simnltaneonsly. 

Franee, Great Britain. Italy and Knssia also nnder- 
take that, in the Peace Treaty, the territories stated in 
Article -i shall Ix^ annexed to the Rnnianian Crown. 

Article t). Rumania shall enjoy the same rights as 
the Allies in all that concerns the peace preliminaries and 
negotiations, and in the discussion of the questions which 
shall be submitted for decision to the Peace Conference. 

Article 7. The Contracting Powers undertake to 
keep the present convention secret uT\til the conclusion 
of the general peace. 

^lade hi tlve parts at Bucharest. August 4/1''. ^016. 

^lilitary Convention 

Article 1. In pursuance of the Treaty of Alliance 
entered into on August 4 17, lOlG. between Franee, 
Great Britain. Italy, Russia and Rumania, Rumania 
mobilising all her land and naval forces, undertakes 
to attack Austria-Hungary not later than August \5 'iS, 
lOlG (eight days after the Salonica offensive). The 
offensive operations of the Run\anian army shall begin 
on the same day as the declaration of war. 

Article "-2. As and fron\ the signature of the present 
convention and during the mobilisation and concentra- 
tion of the Rumanian army, the Russian army under- 
takes to operate in a specially energetic manner on all 
the Austrian front with the object of insuring the carry- 
ing out of the Rumanian operations above mentioned. 
Such action shall be especially offensive and strenuous 
in Bnkovina where the Russian troops must at least 
keep their positions and their present effectives. 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 121 

As and from Aii^,Mist IS/S^.'J, lOlC, the Russian fleet 
must insure I he s;if<My of the port of ('f)nst.'irilzii, prevent 
any hmding by enemy troojjs upon tlic Rumanian (toast 
and any incursion in the Danube, above the mouths of 
that river. 

Rumania, on the other hand will recognise the right 
of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to use the port of Con- 
sliintza and to take such steps as may be necessary against 
the enemy submarine fleet. 

The Russian Fleet units which shall nse the Danube 
whether to protect its shores or to lend assistance to the 
Ruiruinian land and sea forces shall be under the ord(TS 
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Rumanian armies and 
will eooperato ui)on the river with the Rntriaiiiiin monitor 
squadron. The details of such cooperation will be settled 
in accordance with the articles of the present convention. 

Article 3. Russia undertakes that, at the time of 
the mobilisation of the Rumanian army, she will send 
into the Dobrudja, two infantry and one cavalry division 
in onler to (;o5perate with the Rumanian army against 
the Bulgarian army. 

The Allies undertake to start a determined offensive 
by the Salonica armies, at least eight days before Ru- 
mania's entry into the war, in order to facilitate the 
mobilisation and concentration of all the Rumanian 
military forces. This oflensive shall start on August 
7/20, 1916. 

If, in the course of military operations, the Allied 
Powers, after agreement between the respective staffs, 
were to increase their military contingent cooperating 
with the Rum.anian army, such increase of forces shall 
not modify in any way the stipulations of the agreements 
entered into. 

Article 4. France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia 



umlortako to supply KutuaiiiiV with iminitious nuii war 
luatorial whioh sliall bo oarriod in Hinunni;in or Allioil 
ships and ixMivevtHl through Russia. 

Suoh dohvcries and cvuveyaucv shall bo oanlod out 
in suoh a way as to insnrt^ tho arrival into Huniania 
in as ivntinuous a n\ai\nor as possiblo of a uuuiu\uui of 
thrtv lumdtvd tons por day. oaloulatod upon ono month's 
supply . 

In tho ovout of tho AUios obtaining now moans of aiwss 
faoilitatiug tho transport of nuuiitions. Kuniania n\ay 
have the IxMiotit thonvf. 

Articlt' o. The Allies also inulortako as far as possible 
to supply Kuniauia with ]\orses. rubber, niedieines. artieles 
of food and equipuiet\t whioh she may ask aooording to 
quantities and oategories whioh will bo mutually agrtvd. 

Articie 0. The Allies shall plaiv at Rumania's dis- 
posal the teohnioal statT i\tHVssary for the mauufaoture 
within the «.vuntry of war mui\itions and material. 

Article 7. Immediately upv>n the signing of the pivsei\t 
convention, the statTs of the Russo-Rinuanian armies 
and the statT of the Salonioa armies shall \u oomvrt 
agree upon tho modalities of their e«.">C>peratiou. 

Any agrtvmout during the military opera ticMis of the 
Russo-Ruu\at\ian armies or any ohangi\ interpretation 
i^echiiirissnnent) or supplement with a view to a per- 
manei\t liaison, shall be settled at the ivspootivo Head- 
quarters as stattnl hert^under. 

Article 8. The oi^^H^ratiou of tho Allied armies iloes 
not imply any subordination of one of tho oontraoting 
parties to the other: it only operates as tho froo ao^vpt- 
anw of tho provis^ions or moditioations duo to tho gtMioral 
situation, to the requirt^monts of tho objoot in view and 
to oamaraderie in arn\s. 

Article 9. In prinoiplo. the royal Rumanian triH^ps 



EQIJATJTY or TRADE CONDITIONS 123 

and Iho Uiissiiin linijorial troops will preserve their own 
oornrn.ind, tlicir distiriet zone of of)er;j,tioris and eompletc 
in<l<'j)cii(jerie(; in tlu; (;on<Jijet of operations, 'i'he line 
of d(!mur(;ation l>etw(!en tfie two armies will run from 
Dorna-Vatra ]>y tlu; IJistritza and the valleys of the 
('liaio and Samtrseh rive'rs to Dehreezen. 'J'he ehief object 
of the Rumanian oj>erations, us fur us tlie military situa- 
tion south of the Danube may allow, will he through 
Transylvania in the direction of Budapest. 

The Russian troops provided for in Article 3 and in- 
tended to cooperate with the Rumanian army will he 
under the orders of the (yommander-in-('hief of the 
Rumanian urmy. 

In the event of the Russian continj^ent operating 
south of the Danube being cr)nsideraf)ly increased to 
such an extent as to make it of equal or superior strength 
to the Rumanian troops with which it will cooperate, 
such contingent may form, lipon leaving Rumanian 
territory, an indei>endent army which will be placed 
under the suj)r(;me Russian conuiiand. Jn that cuse, 
such urmy op(;rating outside Rumanian territory will 
have a distinct zone of operations and will be conducted 
in accordance with the directive lines of the supreme 
Russian f;oinmand while nevertheless com[>lylng entirely 
with the plans of the two General Headquarters on the 
bases hereinljefore agreed. 

If, by reason of th(! object in view, military operations 
with combined Russo-Rumanian forces were to take 
place, the command of such forces would be settled by 
the resficctive zone of operations. All orrJers and instruc- 
tions relating to the conduct of these operations will be 
drawn up in Rumanian and in Russian. 

Article 10. In princi[>l(;, in national territory as well 
as in territory occupied by the armies of one of the con- 



1-24 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

tract iiig powors. the armies of tlie other shall not ei\ter 
except if the general interest and the common object 
make it necessary ami subject to written ami prior consent 
in each particular case. 

Article 11. Upon every occasion \\hci\. ii\ the course 
of operations, the .Vllied armies shall tincl themselves 
coin[iellecl, for the carrying of troops, of provisions or 
military supplies, to use one or several railways upon the 
territory of the Allied Power, such use shall be settled 
for each i>articular case by ilclegates of the Main Allied 
General Headquarters. 

The administration and organisation of transport, and 
the provisioning by means of local resources shall in 
all cases devolve upon the territorial authorities. 

Article h2. Prisoners, war boi^ty and trophies taken 
by one of the armies shall belong to it. 

War booty taken in connnon battles ami on the battle- 
field shall be divided proportionately to the effectives 
taking part in the battle. Nevertheless in order to 
facilitate the provisioning of the Rumanian army, the 
Russian Imperial Command shall give up to the Rumanian 
army such war material and munitions forming of the 
mixed booty, as it may urgently need. 

Article 1:>. In order to coordinate the action of the 
Rumanian. Russian and .Vllicd armies and in order more 
safely to reach the military objects in view, a representa- 
tive of the Rumanian army, assisted if need be by a 
certain munber of other othcers, must be at the Russian 
and Allied Headquarters upon the opening of the Ru- 
manian military operations. Likewise I'epresentatives 
of the Russian and .Mlied armies and their assistants 
must be at the Headquarters of the Rumanian army. 

Headquarters of the cooperating armies must nuitnally 
inform each other and in good time of military conject- 



EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS 125 

ures, reconstruction of forces and the progress of opera- 
tions. 

Article 14. If, in the course of operations, situations 
arose necessitating the taking of new steps and raising 
questions not provided for in the present convention, all 
such questions shall be dealt with in each General Head- 
quarters with the delegate of the Allied army, but they 
shall not become final until after agreement by the com- 
manders-in-chief. 

Article 15. In order that the measures preparatory to 
the commencement of operations may be taken in good 
time, the contracting parties must agree upon the plan 
of military operation before the day of opening of hostili- 
ties by the Rumanian army. 

Article 16. Questions of armistice shall be decided 
by mutual agreement by the supreme commands of the 
cooperating armies. 

Article 17. The present convention shall remain in 
force from the day of signature to the day of the general 
peace. 

Made in five parts at Bucharest, August 4/17, 1916. 



CHAPTER VI 



COLONIAL EXPANSION 



There are two kinds of policy as regards colonial 
expansion. Jnles Ferry, in the eighties, used colonial 
policy as a method of diverting the attention of 
the French people from the "revanche" agitation 
which was exciting a dangeronsly active hostility 
on the part of Germany. Germany had grown in 
strength and had become considerably more than 
a match for France than she had been in 1S70. 
He was successful in calming the feelings of German 
statesmen but he excited the suspicions of the 
English. Then came a substitute for colonial 
expansion in the Russian alliance. INIr. Ribot 
tried the more direct method of at one and the same 
time giving France a sense of self-confidence and 
putting a brake on aggressive anti-German tenden- 
cies. Jules Ferry's colonial expansion was factitious. 
France had no surplus inhabitants, no expanding 
industries, the prosperity of which was necessary for 
the support of an overwhelming industrial popu- 
lation.^ 

English colonial expansion, on the other hand, 

'See Biirclay, "Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences", chap. 
VII. Loudon ami Boston, 1907. 



COLONIAL EXPANSION 127 

had been a natural growth in which government 
merely followed settlers and there has never been 
a conscious objective connected with any general 
scheme of policy among contemporary British 
statesmen. 

The other policy is that which was pursued by 
Germany for the deliberate purpose at first of 
obtaining outlets for her surplus population which 
her statesmen tried to retain within her allegiance 
and afterwards for that of obtaining markets from 
which lier industrial products could not be excluded. 

Italian colonial policy was based on analogous 
requirements. 

Thes(; two forms of colonial expansion policy 
have occupied much of the attention of the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices of Europe for over a genera- 
tion.' 

England's colonial policy has been natural but 
her continental Asiatic expansion has been more or 
less like that of France, one of imperial conquest, 
conquest which the historian may be entitled to 
regard as that of muscular, semi-barbarous Euro- 
peans over refined races of civilised Asia, far more 
intelligent and though I ful than th(; troops who had 
overcome them. As I wrote in 1914, I am not 
patriot enough to have any sympathy with annexa- 
tion of territory not susceptible of European coloni- 
sation. I venture to quote what I then said, because 

' Russian expansion was not colonial hut connected with a geo- 
graphical situation which is likely to produce the same rivalries whether 
Russia ultimately settles down under a Republican or an imperial 
regime. 



128 COIXAPSE AND RECONSlTxl'CTION 

it is becoming every day more applicable to the 
place of Europe in Asia and because President 
AVilson's tifth proposition shows his keen eye has 
perceived that native right, thought and civilisa- 
tion will have to be respected by Europeans as a 
part of the organisation, method and policy the 
preservations of peace will entail : 

"Much as one n\ust admire toiling European 
civil servants who give their lives to good and useful 
administrative work, one ought to have nothing 
but loathing for the frivolous pretexts etnployed 
to justify the barbarous slaughter of harndess 
people who rise to defend their homes against the 
invaders and the hypocritical pretences put forward 
as a reason for tlepriving them of their independence. 

*' In the case of an overpeopled coimtry there is 
son\e sort of excuse of self-preservation for the 
annexing of territory. To annex merely to find 
employment for an oversupply of candidates for 
the ci\il service is hardly fair to the rest of man- 
kind. 

"The retribution which history generally has 
in store for tlie crimes of nations is already beginning 
to gather on the horizon of the Far East. Those 
who have not the power to defend the possessions 
they have wrested from the weaker hands of native 
Asiatic conmuu\ities may yet have to surreniler 
them to conquering Powers who have borrowed 
Western methods of aggrandisement and with 
which a future generation may have to reckon." ^ 

'Barclay's *" Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences", p. SS. 
London and Boston, 1907. 



COIX)NIAL EXPANSrON 121) 

President. Wilson's fifth f)roj)osition deals witli 
ih(; eoloniul proMcin. On Ixliulf of ihit Allies Ik; 
has proniisiMJ Kuroj>e, it is tr»i(*, "a free, open-minded 
and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims", that is to say those of Europeans in the 
non-Kuro[)('an and non-American world. But he 
goes furllicr and Jias promised the worhi in general 
"a strict observance of the principle that, in deter- 
mining such f|uestions of sovereignty, the Inten'sts 
of the populations concerned shall have; equal riglit 
with the ('(juitaljh; claims of the government whose 
title is to be determined." 

President Wilson confines his [)roposition to 
colonial claimn. It does not aj)[>ly to settled colo- 
ni(^s, sovereignty over which is not in qu(^stion, and 
which do not come witliin the purvi(;w of the peace 
negotiations. In using th(; word "colonial", does 
he, however, distinguish between dependencies and 
colonies, that is, }>etw(!en non-Euro[)<;an countries 
under the "mastery" of another, but which, owing 
either to climatic unsuitability for colonisation by 
Europeans or to other reasons, are without per- 
manent colonists, and extra-Europc^an colonial settle- 
ments, j)r<ji)erly speaking? '^I'he Er(;nc]i lump all 
foreign dependencies and colonies together under 
th(; name of "colonies", such a distinction for any 
j)ra(;tlcal ])urposes not existing for France, whose only 
colony, properly speaking, forms part of a British 
dominion. President Wilson seems not to make the 
English distinction, no doubt for the same reason 
as the French, viz. : that the United States have 



i:>o coi.i.vrsK ANH Kix ONS I iurru>N 

expaiiilod latorally :\\\d tluMr only l"oivii:;n sottlo- 
inonts aro not oolouios. proporly spoakiuu. 

V\\c Prosidont's proposition, wo havo soon. invoK os 
two isjivios. riio ono is impart iality in tlio adjust - 
niont of olaiuis anioui; tho boUi^oront Slatos. and 
tho otlicr, obsorvanoo of tho timo-liouonroil prin- 
oiplo, hitliortv>. alas, nioro hononrt\l in tho broaoh 
than tho obsorvanoo. that tho intorosts of tho 
populations oonoornod nuist havo oqual Nvoi^ht 
witJi tho oi^nitablo olaims of tho govornmont whoso 
titlo is to bo dotorniinod. 

To bogin with tho lattor. tho tirst IVonoh inipros- 
sion was that tho Prosidont was olainiiui; a voioo 
for tho indi^onous populations of tho oountrios in 
qnostion. Though tho original toxt doos not uivos- 
sarily boar that oonstruotion, it might havo booT\ 
a roatHrmation of Amorioan polity as doolaroil at 
tho Inrlin Wost-Afrioau Conforouct" of ISSo. whon 
an atton\pt was mado by tho Uuitod Statos ropro- 
sontativo, Mr. Kasson. to apply intornational law 
to nativo racvs in so far as rogardod "roi'ognition 
of tho right of nativo tribos to disposo frooly of 
thomsolvos and of thoir horoditary torritory." 
In oonformity witli this prinoiplo. tho Amorioan 
Ciovornmont. Mr. Kasson said, would havo gladly 
adhorod **to a moro oxtondod rnlo to bo basod on a 
prinoiplo whioh should aim at tho Noluntary oon- 
sont of tho nati vos whoso ommtry is takon possession 
of. in all oasos whoro thoy had not pro^"i>kod tho 
aggrossion," ^ This suggostion. howovor. was not 

» IV^iHxvl of Jauuary 81, 18S(». l\»rliameutJiry P.-iiH^rs. C4.Si>l, p. liiW. 



(;(HX)NIAI. JOXI'ANSION 131 

acted upon, jiimI I lie ('onfcrcnci; confined itself 
to esljiMisiiiii^ rules for l.lie occupation of Africa 
by European StJilcs. 

KcjUJiiity anion^ Christijin States and tliose, 
sjieli as .Inj),iti, assimilated to them, is a principle 
of llxir inlercoiMse. " UrKtivilised" racres and com- 
munilies are not, in i^Jiropeari piactiee, treated as 
equals. 'i'lieir f.',<)vernm<'nts an; treated as local 
and in sneli pra('tice lliey are annexed to tlie domin- 
i()?is of "civilised" States wil.liout refenmce to their 
will or consent. WJier(^ tn^aties have been mad(; 
with natives, a!iy appeal to Ijiem lias hillHTto 
been rallier by way of evid<>nee of [)rior occnj)ation 
than as involvin;^ any (jueslion of native ri^lil. 

Pr(^sid(mt Wilson says "th(^ interests" of th(« 
poi)nlations conc'erned nmst be balanced against 
tjie lille of the clainiants. If this view is insisted 
and a('l<'d upon, it will mean either that a sp(;cial 
charier or man<la,le containing protective provisions 
will have to be oblained from I he I*ea(re CJonfererjce 
or that some international aulhority be constituted 
by it, or that a special conference })e h(;ld to complete 
and generalise the work of the l^russels African 
Conference of 1880-1800. Tn any case, I rhiid< the 
l*residenl is right to bring the matter forward, 
and it is to be hoped that one of the sections of the 
Congress of ]*eace will deal with the rights of natives 
by providing a (charter for Ifieir i)rotection. 

Tlie impartial adjustment of colonial "claims'* 
involves naturally the c|uestion of the German 
colonies. The word "claims" may also involve 



132 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

that of colonies of a size disproportionate to the 
requirements of the dominant nation. I am always 
using the word ** colonies" in the vague, non-British 
sense. No doubt a section of the Congress will be 
told off to deal with this adjustment, for any attempt 
to repartition Africa would give rise to difficulties 
almost as great as those wuth which we are confronted 
in Europe. 

With what territorial areas will the Congress 
be given by its constituents the right to deal? 
We have seen that the President himself confines 
its scope to "claims." Does the word "claims" 
include all areas the status of which has been changed 
during the War.^^ If so, the British Foreign Secre- 
tary's statement that no colonies will be returned 
to Germany may be premature. Is the phrase 
"open-minded and impartial adjustment" intended 
to cover such cases as the Cape to Cairo railway, 
the granting of reasonable demands for coaling 
stations and exchanges of colonial settlements 
with a view to enabling different nations to have 
such stations? Will the scope of the Congress* 
powers in this connection be defined and limited? 
Certain German colonies will no doubt be "claimed" 
by other Powers as a matter of geographical right. 
Should not certain principles be established as to 
what constitutes priority among different claims ? 

This adjustment of colonial claims on the equitable 
basis of taking the reasonable requirements of 
claimants into account and balancing the industrial 
and demographic exigencies of the one and the 



COLONIAL EXPANSION 133 

other, if carried out in a spirit of impartiality, may 
for many years cheek the revival of the spirit of 
international unrest which comes from overpopu- 
lation, overproduction, insuflScient sources of raw 
materials and all the other causes of overseas 
ambitions. 

Those who get the upper hand in preparing the 
deliberations of the Congress of Peace will do well 
to insist on younger men than those who are respon- 
sible for the contemporary breakdown of European 
statesmanship being taken into Council. The colo- 
nies are the concern of younger men. The future 
appertains to them and not to those who have 
spent their lives in the cramped and narrow space 
of a Europe which already begins to belong to the 
past and where the old men who govern it are 
necessarily too ignorant of new conditions, too 
exanimated by the fatigues of a life of petty political 
detail, to be entrusted with matters requiring breadth 
of treatment by supple minds in the prime of their 
elasticity and genius. 



NOTE TO CHAPTER VI 

Note on Consequences 
England's Position as a Mother of Nations 

As the military power of European nations in the 
present age of universal conscription is largely in pro- 
portion to the magnitude of their population, it is obvious 
that a thiokly peopled country which is ncaring the maxi- 
mum of its productivity will fall automatically into a 
position of military inferiority as compared with a thinly 
peopled one which has a wider margin of prospective 
productivity. 

Great Britain, though not Ireland, is approaching 
such a maxiuuun. 

A consequence of the necessarily restricted population 
of Great Britain is that as the military disproportion be- 
tween her and other Great Powers increases, she becomes 
more dependent on her overseas emigrant population. 
On their loyalty to the motherland she has to rely for her 
raw materials, an absolutely diminishing quantity within 
the home area, and for her food, a relatively and condi- 
tionally diminishing quantity. 

Her interest, therefore, is not only to cultivate the 
friendship of her neighbours but to maintain and 
strengthen social and racial links among all Anglo-Saxon 
communities without assuming that colonies will prove an 
exception to the universal rule of life that a healthy 
maturity is incompatible with the preservation of any 
form of suzerainty. 



CHAPTER VII 

CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 

The sixth, seventh, eighth and eleventh of Presi- 
dent Wilson's propositions deal with evacuations, 
the ninth with a territorial adjustment, the tenth 
(presumably) with the Slav populations of Austria- 
Hungary and the thirteenth with Poland. 

These form a group to which the second of the 
four points set out in President Wilson's July Fourth 
speech refers : 

"The settlement," he said, "of every question, 
whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic 
arrangement or of political relationship" shall 
be "upon the basis of the free acceptance of that 
settlement by the people immediately concerned 
and not upon the basis of the material interest or 
advantage of any other nation or people which 
may desire a different settlement for the sake of its 
own exterior influence or mastery." 

This declaration of the rights of peoples, com- 
munities and races, for it applies to all pending 
questions affecting groups of mankind, is in the 
nature of a charter for the protection of smaller 
and weaker groups against pretensions and ambi- 
tions of existing States and its acceptance by them 



1S6 COLLVPSE AND KECOXSTRUCTION 

is one of tlio ivciprocal pledges on the faith of which 
the War has been brought to a conehision.^ 

' A strango |\uli;imontary divlaration was made by the Italian 
l\ime Minister. Sijinor Orlando, as reported in the Temps of Deivmber 
IT and IS. 1S)1S, whieh is not an enivuragins: syn\ptom as rogjirds the 
spirit in which the wori^l of the Italian C>overnnient has Invn pledged. 
I give it "in oxteuso'" as n^ported without further amunent : 

" Au Senat. le president du cvniseil a pri^tito de la discussion des douzi- 
^mes provisoires, pour faire ci^unattre offieielement lo point de vue 
de ritalie dans les questions de repiiration des attentats allemands et 
des gsiranties neivssain^s jx>ur une paix durable. 11 a r^serv^. en quel- 
que inesurv". la liberie de son gouveruement dans Tappreoiation de oes 
g-a ran ties. 

" ' Llialit',' a dit M. Orlando. ' h'cv/ pas m ftixl de dt'mobilist'r m quelque 
mf-anrc que ce soit. On doit emvre ganler intact tmit lappannl de 
guerre. Les difficultes inmuHliates qu'il s'agit de surnionter ne sont pas 
diiuinuees; eJles soni peut-etre accrues. Qujuit aux questions inter- 
nationales, il ne c<.nj\-ient psis d'anticipej en public sur ce qui fait I'objet 
de discussions pjirticulieres. et d'autre part les droits et les aspiratiotu 
de ritalie sont sulwrdonnes d des direi'tires dun caractere general qui 
peutent prcvaknr ou ne }xis prhaloir a la conference de la paix. 

"'Certes, les directions qui prevaudwnt devront t^tre justement 
appliquees en Italic; les puissamvs alliees ont adhere a des principes 
qui. par leur porltv, ivnduirvuit au reglemcnt eies questions qui iuteres- 
sent notre jviys. Ces principes sont ccux du president AVilson. Nous 
les avons pr^couises; ils doivent elever la guerre aux plus purs id^tUs 
d'humanit6. A ces principes nous serums tideles; vmis je ne saurais 
dire jusqua quel point, car, dans la pratique, des obstacles peureni surgir 
qui nous obligeront « nvourir a des tcm}}eraments. 

"'Quant si la repanition des dommages. c'est une question qui est 
en dehors de toule discussion relative avix principes a adopter dans un 
sens ou dans I'autnv I'u des postulats de M. ^^iIson exclut rindeninitfi 
prise au sens traditionnel du mot. mais il est hors de doute que les 
directives qui seront adoptees par les autres nations pour la reparation 
des dommages seront adoptees aussi pour I'ltalie. (Tr^s vives ajipro- 
bations.) ' 

"M. Orlando est ctin\"!iincu qu'aucune personne de bon sens ne 
pourni peuser qu'un des Etats ennemis puisse ^tre exon^r^ de payer sa 
dette sous pretexte qu'il a pu s'ctTriter. 

" Daus la suite du discours dont nous avons donn£ hier la premi^ 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 137 

There is only one form of "free acceptance" by 
a people known to democracy and that is the decision 
by the majority ascertained by secret ballot. Ac- 
ceptance may be presumed from circumstances 

partic, le president du conscil italicn a expos6 encore comme il suit les 
points de vue du gouverncmcnt dans les questions litigieuses 6ventuelles 
(Vougo-Slavie, Grdce, Asie-Mineure). 

" M. Orlando a declar6 : 

"'A cette heure decisive pour I'ltalie, nous ne serons pas animus 
d'un esprit d'intransigcancc qui nous fcrait considercr des probl6rae3 
si complexes et qui doivcnt Hre rcsolus, sculemcnt d'un c6t6. Cctte 
methode pent convcnir surtout i qui parlc pour son compte et n'assume 
pas de responsabiiitds. 

"'Ne voulant pas que des violences soient commises k notre egard 
nous n'en userons pas contre d'autres, et parce que nous sorames inspires 
d'un sentiment de profonde confiance non seulement dans la loyaute — 
cette declaration est d'clle-m6me superflue — mais dans la cordiale 
amitid de nos allies, nous savons pouvoir compter sur une egale et 
r6ciproquc confiance et nous sommes sOrs que toutcs les difficultes objec- 
tiveraent cxistantcs scront licureusement surmontet*.' 

"M. Orlando a assur6 que le gouvcmemcnt tiendra, qu'il a tcnu md-me 
un trcs haut compte des considerations presentees par M. Tittoni sur 
les questions concernant Tindemnit^ de guerre, la reorganisation de la 
M cditerranic orientate el des colonies. 

"Aprcs avoir rappele le r6le de I'ltalie dans la guerre ainsi que I'cffort 
et les victoires de la France, la creation d'une coasiderable armee bri- 
tannique et les inapprdciables services de sa marine, I'intcrvention, cnfin, 
des Etats-Unis et I'apport de ses ecrasantcs rcssourccs qui ont et6 
pour I'ennemi le coup de gr^ce, M. Orlando a rcvendique pour I'ltalie 
le droit de faire valoir son point de vue dans toute grande question 
mondiale : 

"'Maintenant que nous obtiendrons, comme c'est notre droit pri- 
mordial, de pouvoir fermer les portes de la maison (Tres vifs applaudisse- 
ments), que le peuple a montre son pouvoir de defendre sa maison contre 
toute menace, maintenant commence pour I'ltalie une periode de com- 
munion Internationale, qui affirme son interet partout oii les questions de 
caractere 6conomique et spirituel portent I'ltalie en contact avec les 
autres races. II n'y a aucun imp6rialisme dans ce programme. Les 
rapports auxquels je fais allusion, j'entends qu'ils se developpent dans 



138 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

and it may be free according to circumstances but 
experience has sho\\Ti that presumption of a popuhir 
opinion is open to doubt. ^ 

It may be diflficult to proceed with due respect 
to democratic principles in all cases. Before a 
referendum can be held a register of voters must be 
established and this implies an electoral law fixing 
who is entitled to figure on the register. To adopt 
an electoral law the preliminary step of creating 
a provisional constituent assembly may be neces- 
sary. These different steps take time and mean- 
while events proceed, irrevocable measures are 
taken, public opinion may grow excited and the 
fait accompli may become an obstacle to the exer- 
cise of principles essential to the vindication of 
popular rights. This seems to be the case in Alsace 
where the presumption is that the Alsatians are 
favourable to a re-transfer to French allegiance, for 

la libre et f^conde concurrence des acti\'it^s pacifiques, mais il est essentiel 
que ritalie ne soil plus absente du camp politique international, car 
on pent affirmer, en general, qu'il n y a pas de question internationale 
ne touchant pas a un juste interet de I'ltalie. 

"'Xos enfants. qui siirent tragiier cette terrible guerre, sauront ouvrir 
le radieux chemin de la paix.' 

" Tons les ministres et de nombreux senateurs felicitent M. Orlando. 

"On approuve, a lunanimite, Tortlre du jour suivant aecepte par 
le president du conseil, M. Orlando : 

"*Le Senat, sfir d'interpreter le sentiment unanime de I'ltalie, a 
pleine confiance que I'opuvre des delegues italiens h la conference de 
la paix assureni & la patrie la rtalisation de nos aspirations et de ses 
interets moraiix et maierieh scelles par le sang verse et par les sacrifices 
soutenus et couronnes par la victoire commune.* " 

* The prognostications of the result of the British election of 1906 
of practically the whole press of the country turned out wrong — so 
wrong that instead of the victory expected by the Unionists, the Liberals 
obtained one of the largest majorities on record. 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 139 

though the Alsatian deputies to the Reichstag 
were not elected specifically to deal with the subject, 
they may be supposed to possess the confidence of 
the electors generally. 

Annexation without the deliberate consent of the 
people immediately concerned, however, implies 
different consequences from those arising out of 
deliberate consent. In the latter case the people 
are free to judge whether the conditions are suitable 
and decide accordingly. In the case of presumed 
consent, they exercise no such option and in the 
absence of any presumption as to conditions, 
it is just that their existing laws, local institutions 
and privileges, religious convictions and habits 
be respected. This implies further that any measure 
of autonomy they possess be maintained until, 
upon all matters concerning them, the inhabitants 
decide otherwise. This has been the English prin- 
ciple of conduct towards all the European peoples 
within the British Empire. It applies to Scotland, 
Ireland, the Channel Islands and to all the colonies, 
to all its dependencies of European origin. It is 
an Anglo-Saxon principle which the Allies have 
accepted in accepting President Wilson's formulae 
and is too precious a guarantee of popular freedom 
to be treated with indifference. 



NOTES TO CIL\PTER VII 
Note on Language as a Political Question 

Nobody who has not been in rural Hungary or in 
Macedonia can reaHze the meaning of what is called 
the "Language Question." 

Within twenty miles of Budapest the traveller meets 
villages, — Slav, German and Magyar. — as separate 
from each other in appearance, habits and language as 
the nations of Europe. 

The manager of the Hungadi enterprise told me in 
1908 that he had to take his employees from one or 
another village entirely, for tliey would not mix. They 
were like a trade union. They worked as villages. The 
only advantage in a strike was that he could get a village 
of another race to replace them ! 

One of the Hungarian Ministers told me that he had 
to be able to speak to his constituents not only in Magyar 
and German but also in some Slav language and even 
Rumanian. On one occasion, he had not been able to 
make himself understood in a village of his constituency 
where an unfamiliar language was spoken. It turned 
out that this village had grown recently into importance 
through the return from America of emigrants who had 
left it a number of years earlier and that most of them 
knew English. He addressed them in English ! 

The mixture in Macedonia is of still greater variety, 
including Greeks as well as Rumanians and even Al- 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 141 

banians. The obvious remedy for this confusion and 
the resulting complication of government is to enforce 
the teaching of a common language and this has been the 
policy in the United States, which might otherwise have 
become an exaggerated Macedonia. 

When other States have tried the same system, there 
has generally been some rival State which had an interest, 
or supposed interest, to stir up resistance. In German 
Poland it was the neighbouring Poles, in Hungary the 
Rumanians, in Austria the Russians, in Macedonia the 
Greeks, and all have carried on political intrigues on the 
spot against the dominant State through the schoolmaster 
and excited sympathy for alleged grievances by repre- 
senting the dominant State as an oppressor. 

Yet, there is no hardship in adding a common language 
to the vernacular one. France became unified through 
this very process and not only patois of French but Breton 
and Basque, which are distinct languages, are nevertheless 
still spoken as before the union. 

In ignorant and degenerate cities, among an illiterate 
middle class and in countries where elementary education 
is regarded as a means for keeping the working classes 
"in their place", knowledge of two languages is regarded 
as the privilege only of the traveller. In Russia, Ger- 
many, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Italy, ability to 
speak one or even two foreign languages is so widespread 
that Anglo-Saxon and French monolinguists belonging 
to a class which has the means of being properly educated 
are regarded as intellectual inferiors and justly so, for, 
in fact, those who are excluded from the bulk of their 
fellowmen's language, literature and thought are not 
equal to those who have access to them. This is observ- 
able in the self-sufficiency and aggressive ignorance of 
monolinguists when they judge men and things of other 



14<! COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

countries, winch tlicy are n\uch more prone to do under 
the intinence of Httle than great knowledge. 

While, on the one hand, enforcement of the learning 
of a conunon language is a reasonable method of cementing 
the heterogeneous elements of which all existing European 
States are composed, and is in the interest of the indi- 
vidual members and posterity of every connnunity. the 
maintenance of the local language is a matter of senti- 
mental attachment, a part of the local usage and manners 
with which it becomes oppression to interfere. Connnou 
language makes a united nation to such an extent that, 
as I have said, it has been a deliberate State metliod of 
enforcing Americanism in the United States as it was of 
Gallicising tlie inhabitants of France. Common language 
on the otlier hand has been the basis of all the nationality 
movements which have been agitating Europe for a cen- 
tury, niovemcnts which culminated in the recent war. 

A reaction may now set in. Knowledge of the ditli- 
cultics of carrying out a redistribution of Europe on the 
principle of homogeneous language, which is the only 
feasible test of "nationality", and due perception of the 
political unrest which arose out of it accentiuite the reac- 
tion in favour of some form of internationalism which 
can preserve European peoples from international irrita- 
tion due to nationalist-linguistic intrigue. 

Note on Aijs.\ce-Lorraine * 

1. Alsace 

There are thrtv distinct periods in the history of Alsace 
since its annexation to France under the Treaty of West- 
phalia in KUS. 

1 A mist nuisl.it iou of President Wilson's note was cirv-ulattni in France 
as regards Alsace-Lorraine. It misled the French uot only as to his 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 143 

The first is that from 1648 to the French Revohition, 
i.e. until 1780 ; the second from the Revohition to its 
annexation to Germany in 1870, and the third since then 
to now. 

The character, traditions and presumed tendencies of 
a people cannot be detached from the story of its evolu- 
tion, and its history, as told in the abstract by students 
of past records, is liable to reflect their personal bias. 
History is but evidence of impressions of the past exist- 
ing at the time in which it is written. There are facts, 
it is true, which cannot be dissolved in the prisms of 
prejudice and there are the contemporary records them- 
selves of events. 

meaninj; Imt also as to the consistency of Ins propositions generally. 
His words were that "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in 
the matter of Alsace-Lorraine which has unsettled the peace of the 
world for nearly fifty years .flioiild be righted in order that peace may 
once more be made secure in the interest of all." 

The French translation of this in the approved version was: "le 
prejudice cause a la France C7i 1S71 en ce qui conecrnc V Alsace-Lorraine 
. . . devra etre r6pard afin que etc." The word devra means in French 
shall or must, not should. 

Even so judicious a critic of events as the Temps, as recently as 
October 10th, argued on the strength of this mistranslation that a reply 
by Germany accepting the President's proposition implied that she 
"accepte des niaintenant entre autres choses de restituer I'Alsace- 
Lorraine h la France." 

Now, though the President's words did not exclude such a solution 
and it is practically certain that this will be the solution, the President 
did not say what the mistranslation of his eighth proposition implies 
and acceptance of it by Germany did not have the unrestricted meaning 
the Temps and other commentators assumed. Moreover, as he has 
laid down in the second proposition of July 4th that every question 
of territory shall be settled on the basis of free acceptance by the people 
immediately concern(>d, the use of the words tmisl or shall in his eighth 
proposition would be inconsistent with this principle, and the last 
criticism the Prcsicl;-nt is likely to lay himself open to willingly is that 
of inconsistency. 



144 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

The first period in the history of Alsace — that from 
1648 to 1789 — embraces a period of 1-il years. 

The Thirty Years' War was the beginning of a new era 
in which the Holy Roman Empire became more or less, 
so to speak, localized. It was identified with resistance, 
on the one hand, to nascent Germany and, on the other, 
to the French sovereign, monarch over a more or less 
unified France. The rivalry between the Hapsburgs 
and the Bourbons had been the keynote of French inter- 
vention in the Great War. Richelieu's policy was to 
occupy the left bank of the Rhine, but his object in secur- 
ing an entrance into Germany was the defence of tlie 
Protestant German States against Austria. At that time 
Alsace was divided and subdivided into imperial landgravi- 
ates, imperial cities, the free city of Strasburg, ecclesiasti- 
cal signories, villages under the overlordship of the Dukes 
of Lorraine and Wiirtemberg and the Elector Palatine. 

After the defeat of the Swedes at Nordlingen in 1634 
Richelieu had thought the time was come to intervene 
and curb the power of Austria by cutting off her connnuni- 
cations with the Low Countries and Franche-Comte. 
In a few months, by invasion and diplomacy, he had suc- 
ceeded. On obtaining the cession to France ^ of Alsace 
he gave assurances that the occupation would not be 
final and that on the signing of peace the occupied terri- 
tory would be retroceded to the Empire. 

Duke Bernard of Sachsen-Weimar contested the rights 
of France over Alsace. He had entered the country, 
nevertheless, under secret engagements with Richelieu 
as to territorial compensation and, on his death in 1639, 
Richelieu succeeded in concluding a military convention 
under which the French king became, though inconclu- 
sively, virtual sovereign over Alsace. 

1 Treaty of Paris. November 1, 1634. 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 145 

The war continued to drag on for several years more. 
Attempts were made to bring about negotiations for 
peace, but the weaker party, hoping always for some 
turn of fate to extricate them from the clutches of the 
French and Swedes, refused to listen to any overtures 
from those who had invaded their territory. 

At length, in January, 1647, at MUnster, the prelimi- 
naries of peace were signed and the final treaty (Peace of 
Westphalia) concluded in October, 1648, by which Alsace 
was placed under the sovereignty of the kings of France 
without entirely emancipating it from its German neigh- 
bours. 

At the outbreak of the French Revolution the Land- 
grave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Duke of Wiirtemberg 
and the Bishop of Spires held fiefs and dependencies in 
Alsace. Mulhouse was a Republic allied to the Swiss 
cantons. Free cities managed their own affairs. Under 
a customs union with neighbouring countries on the other 
side of the Rhine, Alsace was economically separated 
from France and linked up with Germany. 

"Looking at the map of France and reading the his- 
tories of Louis XIV," observes Arthur Young in 1789 in 
his "Travels" at the time of the Revolution, "never 
threw his conquest or seizure of Alsace into the light 
which travelling into it did : to cross a great range of 
mountains, to enter a level plain inhabited by a people 
totally distinct and different from France, with manners, 
language, ideas, prejudices and habits all different, made 
an impression of the injustice and ambition of such 
a conduct much more possible than reading had 
done. ..." 

In short, there was no effective annexation of Alsace 
during the French monarchy. 



146 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

"Doubtless," says Professor Seailles, summing up 
the transition over the centuries of Alsatian history to 
absorption into the French Republic at the end of the 
eighteenth century, "for many hundred years Alsace 
had belonged to the Holy Roman Empire and had been 
mingled more or less with its history. But the Roman 
Empire was not a modern State and still less a nation. 
It included principalities, bishoprics, electorates, free 
towns with their laws, customs and existence, only 
attached to it by a more or less nominal bond of suzerainty. 
In 16-48 at the signature of the treaties of Westphalia the 
Empire gave up Alsace to France, as a reward for the 
protection accorded by the king to the protestant princes 
of Germany. Such a transmission of suzerainty was 
then in nowise contrary to the law of nations. Peoples 
were not their own masters, and provinces, never dream- 
ing of protesting, went from hand to hand, b^^*- contract, 
marriage, inheritance, ruse or violence. The wisdom 
of the royal government respecting their tongue, tradi- 
tions and religion soon made good and loyal subjects 
of the Alsatians, The French Revolution cro^\Tied the 
work begun by the French kings : the suppression of 
privileges, feudal rights and all the complications and 
inequalities of the old order were welcomed entliusi- 
astically." 

It is an amazing instance of the sympathetic character 
of French culture that although the French domination 
anterior to 1870 had only been truly effective from the 
Revolution onwards, that is some twenty years longer 
than since the annexation of Germany, it has not been 
effaced either by deliberate effort or by the greater ma- 
terial prosperity Alsace has since enjoyed. It is esti- 
mated by Grerman authorities themselves that as many 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 147 

as twelve per cent, of the population of Alsace-Lorraine 
still speak French habitually, eighty-seven per cent, speak 
the Alsatian dialect, and only ten per cent, neither, that 
is High German, habitually. 

The difficulty of finding a solution for the question of 
Alsace is not so great as that of finding a solution which 
will assure the peace of Europe and not merely pass the 
grievance from one side of the Rhine to the other. 

Professor Seailles reminds us of the German claim 
made to Alsace from 1813 to the War of 1870. "Fichte," 
he says, "with splendid daring, in the very sound of 
Napoleon's drums, delivers his celebrated 'Speech to the 
German Nation', in which, uplifting its courage, he 
inflamed its pride. 'The German Nation' is hence- 
forward a living active idea, — its unity is not accom- 
plished, but it exists in the thought of learned men and 
philosophers, the will of patriots and the ambition of 
statesmen. In 1813, after the retreat of Russia, Ger- 
many rises up for the War of Independence. The French 
armies are not yet driven out, — they still occupy Ham- 
burg, Lubeck, Danzig, big German towns, when already 
eager, passionate voices ring out in denunciation of the 
Treaty of Westphalia, which recognizes and sanctions the 
overlordship of France on German soil. In his pamphlet : 
*Der Rhein Deutschlands Strom, nicht Deutschlands 
Grenze' (The Rhine, a river of Germany, not a frontier 
of Germany), the poet, Moritz Arndt, vehemently re- 
claims Alsace and exacts 'the frontier should stretch 
as far as echoes the German tongue.' Pamphlets, poetry, 
newspaper articles catch up the refrain, develop and 
enlarge it in a peculiar mixture of earnestness and ped- 
antry. Princes, generals and ministers are all moved with 
the same passion. All expect from victory and diplomacy 
the realisation of their national hopes." 



148 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

"Hardly had Napoleon III," he goes on elsewhere, 
"fallen in the snare Bismarck stretched for him, and 
long before any decisive event, the German intellectnals, 
Strauss, Mommsen and so on, like their fellows of 1813, 
in papers, pamphlets and open letters, lay down the 
problem of Alsace and demonstrate that this soil of 
the Empire ought to come back to Germany, whatever 
may be its will, by the simple reason that it belonged to 
Germany in tlie past." 

The question of the reannexation to France of Alsace is 
not an easy or simple proposition, especially as it is com- 
plicated by a religious question, the greater part of the 
population being Roman Catholic. At Thann, where 
the French have been in possession since 1914, the exist- 
ing institutions have been respected and no attempt 
made to supplant them by those of France. It is not 
consistent with French constitutional polity that this 
recognition of separate institutions should be extended 
to the whole province, but it is diflScult to see how any 
other method will satisfy the Alsatians. 

If the polity of France were that of the United King- 
dom the difficulty would be singularly diminished. 

By granting Alsace independent institutions, religious 
as well as social, by allowing it to keep its own laws, fol- 
lowing the example of the United Kingdom in respect 
of Scotland, or following the British example in Ireland 
by even granting it Home Rule, the internal problem, 
if it arose, might be more easily solved. 

As regards external difficulties, even this relative in- 
dependence may not prevent the re\nval of the old 

* " Alsace-Lorraine : The History of an Annexation ", by Gabriel 
S^ailles, Professor at the Sorbonne, Paris, 1916. 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 149 

patriotic agitation for the recovery of the province by 
Germany. 

Two other solutions, — annexation to Switzerland on 
the one hand and neutralization on the other — have 
been suggested, but there has been no manifestation of 
opinion among the Alsatians themselves in favour of 
either. 

2. Lorraine 

The question of Lorraine is a totally different one 
from that of Alsace. There has never been a difference 
of opinion concerning the racial affinity of the inhabitants 
of the part of Lorraine annexed to Germany in 1870. 
They not only speak the French language but geographi- 
cally form part of the ancient province from which the 
part in question was deliberately detached on grounds 
of defence against repetition of the French aggression 
of 1870. 

It has been stated again and again during the War 
that the preservation of Metz as a defence against French 
invasion has ceased to have any serious importance. 
I do not venture to express an opinion on the subject 
beyond remarking that, whether it is so or not, and 
whether intentionally or not, and whether merely owing 
to shortage of the necessary artillery or not, French 
armies let Metz alone. 

The strategical question may, as alleged, have lost 
importance. After 1870, however, Lorraine acquired 
for Germany an economic importance which quite over- 
shadows the alleged original considerations. I say 
"alleged" because it seems incredible that Bismarck 
should not have known that geologists did not confine 
their calculations of the extent of the iron-ore strata to 



150 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

the area then in course of being worked in Lorraine. He 
was a poUtician and not an economist and possibly did 
not expect German}' to become the second greatest 
metalhirgist in the world. Otherwise he might have 
annexed the whole iron field — the Baasin dc Brieij — 
for France was at his mercy. 

Of the total iron-ore resources of Germany in sight, 
namely, ^2,840,000,000 tons, ^>,180,000.000 tons are credibly 
estimated to be the proportion supplied by the Lorraine- 
Luxemburg district. Of the probable further resources of 
1,067,700,000 tons the proportion credited to Lorraine- 
Luxemburg is 500,000,000 tons. 

This Lorraine-Luxemburg district is one of the largest 
known iron-fields in the world. It is about evenly divided 
— between Luxemburg and German Lorraine on the 
one hand and French Lorraine on the other. 

M. Tribot Laspiere in the Genie Civil (April 7, 1917) 
places the contributive proportion of Luxemburg of 
270,000,000 tons at between one ninth to one tenth of 
that of German Lorraine. 

It is seen that German Lorraine has played a very 
important part in German metallurgy' — no less than 
eighty per cent, in her iron supply. 

In an instructive little treatise by M. Francis Laur — 
La France, rcinc du fer — the author demonstrates the 
enormous superiority in ore production of France over 
both Great Britain and Germany and establishes the 
proportion of fifteen for France against one half for 
England and one for Germany. France, in fact, has 
twenty-nine times more iron ore in sight than Great 
Britain and fourteen times more than Germany, without 
of course counting the German Lorraine which if rean- 
nexed to France would raise pro ianto the proportion in 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 151 

favour of France and against Germany. M. Laur esti- 
mates, however, that German Lorraine alone smelts 
as much ore as the whole of France. 

The iron-fields of the whole Lorraine district are esti- 
mated at the present rate of extraction of 20,000,000 
tons per annum to have a life of about eighty years 
still to run. 

If France is the Reine du fer in Europe, she is far from 
the Reine du charhon — at least in production. Geologists, 
nevertheless, assert that she is one of the most favoured 
countries in Europe in possession of coal seams capable 
of development. Anyhow, France meanwhile suffers 
from a coal shortage while Germany has more than she 
can employ within her own boundaries. 

M. L. de Launay in La Nature (May 4, 1918) estimates 
that the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France would 
be tantamount to an addition of fifty per cent, to the 
coal production of France, but he assumes that the whole 
of the Saar coal-field, which before 1815 was under French 
rule, will be comprised in the reannexation. 

As regards the Bassin de Briey in French Lorraine it 
produces more ore than French metallurgy requires. 
Nearly half of it, M. Tribot Laspiere calculates, before 
the War was exported to foreign countries, twenty-four 
per cent, to Belgium, six per cent, to Luxemburg, ten 
per cent, to Germany and one per cent, to Great Britain. 

The whole Bassin de Briey was under German occupa- 
tion and probably at its maximum exploitation from the 
beginning of the War. 

By way of postscript I may add as regards Alsace in 
reference to the famous potassic deposits at Mulhouse, 
that the whole production, owing to other large deposits 
in Germany, is available for export. 



\5^ COUArSE AND RECOXSTRITTIOX 

If tl\o question of raw materials is destined to play 
an important part anionj:: tJie sanctions proposed for the 
preservation of peacv in the fntnre. international inter- 
dependence in relation to them is mvessarily a condition 
of their etlicacy. 

XoTK ox •* Rkapjtstmfnt ok tuk l-'uONTn^KS OF 
Irvi.Y " 

President Wilson in his ninth proposition says that 
"readjnstment of the frontiers of Italy shonld be etfeotu- 
ated along clearly recognisable lines of nationality." 

"Nationality" ! 

What is nationality? Does the l\esident mean, like 
the anthor of the famons German patriotic song: "Wo 
ist des Dentschen Vaterland" which kindled the German 
claim to Alsai.'C. with the refrain: "Wo die dentsche 
Sprache klingt", that the Italian Fatherland is wherever 
the Italian langnage is s^x-tken? If this is the meaning 
and speaking the same language is to W a principle, 
condition or motive in the readjnstment of Enn^pe, there 
is an obvions cv^mclnsion as regards Alsace. Bnt in prac- 
tice langnage is no test within the area of the Mediter- 
ranean or in that whicli extends sonth of the great line 
of monntain ranges which separates sonthern from north- 
ern Enrope. Any attempt to apply it wonld resnlt in 
a liopeless tangle of racial riddles and political nncH^r- 
tainties, as anybody* who knows Hnngary. the I^alkans 
and the Mediterranean will testify. It wonld atTeet 
almost every habitable square mile of the whole area 
and imply a readjustment in accordance with the there 
prevailing linguistic chaos. 

As regards the Italian language in particular it has re- 
maineil in one form or anotlier, since the time of the 
maritime supremacy of the Italian republics, a common 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 153 

veliiclc of speech along the whole of the Eastern Medi- 
terranean seaboar<I, from Tunis to Nice, even in the 
Levant where the Byzantine Greek influence resisted and 
mainliiinod its- su|)rcinacy. 

If nationality cannot for any practical purpose be 
regarded as a test, what is the alternative ? 

Race ? 

Who is capable of speaking at the present day with 
any certainty of race apart from language ? 

Historically sj)cakiiig, nationality is a political fact 
based on the existing circumstances of modern State 
development in which geographical and economic con- 
siderations, commercial outlets, the course of navigable 
rivers, mountain ranges, mineral resources and all the 
material requirements of existing communities working 
out their own salvation amid the contending rivalries of 
their neighbours are creating common interests, a common 
polity and a common language out of sheer necessity. 

It must be, I think, in this sense that a historian like 
President Wilson speaks of "nationality" and of its 
"clearly recognisable lines." In other words, if they are 
not clearly recognizable ; if they do not tally with geo- 
graphical and economic situations, the lines would not be 
clearly recognisable. 

The following observations of a belligerent statesman, 
if not complimentary to all Italian statecraft, are, at 
any rate, interesting. I leave them to speak for them- 
selves : 

"Italy is in a totally different position in the present 
war from France or England. France was deliberately 
attacked. England came to her assistance under treaty 
obligations in defence of Belgium and, by extension, of 
France. In neither case was there an option. Both are 



154 COLLAPSE .VND RECONSTRUCTION 

in the war for self-preservation — Italy entered the 
war frankly for conqnest and honestly and straightfor- 
wardly she made no attempt to disguise her purpose. 
The story of how she came into it has been undisguisedly 
told in the Italian 'green book.' 

"I do not think the most passionate lover of any coimtry 
or its j^eople is boimd to resjxx^t any government which 
may happen to be in othce any more than true patriotism 
binds him to respect that of his own. This platitude 
applies to more than one country engaged or disengaged 
in the present war. I nnist confess that after reading 
every word of the Italian 'green book' from start to 
finish I can find no palliative for Italian motives in regard 
to the war and, if it was popular in Italy, this must be 
ascribed to the same causes that have made the war 
popular everywhere — causes of many kinds which 
every department of enquiry will have to sift out and 
analyse before modern scepticism will begin to entertain 
any sense of appeasement. 

"The Italian government began by making a claim for 
compensation under Article 7 of the Austro-Italian treaty 
of alliance (of which the text is not given) for possible 
changes of equilibriimi in the Balkans which might result 
from the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia. 

"The text of the article in question is as follows: 

"'Austria-Hungary and Italy, who aim exclusively 
at the maintenance of the ^ttatiu^' quo in the East, bind 
themselves to employ their influence to hinder every 
territorial change detrimental to one or other of the 
contracting Powers. They shall give each other recipro- 
cally all explanations requisite to the elucidation of 
their respective intentions as well as of those of other 
Powers. If, however, in the course of events the main- 
tenance of the status quo in the territory of the Balkans 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 155 

and on the Ottoman coasts and islands of the Adriatic 
Sea and the iEgean becomes impossible, and if, either 
in consequence of the procedure of a third Power or of 
other causes, Austria and Italy be constrained to change 
the status quo by a temporary or lasting occupation, this 
occupation shall take place only after previous agreement 
between the two Powers on the basis of the principle 
of a reciprocal arrangement for all the advantages, 
territorial or other, which one of them may secure out- 
side the status quo and in such a manner as to satisfy 
all the legitimate claims of both parties.' 

"A long correspondence lasting from December 9, 
1914, to May 4, 1915, ensued in which both parties were 
obviously talking against time, the one preparing for 
war and the other hoping the war would come to an end 
before the otlier was ready. 

"The negotiations were conducted with the utmost 
secrecy which Baron Sonnino on behalf of the Italian 
government insisted upon and the secrecy applied even 
to the Italian parliament which he states in the 'green 
book ' he had no intention of taking into his confidence. 

"As the correspondence proceeds Baron Sonnino, who 
seems to be acting without any mandate whatsoever 
from even the government of which he is a member, 
and certainly none from the parliament to which he is 
responsible, offers Austria-Hungary a free hand in Serbia 
in return for compensation which he eventually claims 
in eleven articles covering all the Italian-speaking fringe 
of Austria and more, the Dalmatian Islands, demanding 
recognition of Italy's absolute sovereignty over Valona 
and renunciation of Trieste, to be made a free port along- 
side the new Italian frontier. In return for immediate 
execution, i.e. immediate possession, Italy was to under- 
take to maintain 'perfect neutrality' during the war. 



156 COLLAPSE .VND RECONSTRUCTION 

Baron Biirian declined to accept all this programme 
and especially to grant immediate possession and Italy 
therenpon declared war. 

"Throughont the correspondence Baron Sonnino con- 
stantly refers to the 'national aspirations' of the Italians, 
the prevailing sentiment favonrable to the Western 
Allies and the danger of letting the pnblic know that 
negotiations \Yere pending. One rises from the perusal 
of it with a sense of tlie appropriateness of President 
^Yilson's demand in the third of Iiis propositions as set 
out in the speech of the fourth of July when he asked for 
'tlie consent of all nations to be governed in their con- 
duct towards each other by the same principles of honour 
and respect for the connuon law of civilised society that 
governs the individual citizens of all modern States.' 

"President Wilson in the second of the July fourth 
principles requires tliat the settlement of every question 
* whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic arrange- 
ment or of political relationship* shall be determined on 
the 'basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by 
the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis 
of the material interest or advantage of any other nation 
or people which may desire a ditferent settlement for 
the sake of its own extension, influence or mastery.' 

"The President has not intimated whether he regards 
this of application just as much to populations of a few 
thousands as to those of millions. 

"If it applies to a rectitication of the Italian frontier 
it will be necessary to ascertain the feeling of the popula- 
tions which may be no more desirous, for aught we know, 
of being annexed to It;ily than French Canada or Mauritius 
at tlie present day is of reannexation to France. 

"A witty Italian has said of his country that it is 
like a veal chop a la Milanaise, the more you beat it. 



CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION 157 

the wider it grows. That Italy will 'widen' northwards 
under the contingent promise of President Wilson's 
ninth proposition is more than |)robable. All her Balkan 
claims will necessarily be subordinated to the general 
settlement of the Balkans in which the claim of Serbia to 
a seaboard as a geographical necessity has now been 
recognised by Italy. Whether they will coincide with 
Baron Sonnino's claim to the annexation of the Dalmatian 
Islands or of Valona remains to be seen. In any case, a 
promise has been made to all the peoples concerned in 
such transfers from one sovereignty to another that their 
consent shall be obtained — and their consent cannot 
be, at least according to Anglo-Saxon ideas, a matter of 
surmise, whatever the degree of i)robability." 



CHAPTER Ylll 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 



I MUST confess that I feel some anxiety in ap- 
proaching this snbject. President Wilson in his 
second proposition demands abiiolufc freedom of 
navigation "alike in peace and in war." 

Absolute freedom of navigation is surely incom- 
patible with war! Freedom in war time can never 
extend beyond the limits laid down by the tradi- 
tional policy of the United States, and international 
practice has not yet reached even that stage. 

"A belligerent nation," wrote the Department 
of State at Washington on ^larch 30, 1915, "has 
been conceded the right of visit and search, and 
the right of capture and condemnation if upon 
examination a neutral vessel is found to be engaged 
in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband 
of war intended for the enemy's government or 
armed forces. It has been conceded the right 
to establish and maintain a blockade. It is even 
conceded the right to detain and take to its own 
ports for judicial examination all vessels which 
it suspects for substantial reasons to be engaged 
in unneutral or contraband service and to condenm 
them if the suspicion is sustained. But such rights, 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 159 

long clearly defined both in doctrine and practice, 
have hitherto been held to be the only permissible 
exceptions to the principle of universal equality 
of sovereignty on the high seas as between bellig- 
erents and nations not engaged in war." . 

The United States delegates at the Hague Con- 
ference of 1899 submitted the following resolution 
which may be taken to represent the United States' 
extreme view : 

"The private property of all citizens or subjects 
of the signatory Powers, with the exception of contra- 
band of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure 
on the High Seas or elsewhere by the armed vessels 
or the military forces of any of the said signatory 
Powers. But nothing herein contained shall extend 
exemption from seizure to vessels and their cargoes 
which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the 
naval forces of any of the Powers." 

The same resolution was submitted at the second 
Hague Conference in 1907. 

It is seen that absolute freedom does not exist 
in war time, but subject to the restrictions set out 
in the above resolution England can only endorse 
the President's claim. In fact the British Govern- 
ment in a despatch dated September 26, 1914, 
upheld the same view of the principle of freedom of 
the sea. 

"The freedom of the seas for peaceful trading 
is an established and universally accepted prin- 
ciple; this fact has never been more clearly recog- 
nized than in the words of the report of the third 
committee of the Second Peace Conference which 



160 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

dealt with the question of submarine contact mines : 
— Even apart from any written stipulation it 
can never fail to be present in the minds of all that 
the principle of the liberty of the seas, with the 
obligations which it implies on behalf of those who 
make use of this way of communication open to the 
nations, is the indisputable prerogative of the human 
race." 

If this is the principle, there can be no absolute 
freedom of navigation so long as the right of search 
for contraband, and even the contingent right to 
stop and in case of need overhaul the cargo to ascer- 
tain whether the ship's papers tell the truth are 
maintained. Perhaps President AYilson means some- 
thing new, but it is diflScult to conceive a change 
implying even that neutral ships shall be permitted 
to carry contraband to belligerents without "let 
or hindrance." ^ 

As regards freedom of navigation in time of peace. 
President Wilson's thesis is also open to an objec- 
tion, the objection that his meaning is not clear. 
In time of peace the only restrictions on navigation 
since the old and now extinct attempts to exert 
dominion over the sea beyond the territorial waters' 
limit are just those the President refers to in his 
proposition, viz. : those instituted by international 
covenants such as "fishery agreements", the "sale-of- 
drink-at-sea conventions", "slave-trade-prevention 
arrangements" in the Indian Ocean. Otherwise 
absolute freedom of navigation exists everywhere. 

1 Mr. Lansing's letter of November 5th (see p. 30) merely releases 
reservations made by the Allies without specification of their nature. 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 161 

Does President Wilson refer to the German 
contention that there is no real freedom of the sea 
unless independent coaling stations are available 
for the navigation of every nation having a consider- 
able merchant marine ? Does he mean that the 
power to close the Mediterranean or the Suez Canal, 
or the Panama Canal, or the Dardanelles are restric- 
tions on the freedom of navigation ? Does he mean 
any or all of these ? 

I will assume that he means them all. 

As regards coaling stations, it is not an unreason- 
able contention that facilities should be granted 
to enable the navigation of different nations to 
proceed without necessity of recourse to foreign 
aid or exposure to foreign interference. The diffi- 
culties are physical and material. Two antagonistic 
views, however, may both be reasonable. This 
is all I think it desirable to say at present on a sub- 
ject which does not lend itself to controversy while 
negotiations are pending. 

President Wilson does not refer in detail to any 
maritime channel but the Dardanelles, of which he 
says that they "should be permanently opened as 
a free passage to the ships and commerce of all 
nations under international guarantees." 

The experience of Belgium shows how little 
reliance can be placed on the word "guarantees" 
if it is merely used as meaning a written pledge. 
Belgium's neutrality was guaranteed. President 
Wilson evidently does not suggest that the freedom 



162 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosporus 
should depend on the bare promises of a treaty, 
but probably that it should be guaranteed effect- 
ively, that is, let us suppose, by an international 
commission sitting permanently on the spot and 
managing the straits, not merely as regards legal 
supervision, but as regards the physical aspects 
of their navigation, the policing of their user, 
the maintenance of existing and erection of new 
lighthouses, if need be, and all that is necessary to 
insure free and safe navigation. This is not only 
feasible but highly desirable, and I venture to sug- 
gest that dangers to navigation should not any- 
where be left solely to the devices of the adjacent 
States but that the expense of providing against 
such dangers should, as a common interest and in 
common justice, be proportionately shared by those 
who share in the benefit. 

It has been suggested that all channels communi- 
cating between open seas should be internationalised, 
that the Suez and Panama canals should never 
be liable to closure, but shoidd be as free for traffic 
as the high sea itself. Already they are supposed 
to be open to all the world on equal terms. The 
suggestion is that the traflSc through them should 
be placed under the direction of International 
Boards, that the expenses of keeping them open 
and in good condition should be borne by propor- 
tional contributions on the part of the States using 
them and, of course, that the territory necessary 
for the exercise of such direction should be as inter- 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 163 

national as the canals themselves and in all possible 
contingencies be inviolate. There is a great deal 
to be said in favor of such a view. 

There are also the Straits of Gibraltar. So long 
as the rock of Gibraltar exists it will dominate the 
straits. A Spanish political leader of the greatest 
eminence, while out of office, during the War and 
not long ago, raised the question of restoring it 
to Spain. Contiguity obviously is not a reason 
for doing so. It is practically an island and has 
been for over two hundred years a British possession. 
Its importance for most nations is that possession 
of it should not be abused. England has exercised 
her possession in keeping the straits open. Can 
any other State be trusted to conduct itself better? 
The only practical alternative would be suppression 
— that is suppression of the fortress. This would 
not insure the freedom of the straits unless the 
two coasts were placed under some international 
regime guaranteeing the maintenance of the sup- 
pression. Otherwise, it would be upon the good 
faith of the government of some other State or 
States that the due observance of engagements 
entered into would depend. If so, then why pro- 
pose any change — England has not shown any 
greater indifference to international engagements 
than other States. She has the power to keep 
the straits open, a power which Spain does not 
possess. She can maintain her possession while 
Spain might not be strong enough to resist capture 
by a more powerful surrounding enemy. I offer 



164 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

these arguments for consideration by those who 
suggest that British possession of Gibraltar is not 
in the general interest. There are many situations 
that are anomalous and open to criticism, but it 
is always easier to criticise than to do better. 

That the President includes in this second point 
what is called "England's mastery of the sea" is 
not likely. That mastery has never been used in 
peace time for any purpose inimical to the interests 
of any self-respecting States and since the adoption 
of the Hague Convention of 1907 making the Drago 
theory a part of International Law, she cannot even 
use her maritime power against those who fail 
in their civil engagements. 

The President can hardly have in view the reversal 
of a geographical fact. England's supremacy at 
sea has no reference to objects of conquest or coer- 
cion, but is a necessary consequence of her island 
position and the insufficiency of her possible food 
supply to meet the requirements of a population 
growing at a rate far exceeding any prospective 
increase of such food supply from domestic sources. 
It is not an "offensive" element in her policy, but 
a purely "defensive" one. It means securing the 
connection between an island State and the outer 
world and especially with the colonies and depend- 
encies which are the chief source of her ditferent 
supplies of all kinds, for just as the stomach of a 
people needs food, the stomach of their mills and 
factories needs materials. 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 165 

All the old ideas of exercising dominion over any 
area of \hc sea are dead and iniernalional associa- 
tion for the perservation of equality for all is likely 
to be one of the fundamental axioms of future 
statesmanship beyond the scope of political con- 
troversy. 



NOTES TO CH Vm^KR VTIl 

Note on Immunity from Capturk, of rKivvTE 
Property in \\vai. W\k 

This subjtx't for the time being sootns to liavo altogether 
collapsed. No question of International \.i\w had given 
rise to more ardent controversy and no subject when 
the emergency for decision arose excited so little. The 
votaries of renunciation of the right of capture were 
mainly actuated by tlie fear that the food supply of the 
British Islands might be cut off by a victorious maritime 
Power or, if not, be seriously jeopardised bj' enemy 
cruisers. 

Events have shown the wisdom of not having yielded 
to the advocates of abolition, though possibly it would 
not have much mattered what theoretical decision had 
been taken before the War. 

It nuist not however be supposed that the subject is 
extinct. Far from being so. it will probably be among 
those considered by at any rate tuie of the committees 
of the Congress of Peace. 

It is therefore desirable to place before the reader 

* At the Interparliamentary Ctmferenoe at Brussels in 1910 nt which 
the subject was brvnight up by the advocates of aboHtion. I suggested 
that if Cmwt Hritaiu wett^ seriously to ixmsider the projHx^al as feasible 
as an island State she would Iv thnnving away her chief weapon without 
ptv>isibility of finding any c\im\«i[Hnuling equi^^llont to Readjust the bilan^v, 
but niy \oiiv wjis the exception to an otherwise unanimous chorus in 
favour of aboUtion. 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 167 

not only the historique of the question l)ut also the excep- 
tional character of the En^'lish position. The subject, 
in fact, will no doubt be discussed without reference to 
a war which, by its practical suspension of law in general, 
has done nothing cflcctively to alter the relative attitudes 
of nations towards permanent questions. 

The subject is one of very old standing as between 
the United States and Great Britain. 

As long ago as 1783, Benjamin Franklin, in the course 
of treaty negotiations with Great Britain, expressed him- 
self as follows : 

"It is for the interest of humanity in general that 
the occasions of war and the inducements to it should 
be diminished. If rapine is abolished, one of the en- 
couragements to war is taken away, and peace therefore 
more likely to continue and be lasting. The practice 
of robbing merchants on the high seas, a renmant of the 
ancient piracy, though it may be accidentally beneficial 
to particular persons, is far from being profitable to all 
engaged in it, or to the nation that authorises it." 

He suggested the following article for the treaty then 
under discussion : 

"That if war shall arise between Great Britain and 
the United States, which God forbid ... all merchants 
or traders with their unarmed vessels employed in com- 
merce, exchanging the products of different places, and 
thereby rendering the necessaries, conveniences, and 
comforts of life more easy to obtain, and more general, 
shall be allowed to pass freely unmolested ; and that 
neither of the Powers shall grant or issue any commission 
to any private armed vessel, empowering them to take 
or destroy such trading ships or interrupt such com- 
merce." 

This provision was not adopted. 



lOS COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRLC TIOX 

In his message of December, lSo4. IVesident Pierce 
referred to then pending suggestions on tlie subject in 
the following terms : 

"The proposal to surrender the right to employ pri- 
vateers is professedly founded upon the principle that 
private property of unotTending noncombatants, though 
enemies, should be exempt from the ravages of war; 
but the proposed surrender goes but little way in carrying 
out that principle, which equally retjuires that such 
private property should not be seized or molested by 
national ships of war. Should the leading Powers of 
Europe concur in proposing, as a rule of international 
law, to exen\pt private property upon the ocean from 
seizure by public armed cruisers as well as by privateers. 
the United States will readily meet them upon that 
broad ground." 

The refusal of the United Stiites Government to sign 
tJie Declaration of Paris, it is well known, was a con- 
sequence of the refusal of the Powers to agrtv to this 
proposal. 

Secretary Fish concluded, on February '2t>. 187L 
a treaty with Italy, Article XII. of which provides that 
in the event of war — 
■ "The private property of the citizens and subjects 
(of the contracting States), with the exception of con- 
traband of war. shall be exempt from capture or seizure, 
on the high seas or elsewhere, by the armed vessels or 
by the military forces of either party ; it being under- 
stood that this exemption shall not extend to vessels 
and their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port 
blockaded by the naval forces of either party." 

In his message of December. 1808. President McKiuley 
again asserted the American doctrine on the subject in 
the following passage : 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 169 

"The experiences of the last year })rinj^ forcil^ly home 
to us a s(Mis<^ of tli<; bunions Jind tlu; vv;ist(; <jf war. We 
desire, in cornniou willi most civilised nations, to re- 
duce to the lowest possible [ioiriL l.lic darna^ro sustained 
in time of war by peaceful trade and corrunerce. It is 
true, we may suffer in such cases less than other com- 
munities, but all nations are damaged more or less by 
the stat(^ of uneasiness iirid ap|)reliensi()n into which an 
outbr(!ak of hostilities throws the entire commercial 
world. 

"It should be our object, ther(;foro, to minimise, so 
far as pniclicable, lliis in<;vil,able loss and disturbance. 
This j)uri)ose can probably best be accomplished by an 
international agreement to regard all privaie [)rop(;rty 
at sea as exemjjt from cai)ture or d(^slrucLion by the 
forces of belligerent Powers. The United States Govern- 
ment has for many years advocated this humane and 
beneficent princii)lc, and is now in a position to recom- 
mend it to other Powers without the imputation of selfish 
motives. I therefore sugg<'st for your consideration that 
the Executive be authorised to correspond with the 
Governments of the principal maritime Powers, with a 
view of in(H)r[)orating into [hv. j)ermanent law of civilised 
nations the principle of the exem[)tion of all private prop- 
erty at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or de- 
struction by belligerent l*owers." 

Resolutions were introduced in both Houses of Con- 
gress endorsing this recommendation. The shortness 
of the session, however, prevented final action on the 
resolutions, "but the sentiment which was developed was 
overwhelming in favour of adopting the rule of exemption, 
under proper restrictions as to contraband and blockade. 
Congress at the same session passed the Naval Personnel 
Bill, which abolished prize money, thus removing one 



170 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

of the strongest incentives for capture of private property, 
and eliminating all questions as to the rights of seamen 
and officers." 

The subject, it is seen, has been consistently kept 
in the foreground by successive Presidents, and it has 
repeatedly been brought to the notice of foreign govern- 
ments; but owing chiefly to the unwillingness of Great 
Britain to countenance change in the existing practice, 
acquiescence on the part of other governments has 
remained until now without effect.' 

This brings us down to the following proposition 
made in 1899 by the American delegates at the Hague 
Conference : 

"The private property of all citizens or subjects of 
the signatory Powers, with the exception of contraband 
of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the 
high seas or elsewhere by the armed vessels of the mili- 
tary forces of any of the said signatory Powers. But 
nothing herein contained shall extend exemption from 
seizure to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt 
to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of any of 
the said Powers." 

This proposition is not clear. The words "or seizure" 
in the phrase "exempt from capture or seizure'', which, 
by the way, are borrowed from the Italo-American Treaty 
of 1871, do not tally with the reservation as to contra- 
band. Seizure may be indispensable to ascertain whether 
the arrested vessel has contraband on board or not. 

The Conference ruled that the subject was beyond the 

1 In 1870. on the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, Count Bis- 
marck telegraphed to flie Prussian Minister at Washington : "For your 
guidance, private property on high seas will be exempted from seizure 
by His Majesty's ships without regard to reciprocity." The exemption, 
however, was not maintained by Prussia. 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 171 

scope of its deliberations. The same proposition was re- 
newed at the Conference of 1907 but it has not yet been 
subjected to any searching oflScial examination. 

The discussions on the subject of immunity have 
generally down to now been based on the assumption 
that the object of reform should be to assimilate property 
at sea to property on land, that the natures of war at 
sea and war on land are identical, and that immunity 
of private property on land is already admitted as a 
principle of International Law. 

I shall endeavour in this note to clear away some 
of the obscurity which has resulted from a too desultory 
treatment of the subject, to examine it in its connection 
with the recognised laws of war generally, to discuss 
whether indeed, in itself, immunity is desirable and 
whether it is possible for a great maritime country like 
England to agree to the gratuitous alienation of a right 
which is necessarily of supreme importance to it. 

The object of war is to force the antagonist to sue 
for peace. It is the ultima ratio in all international 
differences. Originally the belligerent exercised the 
right of life and death over the whole armed and unarmed 
population against which he was warring, and he claimed 
the same absolute power of disposition over all their 
property. It is an armed conflict between communities 
or nations. These communities or nations may be 
represented by constituted authorities and armies — 
but it is not a duel confined to these authorities and 
armies. Armies are recruited from the communities 
and nations behind them, and it is on the vitality and 
material resources of these communities or nations that 
the continuance of the war depends. 

Attenuation of the cruelty of war followed the rise 
of standing and regular armies and the consequent more 



172 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

marked distinction between soldier and civilian. They 
took the form of compounding for plunder, of systematic 
requisitions and contributions, the confining of the right 
of levying these to generals and commanders-in-chief, 
the institution of quittances or bills drawn by the bellig- 
erent invader on the invaded power and handed in pay- 
ment to the private persons whose movable belongings 
are appropriated or used, and of war indemnities. These 
were methods of lessening the hardships of war as regards 
private property on land of the subjects of belligerent 
States. 

Their object, however, was not to arrive at immunity, 
but to develop an organised system by which damage 
and losses to individuals, whom the fortune of war had 
brought into immediate contact with the enemy, can be 
spread over the whole community. Those, therefore, 
who speak of the immunity of private property in warfare 
on land do not accurately describe the existing state of 
things. 

To substitute systematic for chaotic seizure and plunder 
on land was obviously in the interest both of invader 
and invaded, and humanity in this as in many other 
cases has only been another term for the common interest 
of mankind. 

Grotius described war as the letting loose of "some 
fury with a general licence for all manner of wickedness", 
and now we know, and let us hope will remember for some 
years to come, the terrors of an invasion which has meant 
the seizure of the food on which the inhabitants of the 
invaded country were dependent for existence, the carry- 
ing away of bedding, implements and horses, the slaughter 
of livestock, the appropriation of the stored seed grain, 
not to speak of gratuitous barbarities, the most reasonable 
explanation of which was a terrorisation which missed 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 173 

its purpose, even when all those cruelties were practised 
systematically. 

The considerations which have led mankind to regulate 
the practice of war in regard to private property on land 
do not arise in the same form in connection with private 
property at sea. Here there is no question of seizing 
the livestock or the bedding, or the food or the utensils 
of the private citizen. Only mercantile ventures are 
concerned. If ship and cargo are captured it may be 
hard upon the merchant but such captures do not directly 
deprive him of the necessaries of life. Yet, as in the 
case of war on land, its hardships have been attenuated, 
and progress has been made by developing a more sys- 
tematic procedure of capture of private property at 
sea. Thus exemption from capture is now allowed by 
belligerents to enemy merchant ships which, at the 
outbreak of war, are on the way to one of their ports, 
and they also allow enemy merchantmen in their ports, at 
its outbreak, a certain time to leave them. A somewhat 
similar practice exists as regards pursuit of merchant 
ships which happen to be in a neutral port at the same 
time with an enemy cruiser. Privateering was abandoned 
by the Powers which signed the Declaration of Paris 
of 1856, and so strong is public opinion in Europe against 
it that the United States and Spain in their war, though 
not signatories of the Declaration, both spontaneously 
waived the right to resort to it. 

Yet the only difference the abolition of privateering 
makes is the substitution for amateur or irregular war- 
ships of vessels officered and enrolled as a part of the 
official navy. 

Lastly grew up, on grounds similar to those which 
have led to the indulgence shown to private property 
on land, a now generally recognised immunity from cap- 



174 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

ture of small vessels engaged in the coastal fisheries or 
petty local navigation and their appliances, rigging, fittings 
and cargoes, provided they are in nowise made to serve 
the purposes of war, an exemption which has been con- 
firmed by the Hague Convention of 1907 numbered XI. ^ 
This has all been done with the object of making the 
operations of war systematic, and enabling the private 
citizen to estimate his risks and take the necessary pre- 
cautions to avoid capture, and of restricting the acts of 
war to the purpose of bringing it to a speedy conclusion. 

We have seen that there is no immunity for private 
property yet known to the laws of war. War, by its 
very nature, prevents the growth of any such immunity. 
The tendency in war on land has been to spread its 
effects over the whole community, to keep a record on 
both sides of all confiscations, appropriations and ser- 
vices enforced against private citizens, but beyond this 
no protection has thus far been given to private property 
on land. 

The object of each belligerent is to break the enemy's 
power and force him to sue for peace. To break his 
power it is not enough to defeat him in the open field; 
he must be prevented from repairing his loss both in 
men and in the munitions of war and this implies crippling 
his material resources, trade and manufactures. 

To capture at sea raw materials used in the manu- 
facturing industry of a belligerent State, or products 
on the sale of which its prosperity, and therefore its 
taxable values depend, is necessarily one of the objects, 
and one of the least cruel, which the belligerents pursue. 

To capture the merchant vessels which carry these 

1 See Barclay, " International Law and Practice ", p. 173. London 
and Boston, 1917. 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 175 

goods, and even to keep the seamen navigating them 
prisoners, is to prevent the employment of the ships by 
the enemy as transports or cruisers and the repairing 
from among the seamen of the mercantile marine of 
losses of men in the official navy. 

It is questionable whether war should be made less 
a calamity than it is — that is, beyond the elementary 
principle that individuals should be made, as little as 
possible, to suffer for the acts of the community. 

The assimilation of private property at sea to private 
property on land would mean that the State to which 
the captured vessels belonged should indemnify the 
ship and cargo owners for their loss. Such indemnifi- 
cation has become a principle in war upon land, and it 
may become a question of the future how, by domestic 
regulation, to deal with captures by the enemy of property 
at sea.^ The cases, however, are not exactly the same. 

After the outbreak of war shipowners and shippers 
belonging to a belligerent State know the risk they incur 
in sending ships or goods across sea. They have the 
option of keeping their ship or cargo in port, or of paying 
war rates of insurance, or again, the shipper has the 
option of sending his goods under the protection of a 
neutral flag. If they expose their ship or cargo to the 
risks of capture, it is because they have calculated the 
chances of escape, and have chosen to run the risks. To 
indemnify them for losses incurred might be to relieve 
the shipowner and shipper from the consequences of 
their want of foresight and caution. 

As a matter of fact, if a proper valuation of outgoing 
ship and cargo were recorded, the State whose flag the 

^ See Barclay, " Problems of International Practice and Diplo- 
macy ", p. 200. London and Boston, 1907. A discussion of the ques- 
tion of national indemnification for captures in time of war. 



176 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

ship carried might indemnify the owner, and thus a 
loss suffered by the individual citizen be spread over 
the community. Means may some day be devised of so 
indemnifying for capture where combined with a licence 
to put to sea. No experiments in this sense seem yet 
to have been made. 

States, from motives of expediency, may agree not 
to capture the property of private citizens during a 
particular war with each other, as in the case of Italy 
and Austria in 1866, or they may by treaty provide for 
similar immunity of their respective private citizens 
in the event of a future war between them.^ 

The United States have made it an article of their 
policy to insist upon the adoption of immunity of private 
property from capture as a primary principle in the reform 
of the law of maritime warfare. England has as reso- 
lutely upheld the contrary principle. Both have been 
actuated by their own interest. Napoleon Bonaparte 
considered that the greatest blow which could be dealt 
to England would be to compel her to give up her mari- 
time rights.^ And Nelson was of the same opinion, 
holding that nothing could be more injurious to the 
English interests than the adoption of "free ships, free 
goods", which is now, nevertheless, the rule binding 
upon England under the Declaration of Paris. 

Whether it is expedient for England at the present 
day to agree to the immunity of private property at sea 

* See Barclay, " Problems of International Practice and Diplo- 
macy ", p. 70, London and Boston, 1907; technical difficulties involved 
in the question of immunity and at pp. 172 et seq., 176 et seq. draft 
forms of treaty dealing with assimilation of enemy private property 
at sea to neutral private property at sea and with assimilation of enemy 
private property at sea to enemy private property on land respectively. 

2 HaUeck, Vol. II., p. 17. 



FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 177 

from capture, must be dictated by the circumstances 
of the particular war in which she engages. It is quite 
conceivable that different considerations would weigh 
with her in a war with the United States from those 
which have arisen in war with Germany. In the case 
of the United States it might be in the interest of both 
parties to localise the operations of war, and to interfere 
as little as possible, perhaps for the joint exclusion of 
neutral vessels, with the traffic across the Atlantic. 
In the war with Germany, England has been forced into 
closing the high sea to all traffic by the merchantmen of 
the enemy not only in her own but in the general interest 
of her allies. 

Apart from expediency, however, necessity of war, 
that is the necessity in which, by the nature of things, 
a belligerent party is placed of preserving its own forces 
against destruction, and of defeating the forces of the 
enemy, must always stand in the way of any abandon- 
ment of the belligerent right to seize all the enemy's 
property, whether private or public, which can serve 
to prolong his resistance. Any attenuations as regards 
private property have never extended beyond the pre- 
vention of wanton destruction and plunder, and the 
equalisation of the burden of the losses, and it is difficult 
to see what further can be done in the common interest 
so long as mankind continues to seek solutions in destruc- 
tion and bloodshed. 



CHAPTER IX 



ARIVL^MENTS 



President Wilson in his fourth proposition 
demands "adequate guarantees" for the reduction 
of armaments. 

What meaning does he attach to guarantees and 
what to adequate? 

Napoleon obtained guarantees from Prussia and 
imposed a reduction of her armed forces to a maxi- 
mum Hmit. She observed the form; nevertheless, 
at the battle of Leipzig she brought six or seven 
times that maximum into the field and the military 
power of Prussia dated from guarantees which 
Napoleon must have considered adequate, seeing 
that at the time he imposed them he was absolute 
master to prescribe any conditions he thought fit. 

A century later the problem of "preparedness 
for war" occupied the minds of all European states- 
men. One set of them thought to conjure the 
danger of war by preparing for it and this led to a 
competition in armaments which was a source of 
much profit to a few, even many, and of high wages 
to an increasing mass of labour. Preparedness for 
war was alleged to be guarantee of peace. Another 



ARMAMENTS 179 

set thought that just as increase responded to 
increase diminution might respond to diminution, 
which as a logical proposition is unanswerable. 

"... The constant danger involved in the 
accumulation of war material renders the armed 
peace of to-day a crushing burden more and more 
difficult for nations to bear. It consequently 
seems evident that if this situation be prolonged 
it will inevitably result in the very disaster it is 
sought to avoid, and the thought of the horrors of 
which makes every humane mind shudder. It is 
the supreme duty, therefore, of all States to place 
some limit on these increasing armaments and find 
some means of averting the calamities which threaten 
the whole world." 

The author of these w^ords, from the Russian 
note of 1898 proposing that an international con- 
ference be held to deal with the question of exces- 
sive armaments, seems to have had a prophetic 
vision of the World's War. 

The answers of the Powers to the Russian proposal 
were unanimously favourable and, as the reader 
will remember, the first Hague Conference of 1899 
was the outcome of the Russian suggestion. 

At the Conference the Russian Government 
submitted the following propositions : 

"1. Establishment of an international under- 
standing for a term of five years stipulating non- 
increase of the present figures of the peace effectives 
of troops kept up for home use. 

" 2. Fixation, in case of this understanding being 



180 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

arrived at and, if possible, of the figures of the 
peace effective of all the Powers, excepting colonial 
troops. 

"3. Maintenance for a like term of five years 
of the amount of the military budgets at present 
in force." 

When the subject came on for discussion in the 
Commission appointed to deal with it in 1899 the 
German military delegate stated his view that 
the question of effectives could not be discussed 
by itself, as there were many others to wliicli it 
was in some measure subordinated, such, for in- 
stance, as the length of service, the number of 
cadres, whether existing in peace or made ready for 
war, the amount of training received by reserves, 
the situation of the country itself, its railway sys- 
tem, and the number and position of its fortresses. 
In a modern army all these questions went together, 
and national defence included them all. 

This did not seem an unreasonable objection and, 
in any case, this statement of the difficulty was not 
refuted. 

In June, 1906, the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (then INI. Tittoni) made a statement which 
was characteristic of the then condescending "non 
possumus" continental attitude towards the sub- 
ject. It w^as as follows : 

"I, as Minister of Foreigii Affairs of Italy, now 
publicly express the adhesion of the Government 
to the humanitarian ideas which have met with 



ARMAMENTS 181 

such enthusiasm in the historic House of Parlia- 
ment at Westminster. I have always believed 
that, as far as we are concerned, it would be a 
national crime to weaken our armaments while 
we are surrounded by strongly armed European 
nations who look upon the improvement of arma- 
ments as a guarantee of peace. Nevertheless I 
should consider it a crime against humanity not 
to cooperate sincerely in an initiative having for 
object a simultaneous reduction of armaments 
of the great Powers. Italian practice has always 
aimed at the maintenance of peace. Therefore, 
I am happy to be able to say that our delegates 
at the coming Hague Conference will be instructed 
to further the English initiative.'* 

Between the two Hague Conferences at which 
attempts were made to deal with the subject an 
actual trial of reduction was effected in the Ameri- 
can continent in a Disarmament Agreement (May 
28, 1902) between the Chilean and Argentine 
republics. This agreement, which was due to the 
initiative and good offices of the British Govern- 
ment, provided that "in order to remove all cause 
of fear and distrust between the two countries,'* 
the governments in question "agree not to take 
possession of the warships which they are having 
built, and also for the present not to make any 
other acquisitions." The two governments further- 
more agreed to "reduce their respective fleets, 
according to an arrangement establishing a reason- 
able proportion between the two fleets." 



18^2 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

The two governments also respectively promised 
not to increase their maritime armaments during 
five years unless the one who wished to increase 
them gave the other eighteen months' notice in 
advance. 

Are these the kind of guarantees the President 
proposes ? 

Or does he mean that there should be an Inter- 
national Commission which would have the power 
to examine into our respective national concerns 
and tell us what reductions we have to make to 
comply with the contractual scheme of reduction 
agreed to? If so, my imagination does not rise 
to realisation of the amount of obedience such a 
Commission is likely to receive- 
In short I am afraid "adequate guarantees" are 
in the nature of a pious wish and yet the President's 
inclusion of the reduction of armaments among 
the main issues which arise out of the war is un- 
questionably right. 

There are forces which make for war which seem 
beyond the control of the more intelligent part of 
the population of even the most progressive and 
experienced parliamentarily governed countries. 
Thus twenty years ago war between England and 
France hung in the balance. Ardent patriots 
among the French clamoured for the blood of the 
Englishman to wipe out the humiliation of Fashoda, 
and proposed a crusade to free South Africa and 
the Irish people from the tyrant's yoke. Ardent 
English patriots on their side professed their indif- 



ARMAMENTS 183 

ference for the feelings of a degenerate people who 
did not rise against military oppression and release 
the innocent Dreyfus. 

Against such dangerous manifestations of aggres- 
sive patriotism which, whether sincere or not, 
caused great unrest and forced governments into 
otherwise unjustifiable increases of expenditure 
on armaments, statesmen strove to react in vain, 
and if a reaction did come eventually it was not 
due to governments but rather in defiance of them 
and achieved under a running fire of discouragement 
and ridicule from the minority of ardent patriots 
on whom governments too often seem to lean for 
support. 

Shortly before the outbreak of the recent War 
revelations were made which showed how powerful, 
cooperative and centralised were the interests of 
the great private arsenals and manufacturers of 
material of war of all kinds and how closely inter- 
woven and international they were. 

Where powerful and wealthy interests are con- 
cerned, it is not a far cry to say public opinion is 
exposed to being influenced by them without con- 
scious knowl^edge of the methods employed. 

Is not the immense power which these huge inter- 
ests can wield in the promotion of orders for arma- 
ments in itself a possible danger to peace ? 

If this is so, statification of all armament indus- 
tries is perhaps the one effective method of restrict- 
ing armaments, that is, by keeping them under con- 
trol. The present situation lends itself to the 



184 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

realisation of such a reform both nationally and 
internationally. 

Perhaps it is just an agreement to take some such 
steps that the President means when he speaks of 
" adequate guarantees." 

But above all these factitious aids to evolution 
is the process of evolution itself. The ^^ork^s 
"War may have killed for the time being the disease 
of militarism from which the world was suffering 
before it reached its climax in the criminal act of 
August. 1014. The world has now seen what the 
thrill of war means as compared with the dullest 
time of peace. For years hence the peoples of the 
earth will be paying the price of armaments and the 
most powerful interests will have difficulties in rous- 
ing peoples for a long time to see in "preparedness 
for war" a method of peace or a way out of the annual 
financial difficulties our governments will all liave 
to face till peoples have again forgotten what war 
means. 



NOTE TO CHAPTER IX 

Suggested Clauses Respecting Nationalisation of 
Production of Material of War 

Whereas it is obvious that the existence of large war 
industries dependent for their prosperity and even exist- 
ence on the obtaining of orders for the supply of war ships, 
artillery, small arms, ammunition, that is to say, of 
articles which can be used for no other purpose than the 
prosecution of war, implies an interest which profits by 
the apprehension of war and loses by international ar- 
rangements which would entail any slackening of the 
demand for such material of war ; and 

Whereas these interests, like all great industrial inter- 
ests naturally and in self-protection gravitate to under- 
standings which are in direct opposition to movements 
for the preservation and assurance of peace ; 

It is in the joint interest of national finance and inter- 
national peace that henceforward all production of articles 
of no use except for purposes of war shall be State monop- 
olies, a fair indemnity to be paid to present owners 
in which any exceptional rate of profit made during the 
present war or in preparation for it shall be debited in 
reduction of the gross amount payable. 



CHAPTER X 



THE I„\W OF NATIONS 



TiiF protoctivo law of wnr. the law which sociires 
as far as possible the rights of neutral countries 
and subjs.H?ts from the consequences of warfare 
and which by sympathetic extension asserts the 
rights of innocent nonconibatants against its bar- 
barities, is the creation of neutrals. The contradic- 
tion between the contentions of belligerents and 
neutrals is only one of standpoints and the indigna- 
tion of the latter is an emanation of their interest, 
as such, to be unatTtH^ted by hostilities to which they 
are not a party. 

\Yhere there is no neutral powerful enough to 
insist on the neutral standpoint, it remains merely 
doctrinal and this is what happened in the recent 
War. 

Thus, for instance, so far from the facts of the 
^Yar having shown that the doctrine of immunity 
of private property from capture in maritime war 
needed adoption, they seem to have shown the 
contrary, it has been made clear that war in cer- 
tain cases can only be brought to an end by economic 
isolation. Four years of military operations only 
brought out their futility: it was the silent block- 



THE LAW OF NATIONS 187 

ade which stifled the enemy's trade and industry 
and starved him to llic brink of deuLh that turned 
the scale. 

On the other hand, it was the submarine warfare 
that brought tlic Allies nearest to defeat. While 
the navy by its eoiisiant and unfuiiiiig vigilance 
never allowed an enemy shij) to cross the open sea, 
the enemy submarines with corresponding persist- 
ency kept up the same strain of impending hun- 
ger and anxiety lest food and other supplies to the 
Allies should become reduced beyond the rate of 
repair. 

On botli sides the determining factors in the ulti- 
mate result have been economic and the fate of the 
War on land has been dependent on the power of 
the belligerents' respective naval forces to capture 
or destroy private ])roperiy and Iheir respective 
domestic ability to repair loss. The War has shown 
that, in such a war, warfare obeys no rules but 
those of expediency. It has been, as events have 
proved, truly a death struggle. All arms were 
resorted to and all the barbarities of past ages have 
been revived because it has been a death struggle 
similar to the racial deatli struggles of earlier ages. 
There has been no moderating neutral influence 
to watch over the interests of non-parties or of 
humanity. 

The exceptional character of the War warrants 
the conclusion that though the doctrines of the 
international law of war have been more or less 
ignored during the recent War, this is only because 
practically the whole world was in a state of bel- 



188 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

ligerency. When the neutral influence is able once 
more to make itself felt the more familiar condi- 
tions will be revived, and just as there is no reason 
to suppose the Congress of Peace will be able to do 
more than its predecessors in the settlement of the 
world to the satisfaction of all the High Contract- 
ing Parties, some of such parties may profit by 
the experience of recent events and seek to avoid 
entangling alliances capable of dragging them out 
of their comparatively safe and potentially strong 
position as neutrals. 

Organisation and disintegration in the history 
of mankind follow each other with the fatality of 
a law of nature. The stages from the conquest of 
liberty to dictatorship as a rescue from licence are 
among the recurring facts of historical evolution. 
The wisdom of the leader is soon swamped in the 
struggle for leadership as we have seen whenever 
democracy produces a political class among a free 
people. 

Law is the one stable element in the life of com- 
munities. Even bad law is better than disrespect 
for it, because the alternative for bad law is not 
necessarily good law and the stability of law is the 
common basis of all social and commercial inter- 
course. To labour anything so obvious is super- 
erogation and I need only add that what is true of 
the domestic intercourse of nations can only be true 
of intercourse between nations. To say that Inter- 
national Law is dead is, therefore, about as true 
as to say that an inundation or an earthqiuike puts 



THE LAW OF NATIONS 189 

an end to engineering and architecture. Far from 
it, the need of a law binding on nations and which 
nations will respect and may even be forced to 
respect is inherent to the idea of that Society of 
Nations to which the peoples of the world are look- 
ing forward as a safeguard against lawless amljitions, 
whether of potentates, statesmen, bureaucracies, 
oligarchies or democracies. 

The work of the Hague Peace Conference will 
necessarily form part of the special work which the 
creation of a Society of Nations will entail. 

After two great wars in the last century there 
was active and effective agitation in favour of further 
development of the Law of Nations. The Italian 
war of liberation led to the Geneva Convention 
and the Red Cross movement, that of 1870 to the 
foundation of the Institute of International Law 
and the Society for the Reform and Codification of 
the Law of Nations (now called the International 
Law Association), and eventually to the Hague 
conferences. The reaction in the case of the recent 
War is towards sanctions for the enforcement of the 
Law of Nations and hence to the conception of a 
Society of Nations capable of enforcing respect for 
it. 

Fiat juris regnum in terris. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER X 

Note on Preambles to Different International 
Conventions relating to War and Peace 

The following preambles to international conventions 
may be considered as having definitely determined cer- 
tain principles to be beyond the scope of controversy. 
It is important to group them as declarations of moral 
law and conduct agreed to by the different States which 
ratified the conventions in question. 

War 

1. Geneva Convention of 1864 : the Powers were 
animated by "the desire within the measure of their 
ability of mitigating the evils inseparable from war, 
of suppressing its useless hardships and of ameliorating 
the condition of wounded soldiers on the field of battle." 

In the new Geneva Convention of 1906, the Powers 
repeat that they are "equally animated by the desire 
of mitigating, as far as possible, the evils inseparable 
from war " and desire, with this end in view, to improve 
and to complete the arrangement agreed upon at Geneva 
on August 22, 1864, for the amelioration of the condition 
of wounded or sick soldiers in armies in the field. 

The first provision of the Convention carrying out the 
object of the above preamble states that "officers and 
soldiers and other persons officially attached to armies" 



THE LAW OF NATIONS 191 

shall be taken care of as prisoners of war "without dis- 
tinction of nationality." After each engagement the 
commander in possession of the jfield is to take measures 
to search for the wounded and prevent any maltreatment 
or pillage. 

2. The Convention of 1899-1907, for the Adaption to 
Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Con- 
vention relates that the Powers are "alike animated by 
the desire to diminish, as far as depends on them, the 
evils inseparable from warfare", and that they wish "with 
this object to adapt to maritime warfare, the principles 
of the Geneva Convention." 

3. The Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868) sets out 
that an International Military Commission " assembled 
at St. Petersburg in order to examine into the expediency 
of forbidding the use of certain projectiles in times of 
war between civilized nations" and by common agree- 
ment "fixed the technical limits at which the necessities 
of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity", 
that the governments represented considered "that the 
progress of civilisation should have the effect of alleviat- 
ing as much as possible the calamities of war" ; 

That the only legitimate object which States should 
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy ; 

"That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the 
greatest possible number of men ; 

"That this object would be exceeded by the employ- 
ment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings 
of disabled men, or render their death inevitable ; and 

"That the employment of such arms would, therefore, 
be contrary to the laws of humanity." 

4. All the declarations of 1899 in their preambles 
are stated to be inspired by the sentiments which found 



Un COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 
forbidding the employment of explosive projectiles of 
a weight inferior to 400 grammes. 

The Powers represented at these different conferences 
have, therefore, declared that on a level with the use of 
explosive bullets are the use of bullets which expand or 
flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a 
hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or 
is pierced with incisions; of projectiles which diffuse 
asphyxiating or deleterious gases ; and the discharging 
of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other 
new methods of a similar nature. 

5. The Powers, say the Convention with Respect to the 
Laws and Usage of War on Land, in drawing it up were 
"animated by the desire to serve the interests of humanity 
and the ever-increasing requirements of civilisation"; 
they thought it important "with this object to revise 
the laws and general customs of war, either with the view 
of defining them more precisely, or of laying down cer- 
tain limits for the purpose of modifying their severity 
as far as possible." 

"The provisions." it says, "have been inspired by 
the desire to diminish the evils of war so far as military 
necessities permit" and are destined to serve as general 
rules of conduct for belligerents in their relations with 
each other and with populations. 

Though it had not been possible to agree forthwith on 
provisions embracing all the circimistances which occurred 
in practice, it was "not intended by the High Contracting 
Parties that the cases not provided for should, for want 
of a written provision be left to the arbitrary judgment 
of the military Commanders"; "and until a more com- 
plete Code of the laws of the war was issued, the High 
Contracting Parties thought it right" to declare that 



THE LAW OF NATIONS 193 

in cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, 
populations and belligerents remain under the protection 
and empire of the principles of international laws as 
they result from the usages established between civilised 
nations, from the laws of humanity, and the require- 
ments of tiie public conscience. 

And Article 3 of the Convention by way of further 
emphasis states that "the belligerent Party who violates 
the provisions of the said Regulations shall be bound, if 
the case arises, to pay an indemnity", and that "it is 
resi)onsible for all acts done by persons forming part of 
its armed force." 

0. In the same way the Convention relating to Bom- 
bardment by Naval Forces in time of War states that 
the Powers considered that it was of "importance to 
subject bombardment by naval forces to general pro- 
visions guaranteeing the rights of inhabitants and insur- 
ing the preservation of the principal buildings, by ex- 
tending to this operation of war, as far as possible, the 
principles of the regulations of 1899 with respect to the 
laws and customs of war on land" and that they were "in- 
spired by the desire to serve the interests of humanity 
and to lessen the rigours and disasters of war." 

7. Lastly as regards the Employment of Submarine 
Mines acting automatically by Contact, the Convention 
on the subject upholds "the principle of the freedom of 
sea routes open to all nations" and declares that "if, 
in the present state of things, the use of submarine mines 
with automatic contact cannot be forbidden, it is im- 
portant to limit and regulate their use, in order to restrict 
the rigours of war and to give, as far as possible, to peaceful 
navigation the security it has the right to claim, in spite 
of the existence of a war." 



194 COLLAPSE ATsD liECOxXSi RUCTION 

Peace 

Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter- 
national Disputes 

(The passages in italics are additions and alterations 
made by the Convention of 1907.) 

"Animated by a strong desire to concert for the main- 
tenance of general peace ; 

"Resolved to second by their best efforts the friendly 
settlement of international disputes ; 

"Recognising the solidarity which unites the members 
of the society of civilised nations ; 

"Desirous of extending the empire of law, and of 
strengthening the appreciation of international justice ; 

"Convinced that the permanent institution of a Court 
of Arbitration, accessible to all, in the midst of the inde- 
pendent Powers, will contribute effectively to this result ; 

"Having regard to the advantages attending the general 
and regular organisation of arbitral procedure ; 

"Sharing the opinion of the august Initiator of the 
International Peace Conference that it is expedient to 
record in an International agreement the principles of 
equity and right on which are based the security of States 
and the welfare of peoples ; 

'' Desirous for this purpose of better assuring the practical 
working of Commissions of Inquiry and Courts of Arbitration 
and to facilitate recourse to arbitration when matters in 
variance are concerned which can be dealt with by a summary 
procedure; 

" Have thought it necessary to revise on certain points and to 
complete the work of the first Peace Conference for the pacific 
settlement of international disputes." 



THE LAW OF NATIONS 195 

Neutral Rights 

Convention Relative to the Establishment of an Inter- 
national Prize Court (1907) 

"Animated by the desire to settle in an equitable 
manner differences which arise from time to time in 
maritime warfare, in connection with decisions of national 
Prize Courts ; 

"Holding, that if such Courts are to continue to give 
decisions in accordance with the forms prescribed by 
their legislation, it is important that, in certain cases, 
recourse be provided under conditions harmonising, as 
far as possible, with the public and private interests 
involved in all Prize cases ; 

"Considering, on the other hand, that the formation 
of an international Court with a carefully regulated 
competence and procedure seems the best means of 
attaining this object ; 

"Being, moreover, convinced that in this manner the 
rigorous consequences of a maritime war may be atten- 
uated : that, in particular, good relations between bellig- 
erents and neutrals are more likely to be maintained, 
and, in consequence, the preservation of peace better 
assured". . . . 

Memorandum of a Scheme for the Promotion of 
Law and Justice among Nations by Education 

The weakness of all the schemes which have hitherto 
been propounded for the promotion of the spirit of law 
and justice among civilized mankind generally has been 
that they assumed mankind generally to be ready to 
receive enlightenment. That this is not the case is 
shown by the almost universal adoption of compulsion 



196 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

for the spread of education and by the practical faihire 
of all propagandas which are not founded on the very 
simplest of issues. 

On the other hand, it is a matter of almost universal 
experience that ideas absorbed in youth while the mind 
is still fresh and therefore receptive are far more tenacious 
than impressions obtained in later years when the brain 
tissue, like the rest of the physical being, has begun to 
harden. 

Ideas acquired in youth partake in fact of the character 
of faith. They remain throughout life, like faith. The 
deeper furrows of mental tendency and the thinner after- 
impressions due to reason have little chance of obliter- 
ating these stronger lines which become the convictions 
of almost every life. 

If, in particular. Peace advocacy 'per se has made but 
little progress, it is mainly due to its having been addressed 
to men's maturer reason which unfortunately is just as 
unstable as faith imbibed at an early age is firm. 

Just as the Churches seek to implant conviction in 
the young and creeds are taught to children long before 
they have reached the age of understanding, with the 
result that even the greatest minds seldom succeed 
completely in their efforts at self-emancipation, so may 
we not hope that if a basis of international amity and 
mutual respect and consideration could be implanted in 
the minds of the rising generations of those who are 
destined to voice the political and international life of 
peoples, it would have a similar effect? Might it not 
forward the growth of that faith in upright, humane and 
considerate conduct among nations, the absence of which 
is now being shown to be the chief cause of the deplorable 
break-up with which civilisation is at present threatened ? 

That the best laid schemes may fail through the inter- 



THE LAW OF NATIONS 197 

vention of the unforeseen, that faults of character, a bad 
choice of instruments, external jealousies and rivalries 
and many other disturbing elements due to our faulty 
human nature may interfere with their successful realisa- 
tion, is a consideration inherent to all human effort. This, 
however, may be said of the scheme I have outlined in 
the following suggestions, that whether its effect should 
be wholly as beneficial as I believe it would be or not, 
it could not be without any effect at all in determining 
a current of international understanding. Even if the 
effect were only small, the effort would not be entirely 
lost. It might, moreover, be the starting-point of other 
efforts in the same sense. My own conviction is that 
the emancipation of mankind from the present tendency 
to regard as justifiable in international relations most of 
the misconduct we strive to banish from our citizen 
life can only be achieved by creation of a new faith among 
mankind and all analogies point to this being achievable 
by influence exercised over young minds at their impres- 
sionable age. 

I. The purpose to be fulfilled 

The purpose to be fulfilled is the education of public 
opinion in : 

(a) The utility of law and order in international 
relations ; 

(b) The futility as a solution of international problems 
of war which at the best only substitutes new for older 
problems ; 

(c) The advantages to the masses of mankind of a 
progressive international morality ; 

(d) The sanctity of international engagements as a 
basis of such morality ; 



198 COLLAPSE .VND RECONSTRUCTION 

(e) The desirability of employing peaceful mot hods 
of diplomacy, mediation, arbitration and the Hague 
Court and appreciation of their respective potentialities. 

2. Points for consideration in the attainment thereof 

(a) The most effective channel for influencing public 
opinion is the teaching of those whose minds are still in 
a receptive condition ; 

(b) To give direction to the forces which form public 
opinion, it is necessary to operate on the intellcotual, 
professional, commercial and industrial classes sinml- 
taneously. 

(r) The intellectual, professional and so-called upper 
classes have always been influenced by the training of 
the higher schools. 

(d) The commercial and industrial or so-called middle 
and lower classes are entitled to obtain knowledge and 
intellectual training (as in Scotland and America) un- 
affected by questions of leisure and means. 

3. To efifect the above purpose 

(e) Eight Chairs of International Law might be created 
in connection with the I'nivcrsitios of Loudon, Paris, 
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Petrograd, New York and Tokio. 

(f) Tenants of these Chairs to be chosen for qualifica- 
tion from among members of the Institute of Interna- 
tional Law, and 

((]) Such tenants to undertake before appointment to 
regard their mission as purely international, cosmopolitan 
and independent. Acceptance of any public appoint- 
ment during tenure of the Chair or of any office which 
might curtail the freedom of their opinions to be equiva- 
lent to resignation. 



THE LAW OF NATIONS 199 

(h) Tenants of the Chairs to meet at regular intervals 
as an academic committee to discuss matters of interest 
in the prosecution of the purpose for which the Chairs 
have been created. 

(i) The Chairs to lie placed uiid(!r the High Patronage 
of (say) the Poi)e, tlie President of the United States and 
the President of tlie Swiss Confederation. 

(j) A meeting to be held (say) once every year under 
the presidency of one of the above patrons alternately 
at which the tenants of the Chairs should render an 
account of their stewardship and to which such persons 
should be invited as the patron in question may deter- 
mine. 

(fc) The first tenants of the Chairs to be appointed by 
(say) the Committee of the "Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace" or other constituent authority 
or authorities. Thereafter appointments to be made by 
the said Carnegie Endowment and (or) authorities on 
presentation by the governing bodies of the universities 
in question. 

Tenure of the Professorships to be for ten years ; holders 
to be re-eligible. 

(I) The foundation in each case to be more or less 
in proportion to the needs of the respective cities; for 
London, Paris, Berlin and New York, to be (say) $500, 
000 each and in the case of Vienna, Rome, Petrograd 
and Tokio (say) $400,000 each, making a total of (say) 
three and a half million dollars. 

4. To effect the purpose of the Chairs, the Professors to 
bear in mind that they must seek 

To promote the study of International Law and Usage 
as a branch of knowledge in statecraft among : 
(a) Those who contemplate entering public life ; 



200 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

(6) Those who are quaUfying for entry into the diplo- 
matic or consular services ; 

(c) Publicists and journalists ; 

(d) Students of law; 

{e) Students of the subject for its own sake. 

5. Mode of work. Nonacademic lectures 

The tenants of the Chairs to deliver a series of (say) 
six public lectures a year open to all persons free of charge 
who apply for a ticket ; these lectures to be of a popular 
character explaining the methods of operation of inter- 
course among nations, the working of diplomatic and 
consular relations, the conclusion and effect of treaties, 
the origin and advantage of law and order among the 
community of States, the growth and grouping of States ; 
the part played by racial and linguistic homogeneity 
in state development and the capabilities of statecraft and 
its organs in the promotion of good understanding among 
peoples generally. 

Academic work 

The tenants of the Chairs to take charge of three simul- 
taneous classes in which the work would be graduated. 

First year's class. The students should be conducted 
through the elements of International Law in such a 
way as the tenant of the chair may deem best adapted 
to the enlargement of their understanding of the subject. 
In this class, an adequate portion of the time should be 
devoted to the origin and history of International Law. 

The object of this class would be purely the acquisition 
of knowledge. 

Second year's class. This should be devoted to the 
examination of the problems of International Law and 



THE LAW OF NATIONS 201 

Usage, students in turn under the chairmanship of the 
Professor to deal with matters selected by the Professor, 
other students to take part in the discussion ; the matters 
to be selected in advance by the Professor to enable the 
members of the class as far as possible to mature their 
views on the subject. 

The object of this class would be to deal with the practi- 
cal application of law and usage among nations. 

Third yearns class. This should be devoted to the 
language of diplomacy, the drafting of memoranda on 
current events, condensing reports, the art of statement 
in memoranda, verbal notes, etc., the preparation of 
treaties and other diplomatic engagements and under- 
takings and their interpretation, the art and methods of 
diplomacy and negotiation, the study of the official 
books of the different States, the utilisation of books of 
reference, the methods of government and foreign policies 
of different States, commercial politics, treaties of com- 
merce, tariff systems, colonial doctrines, exterritoriality, 
comparative and historical geography and cartography. 

Professors' assistants. As the above scheme of work 
implies more than any man could manage, the Professor 
to be entitled to employ assistants as lecturers and teachers 
to aid him in such parts of his work as he may in his 
discretion appoint. 



CHAPTER XT 



NEUTRALISATION 



Before dealing with neutralisation, we must 
be clear about the meaning and varieties of meaning 
of the word "neutrality", from which, owing to 
imperfection of terminology, the sense of the term 
has not been sufficiently distinguished. 

Mr. Kleen, an eminent Swedish writer, member of 
the Institute of International Law, whose book in 
two volumes on neutrality is the most complete 
work on the subject ever written, finds in practice 
a number of distinctions. First of all there is 
neutrality purely and simply which he defines as 
"celle qui appartient et s'impose en vertu du droit 
international a tout Etat qui pendant une guerre, 
veut Tester en dehors des hostilites." ^ He then 
finds a cojircfitioual neutrality which he defines 
as "celle qui, par suite d'une situation particuliere 
ou exceptionnelle, accommode la neutralite simple 
et ordinaire a certains cas ou aux circonstances, 
en la soumettant a des conditions ou bien en aug- 
mentant ou en diminuant sa portee.'' - This con- 
ventional neutrality again may be perfect, that is 

* Kleen, "Lois et usages de la neutralite," I, p. 81, 
- Ibid., I, p. 83. 



NEUTRALISATION 203 

to say in the legal sense, strict, when it is "appliquee 
entierement comme le present le droit international 
quant aux droits et devoirs reciproques",^ or it 
may also be free if "elle depend de la volonte et 
du jugement de I'Etat neutre lui-meme, et si elle 
peut etre abandonnee par lui quand bon lui semble, 
lorsqu'il trouve que son droit et son interet I'obli- 
gent a prendre les armes." ^ On the other hand, 
conventional neutrality may be obligatory in the 
case where "un Etat s'engage par convention avec 
un ou plusieurs autres Etats a I'observer ou a 
la maintenir, soit en general et pour tons les cas 
de guerre soit pour un cas special ou en vue d'une 
certaine ou de certaines guerres." ^ Neutrality 
in the special case mentioned in the latter part of 
this quotation is termed by Mr. Kleen "neutralite 
accidentelle." He gives its definition as follows : 
"La neutralite accidentelle est celle par laquelle 
un Etat s'engage par convention envers un ou 
plusieurs autres Etats a rester neutre pendant une 
ou plusieurs guerres determinees. L'acte conven- 
tionnel peut etre conclu, ou d'avance, dans la 
supposition de telle eventualite de guerre, ou lors 
de celle-ci." '^ The conventional neutrality which 
is imperfect or limited, *'la pretendue neutralite 
dite imparfaite ou limitee et qui comporterait une 
somme moins grande de devoirs a remplir, soit pour 
les neutres, soit pour les belligerents", he declares 
"nulle." '" Mr. Kleen, however, finds still another 

1 Kleen, "Lois et usages de la neutrality", I, p. 109. 

2 Ibid., I, p. 84. » Ibid., I, p. 84. * Ibid., I, p. 102. 
^Ibid., I, p. 109. 



204 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

conventional neutrality which is partial, viz. : "lors- 
qu'elle n'embrasse qu'une on plusieurs parties du 
territoire de TEtat." ^ With this he contrasts 
**general conventional neutrality", i.e. "celle qui 
embrasse tout le territoire de I'Etat." - And this 
brings us back to the definition of neutrality itself 
as to which he says: ''La neutralite est la situation 
juridique dans laquelle un Etat pacifique est, autant 
que possible, laisse en dehors des hostilites qui out 
lieu entre des Etats belligerents, et s'abstient lui- 
meme de toute participation on ingerence dans leur 
difTerend, en observant vis-a-vis d'eux une stricte 
impartialite." ^ 

Distinct from all these forms of neutrality, quali- 
fied and absolute, is convetitional jycrmanent or per- 
petual neutral iti/ which he defines as follows : "celle 
par laquelle un Etat — ordinairement contre des 
garanties d'inviolabilite pour sa neutralite — s'oblige 
une fois pour toutes envers d'autres Etats a rester 
neutre en general et pendant toutes les guerres/' ^ 

This is the neutrality which results from the 
status of "neutralisation." 

A neutral nation in time of war is merely one 
which does not take part in it. Its nonbelligerent 
position entails certain rights and obligations which 
are known as the law relating to neutrals. Holland, 
for instance, which is not neutralized like Belgium, 
was nevertheless neutral and the Hague conven- 
tions apply without distinction to both. The oper- 

^ Kleen, "Lois et usages de la neutralite", I, p. 103. 

» Ibid.. I, p. 103. s Ibid.. I, p. 73. ^ Ibid., I. p. 85. 



NEUTRALISATION 205 

ation of neutralisation is not confined to time of war. 
It places the neutralised State or area, as it were, in 
trust. It implies a relationship among the grantors 
or guarantors which, within the scope of the orig- 
inating agreement, is a curtailment of the freedom 
of action of its governing authority. 

Of neutralisation in contemporary practice we 
have six examples, viz. : those of Belgium, Switzer- 
land, Luxemburg, the Congo Territories, an area 
of French Savoy and the Ionian Islands. 

As regards Belgium, her neutrality was first 
assured by a treaty dated November 15, 1831, 
and reaffirmed in another dated August 30, 1839. 
The signatories were Great Britain, France, Austria, 
Prussia, Russia and Holland. Article 7 of this 
treaty provided: "Belgium shall form an independ- 
ent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be 
bound to observe such neutrality towards all other 
States." 

That of Luxemburg resulted from a treaty con- 
cluded on May 11, 1867, between Great Britain, 
France, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Prussia and Russia, which declared the Grand 
Duchy of Luxemburg a "perpetually neutral State," 
the High Contracting Parties undertaking to respect 
its neutrality and, with the exception of Belgium 
(itself a neutral State), placing it under their "col- 
lective guarantee." 

Switzerland owed her neutrality to a Declaration 
dated March 20, 1815, signed by eight Powers, 
viz. : Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, 
Spain, Portugal, and Sweden and Norway, which 



"200 COLLVPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

guaranteed her perpetual neutralisation. By a 
decision of the Swiss Confederation, dated May '27 „ 
1S15, this neutralisation was accepted, and on 
November '20, ISlo, it was reathrmed by a fresh 
declaration on the part of Great Britain, Fi'ance, 
Russia. Prussia and Austria. 

There is a diti'erence in form between the neu- 
tralisation of Belgium and that of Luxemburg 
and Switzerland. In the case of Belgium, there is 
no specific guarantee of neutralisation by the 
Powers, as there is in the treaties insuring it for 
the two other States, but as the articles agreed to, 
including the one quoted above, were "placed luider 
the guarantee" of the said Powers, the etl'ect is 
the same in so far as the rights and obligation of 
perpetual neutrality are concerned. 

The legal position of the neutralised area of 
the Congo Basin is quite ditYerent. This basin com- 
prises all the regions watered by the Congo and its 
affluents, including Lake Tanganyika and its eastern 
tributaries. It is a vast region of Central Africa 
atl'ecting French, Portuguese, British and German 
dominions as well as the whole Congo State, now 
a Belgian dependency. By the General Act of 
Berlin of 1885, the High Contracting Parties bind 
themselves to respect the neutrality of the terri- 
tories or portions of territory belonging to the 
States concerned so long as the Powers exercising 
the rights of sovereignty or protectorate over these 
territories shall fullil the duties which neutrality re- 
quires. But in a letter from Sir E. ]\ralet to Earl 
Granville, respecting the nature of this condition. 



NEUTRALISATION 207 

it was stated that though the British Government 
had been "anxious to extend the benefit of neu- 
traHty as widely as should be found practicable", 
it had been absolutely necessary to insist on such 
provisions as would secure that *'if parts of the 
territory of a belligerent were to be respected as 
enjoying immunity from hostilities, they should 
in no sense and in no degree be capable of serving 
as a base of operations for the forces of such bellig- 
erent." As France and Portugal considered this 
to be inconsistent with their sovereign rights, it 
was agreed that the signatory Powers should use 
their good offices in case of a war in which one or 
more of the belligerents should hold territory in 
the free basin, to obtain the neutralisation of such 
territory during the war by special agreement. As 
regarded the newly formed free State of the Congo, 
added Sir E. Malet, "the engagement to respect 
its territory does not involVe a guarantee but it 
only entails a moral obligation." 

It is seen that neutralisation, like neutrality, 
involves distinctions. In the case of the Congo 
Basin, to take the least definite form, there is merely 
an obligation arising from the power to claim it. 

In the case of Luxemburg, the neutralisation 
is not only absolute but its preservation is dependent 
entirely and unrestrictedly on the good faith of 
the Powers creating it, the Treaty of 1867 providing 
that, being neutralised, "the maintenance or estab- 
lishment of fortifications on its territory becomes 
without aim or object." This treaty further 



208 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

provided that the to\^^l of Luxemburg should cease 
to be a fortified phice and that any troops provided 
by the sovereign should be restricted to requirements 
for the preservation of order. As regards Switzer- 
land and Belgium, no such stipulation was imposed 
and, alongside the guarantee, in the one case of 
the neutralisation and, in the other, of the stipu- 
lations contained in the treaty creating the neutrali- 
sation they were left to provide such fortifications 
and defences as in their discretion they might deem 
desirable.^ 

Differing from neutralisation but having a pur- 
pose of more or less the same character are buffer 
zones, that is to say, strips of territory on either 
side of a frontier which the respective States agree 
to regard as in a sense neutralised. On the zone 
the parties may undertake to erect no fortifications 
and to maintain no armed forces but those necessary 
to enforce obedience to the law. Such zones, it 
is seen, are not neutralised in the sense of being 

^ The case of Savoy is anomalous and does not fall within the scope 
of the present volume. 

The case of tlie Ionian Islands has given rise to no examination of the 
character of the neutrality conferred on them by the treaties of 1863 
and 1864. That of July li. 1863, did not go beyond laying down the 
principle that the Ionian Islands should be attached to Greece. The 
Contracting Powers a few months later first placed all the islands under 
the regime of neutrality and then confined the neutrality to the islands 
of Corfu and Paxo only. By the Treaty of March 29, 1864, France, 
Great Britain and Russia, in tieir capacity of Guaranteeing Powers, 
declared with the assent of Austria and Prussia that the islands of Corfu 
and Paxo with their dependencies, after being united with the Hellenic 
Kingdom, should enjoy perpetual neutrality, the King of the Hellenes 
undertaking to preserve such neutrality. 



NEUTRALISATION 209 

recognised as such by any third Power and in the 
event of war between the States concerned, the 
arrangement between the parties would cease to 
be operative. There have been many instances 
of buffer zones ^ in the course of history. The most 
recent of them, estabhshed by agreement between 
Sweden and Norway in 1905, is a zone of fifteen 
kilometres on either side of their frontier within 
which all existing fortresses were to be dismantled 
and no new ones to be erected and no armed troops 
to be maintained. 

The principle of neutralisation is still one of the 
most promising of modern political developments 
for restriction of geographical areas exposed to 
the calamities of war. If one aggressive State 
broke its promise, other States respected theirs, 
at any rate as regards Belgium and, on the whole, 
the de facto situation is favourable to reliance on 
good faith being observed where the terms of a 
treaty leave no room for equivocation. With 
the interdiction of secret treaties and the control 
of foreign policy by the respective parliaments 
of the High Contracting Parties to the coming 
settlement, international affairs may be brought 
into line with the ordinary straightforward rules 
of conduct by which honest private citizens con- 
sider themselves bound, and neutralisation by 
treaty or proclamation may become one of the dif- 
ferent processes of law by which war may eventually 
become as obsolete as duelling. 

^ See special note on Buffer Zones, pp. 222-224. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER XI 

Suggested Form of Agreement as to Procl.\hl\- 
TioNs OF Neutralisation^ 

Considering that Article 10 of the General Act of 
Berlin of February "^0, 1885, provides that : 

"In order to give a new guarantee of security to trade 
and industry, and to encourage by the maintenance of 
peace the development of civilisation in the countries 
mentioned in Article I.,- and placed under the free-trade 
system, the High Signatory Parties to the present Act, 
and those who shall hereafter adopt it, bind themselves 
to respect the neutrality of the territories or portions 
of territories, belonging to the said countries, comprising 

* From Sir T. Barclay's "Problems of International Practice and 
Diplomacy." Ix^ntlon and Poston, 1907. See also by same author. 
"International Ljiw and Practice for Comparison of Conventions of 
ISS)!) with Those of 1907." 

- This Article extends the application of the frei^-tradc declaration 
to all the territories forming the basin of the Congo and its tributaries. 
It adds a zone eastwards of the Congo Basm to the Indian Ocean, and 
concludes as follows: "It is agreed that, in extending the principle 
of free trade to this eastern zone, the Powers represented at the Confer- 
ence only enter into an imdertaking for themselves, and that tliis prin- 
ciple docs not apply to territory belonging at present to any independent 
and sovereign State without its consent. The Powers umlertakc to em- 
ploy their good otEces with the Governments established on the African 
shore of the Indian Ocean with a view to obtaining their consent thereto, 
and, in any case, to assure the most favourable conditions of transit 
for all nations." 



NEUTRALISATION 21 1 

therein the territorial waters, so long as the Powers which 
exercise or shall exercise the rights of Sovereignty or Pro- 
tectorate over those territories, using their option of pro- 
claiming themselves neutral, shall fulfil the duties which 
neutrality requires." 

But that no provision has been made for the mode in 
which notice of such a proclamation of neutralisation 
shall be given ; ^ 

And whereas the said General Act provides that diffi- 
culties arising in connection with the territories dealt 
with under it shall, before any appeal to arms, be sub- 
mitted to mediation or arbitration ; ^ 

And considering that Article 1 1 provides that — 

"In case a Power exercising rights of Sovereignty or 
Protectorate in the countries mentioned in Article I., 
and placed under the free-trade system, should be involved 
in a war, then the High Signatory Parties to the present 
Act, and those who shall hereafter adopt it, bind them- 
selves to lend their good offices in order that the terri- 
tories belonging to this Power and comprised in the 
conventional free-trade zone shall, by the common con- 
sent of this Power and of the other belligerent or bellig- 
erents, be placed during the war under the rule of neu- 
trality, and considered as belonging to a nonbelligerent 
State, the belligerents thenceforth abstaining from extend- 
ing hostilities to the territories thus neutralised, and from 
using them as a basis for warlike operations." 

^ The provision made for notice in case of occupation is as follows : 
"Any Power which shall henceforth take possession of any territory 
on the shores of the African Continent, situate outside its present pos- 
sessions, or which, until now, having none, shall come to acquire any 
such possessions, and any Power which shall assume a protectorate, 
shall accompany the document relating thereto by a notification ad- 
dressed to the other Powers, signatories to the present Act, in order 
to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims" (Article 34). 

« Article 12. 



^3H COLLAPSE .VXD RECONSTRUCTION 

And whereas there is no reason why, subject to the 
same prmoiples and conditions, such ueutraHsation should 
not be made applicable to other nou-Europeaii \^Euro- 
pean?) regions; 

It is hereby agreed, etc., as follows: 

1. Upon notice being given to the International Bureau ^ 
at The Hague that any High Contracting Party has 
placed any territory under the rctjimc of strict permanent 
neutrality, the said Bureau shall notify all the other High 
Contracting Parties accordingly. If within three months 
after receipt of such notification, no objection should be 
raised by any H. C. P.. such permanent neutrality shall 
be considered as proclaimed. 

"2. The conditions upon which permanent neutrality 
shall be enjoyed are as follows : 

(a) That on the neutral territory there shall, at no 
time, be raised any fortifications, and that there shall 
be kept up in connection with it no armed ships or forces 
beyond such as may be necessary for the preservation of 
public order ; 

{b) That the rules of neutrality as set out in draft 
No. 9 shall be strictly observed; 

(c) That all international difliculties. without any 
exception whatsoever, shall be deemed ipso facto within 
the jurisdiction of The Hague Court, the L^mpire, in 
case of disagreement as to his selection, to be appointed 
by the President of the Swiss Confederation, and in case 
Switzerland should be a party, or the President should 
refuse to act. by the King of the Belgians. 

3. The High Contracting Parties solemnly undertake to 
respect any neutralisation thus proclaimed and observed. 
Any breach thereof shall be submitted to The Hague Court 
in accordance with the provisions of § (c) of Article - hereof. 

I'See Article ii of " The Hague Peace Convention." 



NEUTRALISATION 2 1 3 

Note on Some German Theories Respecting Neu- 
tralisation AND Its Guarantees 

A theory was propounded by German writers in the 
course of the late War that a guarantee of neutralisation 
is the same as a guarantee of integrity and that Belgium 
was not bound to resist the invasion of German troops 
under the treaty imposing neutralisation, that Germany 
in undertaking to respect her integrity and defray all 
the expenses and loss incurred by crossing her territory 
would still have been observing the conditions of her 
guarantee. This, however, is not the view of her best 
known and most influential writer on International Law, 
Professor Von Liszt, of the University of Berlin, who has 
treated the whole subject in a totally different sense in 
his book: "Das Vcilkerrecht" (9th edition) published in 
1913. I translate the chief passages of his pronounce- 
ment on the subject : 

"Permanent neutrality," he says, "in the first place, 
is binding on the neutralised State, inasmuch as it is 
not only forbidden to carry on any war, except one in 
defence of its territory, but also, not, in peace time, to 
conclude any Treaty which may bind it to carry on war. 
. . . Permanent neutralisation, moreover, is binding 
upon other States not only those which have stipulated 
the neutralisation but also those which either expressly or 
even only tacitly have given their consent to it. Viola- 
tion of such neutralisation by belligerents, therefore, 
constitutes an international delict and entitles the Powers 
to take steps against the offender. But more particularly 
does the neutralisation bind the guaranteeing Powers, 
that is to say those States which have bound themselves 
to uphold the integrity of the territory of the neutralised 
State, to defend it, if need be, with armed forces. If the 



214 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

guarantee is a collective one, it binds the Powers, how- 
ever, only to collective intervention, though each of them 
is entitled to unilateral intervention. 

"Neutralisation by Treaty creates a juridical situa- 
tion which can only be altered or determined by consent 
of the contracting States. Hence the neutralised State 
cannot terminate its neutralisation by its own declara- 
tion nor can any of the States which have stipulated 
the neutralisation retire voluntarily from its undertaking. 
Any accretions of territory, which include colonial acquisi- 
tions, on the part of the neutralised State, however, re- 
quire the approval of other States and especially of the 
guaranteeing Powers. This follows from the principle 
of unity of State territory which excludes any distinction 
between neutralised and non-neutralised parts." ^ 

Professor Von Liszt, I may mention, was nevertheless 
one of the signatories of the manifesto of the "intel- 
lectuals " which stated that it was not true that Germany 
had criminally violated the neutrality of Belgium, be- 
cause she had unquestionable proof that France and 
England had already made preparations to violate Bel- 
gian territory and that, on the part of the Fatherland, 
not to have been the first to do so would have been suicide. 
As no evidence whatsoever has been advanced in sup- 
port of this statement except two reports found in the 
archives of the Foreign Office at Brussels after the inva- 
sion of Belgium, which do not bear out the allegation, the 
signatories must have been entirely misled by some false 
allegations submitted to them. I cannot suppose that 
an accomplished lawyer like Professor Von Liszt, that 
first-class business men like Herr Von Gwinner and Doctor 
Kaempf, that men trained in the exact sciences like Pro- 
fessors Ehrlich, Ostwald and Haeckel, that a mathema- 

* Pages 60 et seq. 



NEUTRALISATION 215 

tician like Professor Foerster, that a historian like Pro- 
fessor Lamprecht, that a critical theologian like Professor 
Von Harnack, that men, in short, with great European 
reputations at stake should have subscribed such a 
statement without evidence sufficiently cogent to warrant 
their doing so. It is to be hoped that we shall some day 
know by what ignoble methods men of such scientific 
eminence can have been induced to make a statement of 
such precision. Professor Schiemann, to whose sagacity 
I have had occasion more than once elsewhere to refer,^ 
was not misled. As he seems to have said ^ the manifesto 
proved nothing and, therefore, could not possibly con- 
vince people who took a diametrically opposite view. 
If they were not misled by false allegations, it only shows 
that in time of war even the wisest of men revert to 
unreasoning combative instincts. I need not quote 
from less exhaustive examinations of the subject by 
other German publicists, but I may say that the views 
expressed by Professors Von Ullmann and Gareis in 
their treatises on International Law are practically the 
same. 

Nor did oflScial Germany contest the view that the 
neutralisation of Belgium forbade entry upon its terri- 
tory. The German Chancellor, apart from the notorious 
incident of the "scrap of paper", stated in the Reichs- 
tag: 

"We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity 
knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg 
and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is 
contrary to the dictates of International Law. France 

' See Barclay's "Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences." Lon- 
don. Constable & Co., 1914. 

2 See "Enquete" of Mr. Ibanez de Ibero, Echo de Paris, March 29, 
1915. Mr. De Ibero's articles have since been republished in book 
form. 



216 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared 
to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was 
respected by her adversary. But we knew that France 
was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait ; we 
could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region 
of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, 
therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate 
protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. 
For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make 
reparation as soon as our military object is attained." 

To this admission that the invasion was a violation 
of Germany's contractual obligations towards Belgium 
and her co-guarantors, the contention of later writers 
must yield. Moreover, it is in accordance, as we have 
seen, with the views of Germany's leading authorities 
on International Law. 

Far, however, from facilitating an issue from the 
difficulties we have to face in determining the nature of 
neutralisation, the admission of deliberate illegality 
adds very seriously to the complication. 

Neutralisation is solely dependent on honourable 
observance of the treaty obligations creating it. Even 
Treitschke, the apologist of all that is ruthless, selfish 
and uncompromising in international relations, has 
warned his countrymen, that, "a State must have a 
very highly-developed sense of honour, if it is not to be 
disloyal to its own nature. The State is not a violet 
blooming in the shade. ... It must strain every nerve 
to preserve for itself that respect which it enjoys in the 
State-system." ^ We shall see below that elsewhere he 
qualifies this high-minded recommendation to the states- 
men of the Fatherland. 

> *' The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke", by H. W. 
C. Davis, p. 177. London, 1914. 



NEUTRALISATION 217 

There is no ground upon which a nation which breaks 
its bond is less unworthy than an individual who com- 
mits a breach of trust. International good faith is a 
primal interest for the whole community of nations. 
That engagements shall be respected is the groundwork 
of civilised intercourse. It is no mere theoretical or 
moral proposition to say that on the sanctity of treaties 
rests the whole fabric of international stability. On the 
strength of the confidence that States will respect their 
engagements, nations enter into contracts with each other 
without taking the precautions necessary where bad faith 
may be apprehended. The interchange of merchandise 
between the citizens of different States, the admission 
of ships to each other's ports and harbours, all the free- 
dom of business between nations is guaranteed by trea- 
ties. Patents, trade-marks, designs, copyright are all the 
subject of treaties. Cables, telegraphs, telephones, postal 
services all interconnect the different countries of the 
world in virtue of treaties. In short, the whole intercourse, 
trade and navigation of the two hemispheres is subject 
to the fidelity with which States may be counted upon 
to respect their engagements. Cases there have been 
of States repudiating engagements, but until now these 
have never been among the great States and the result 
has been without exception disastrous for the delinquents. 

In the case of Germany's repudiation of her engagements 
to Belgium, she appeals to the authority of her chief 
political historian, Treitschke, who, in spite of his own 
theory of national honour, qualifies the binding character 
of treaty engagements to such an extent that little of it 
remains : 

"The relative importance of various obligations," 
he says, "must be quite different in the case of the State 
from what it is in the case of private individuals. A great 



218 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

number of the duties incumbent upon private individuals 
could not possibly be held to be incumbent upon the 
State. The highest duty of the State is self-preservation. 
Self-preservation is for the State an absolute moral 
obligation. And, therefore, it must be made clear that of 
all political sins, that of weakness is the most heinous and 
despicable. ... In private life there may be excuses 
for moral weakness. In the State there can be no ques- 
tion of any excuse. The State is Power, and if it is false 
to its own nature, no puuislunent can be too severe for 
it." 1 

"Every State," he wrote elsewhere, "will for its own 
sake limit its sovereignty to a certain extent by means 
of treaties. ^Yhen States conclude agreements with 
one another, they do to some extent restrict their powers. 
But tliis does not really alter the case, for every treaty 
is a voluntary self-limitation of an individual power, 
and all international treaties contain the tacit proviso: 
rebus sic staiitibini. One State cannot hamper the exer- 
cise of its free will in the future by an obligation to another 
State. The State has no supreme juilge placed above 
itself, and, therefore, it concludes all its treaties with 
that mental reservation. This is confirmed by the fact 
that . . . the moment war is declared all treaties between 
the belligerent nations are cancelled. Now every sover- 
eign State has the unquestionable right to declare war 
when it so desires and, therefore, it is possible for every 
State to cancel its treaties." ' 

This is not a lawyer's view and in justice to German 
authorities of a more accurate and less polemical charac- 
ter, I translate the following passage on the same sub- 

> "The rditioal Thought of Ileinrich von Troitsohke", by H. W, 
C. Davis, p. 167. Londou, 1914. 
» Ibid., pp. 162 et teq. 



NEUTRALISATION 219 

ject from the already quoted work on International Law 
of Professor Von Liszt : 

"The statement that all international treaties are 
subject to the tacit clause rebus sic stantibus, that on alter- 
ation of circumstances they may he denounced, is un- 
questionably as a general proposition inaccurate; other- 
wise the very principles of international law would be 
negatived. The course of historical events involves a 
continual variation of circumstances and contractual 
fidelity, without which no international law can subsist, 
would be within the discretion of the contracting States . . . 

"... Even treaties of indefinite duration . . . can- 
not be ofl^hand cancelled by unilateral denunciation. . . . 

"An exception is admissible only in so far as a treaty 
involves specific conditions, expressed or tacit, and in so 
far as, through the alteration of these conditions, the 
obligations undertaken have become essentially heavier. 
If a State has guaranteed the integrity of another State, 
the treaty of guarantee may be denounced if, through 
expansion of its territory, as for instance through the 
acquisition of an extended colonial area, the obligations 
of the guaranteeing State are sensibly increased. This 
would apply to tariff arrangements, if by the territorial 
expansion the new economic conditions altered essential 
conditions of the arrangements. Also constitutional 
changes as from a monarchical to a republican form of 
government, or vice versa, would warrant denunciation, 
if the treaty had been entered into in view of the con- 
tinuance of some form of government. 

"Apart from such exceptions, the principle pacta 
sunt servanda, which is the basis of all law, must be up- 
held." ' 

International Law has only the binding character 
1 " Volkerrecht", pp. 170 et »eq. 



220 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

which States choose to accord it. Observance of its 
rules depends entirely on the voluntary respect with 
which the Great Powers treat them. A single State 
so powerful that it is beyond reach of the pressure of 
other States can set them at naught. Thus for genera- 
tions attempts to modify international maritime law 
have been dependent on the cooperation of England as 
chief maritime State, without whose assent these attempts 
were necessarily abortive. So it is as regards International 
Law governing matters on land. Thus without the co- 
operation of Germany as the then greatest military 
Power, proposals for reduction of armaments, in spite 
of their having the support of practically all the other 
great Powers, were destined to failure and failed. The 
same consensus is necessary for the maintenance of exist- 
ing rules and practice. A great Power which refuses to 
recognise the binding character of neutralisation nega- 
tives its purpose. If the moral restraints of neutralisa- 
tion by treaty can no longer be relied upon, the independ- 
ence and integrity of smaller States generally will depend 
upon the overwhelming physical cooperation of guar- 
anteeing States. The method originally planned for 
the protection of Holland and Belgium was the creation 
of a line of fortifications erected at the expense of the 
guaranteeing States. Neutralisation was a later substi- 
tute for this method. The recent War has shown that 
fortresses are powerless against sufficiently powerful 
artillery and we are thrown back on trenches and water 
as a means of self-defence and, as in antiquity, European 
frontiers, liable at any moment to violation, may have 
to be guarded in peace as in war time ! Without going 
to any tragic length we shall now have to consider the 
feasibility at any rate of buffer zones — zones on either 
side of frontiers within which, as in the case of Sweden 



NEUTRALISATION 221 

and Norway, no fortifications, defences of any kind, or 
the presence of troops would be permissible. The neu- 
tralisation of such zones would at least prevent the 
creation of such a threatening anomaly as the great 
German camp at Elsenborn on the very edge of the Bel- 
gian frontier. 

The violation of Belgium's neutrality dwarfs every 
other violation of right and law of the War. Atrocities 
may be explained to the satisfaction of those in whose 
name they were committed, ruses of war may be argued 
to cover abuses charged against each other, reprisals 
may be alleged to warrant the sinking of passenger ships 
and drowning of innocent civilians, damage to private 
property and harmless persons by bombardment may be 
excused on the ground that it was involuntary. But no 
excuse can be given for the imposition of war upon a 
neutralised State in defiance of a binding treaty by a 
guarantor of that neutralisation. 

By straining every muscle in vindication of her guar- 
antee England has earned the respect of posterity. No 
other European State engaged in this frightful conflict 
can claim to have entered the struggle solely as she did 
as a matter of national honour and good faith. She was 
ready in 1911 to go to war at the side of France in fulfil- 
ment of her obligations under the agreement of 1904. 
She was only partly bound to assist France in 1914, but 
as she was bound to assist France to resist invasion in 
1911 so she was bound to resist the invasion of Belgium 
in 1914. But for that invasion she might have confined 
herself to carrying out her obligations to France in respect 
of the navigation of the British Channel and the Atlantic 
ports. Whether this would have led to war or not would 
have depended on the development of events. England 
by intervening for the assertion of the sanctity due to 



•JO-: COLLAPSE AND RFCOXSTRLCTUA' 

treaty obliijations has established a priceless precedent 
for the protet^tion of mankind against repetition of the 
crime of which Germany stands convicted at the bar of 
history.^ 

NOTK ox Rl'FVEU ZoXKsi 2 

"BnfTer" zones are of qnite recent origin as a political 
creation ; /.<•. where their objtx^t is to establish npon the 
territory of two contignons States a strip or zone on 
either side of the frontier which the respei^tive States 
agrt'c to nyard as nentral, on which the parties undertake 
to erect no fortitications. and to mauitain no armed 
forces bnt those necessary to enforce the ordinary rights 
of government. The word "nentral" does not corret^tly 
describe the character of the zone. It is not nentral in 
the sense of being recognised as such by any third State, 
and it necessarily ceases to be neutral in case of war 
between the States concerned. The word "bulTer" 
comes nearest to the object, but even this term implies 
more than is meant. 

The "butfer" zones between European and native 
possessions outside Europe ditfer according to their dif- 

^ A German news^xiper in An\orioa has quot^xl frtnu u\y article ou 
Neutrality in the last edition of the KncyelopaxUa Britannioa a "prec- 
edent" in the Boer War when Gn^at Britain askoil and obtaine*.! from 
Portugal permission to take tn.>ops across Portuguese ivlonial territory. 
Therv w-:\s no question iu tvnneetiou with this incident of a guarantee 
by Great Britain of the neutrality of Portuguese territory. Nor had 
any such neutrality been impostni upc>u Portugal by neighlvuring States. 
Portugal, in short, was free to allow British tnxips and ammunition 
to cross her territory in the same way as Holland would be frtv to allow 
British or German tn.x>ps or munitions of war to cross her territory. It 
would Ix^ for the other Mligerent to reganl such a dcpjirture from the 
duties of neutrality as tantamount to joining the enemy. 

'From Sir T. Barclay's "Pr^^blems of International Practii'e and 
Diplomacy." Loudon and Boston, 11)07. 



NEUTRALISATION 223 

ferent purposes. Thus ci^Iit kilometres on cither side of 
the front i(T were estahlislicd by an a^reciriont of April 12, 
1882, between the King of Cainbodge (under French 
protectorate) and the Governor of Cochin-China for 
the purpose of n^prcssing a number of iniquities. Under 
this treaty the police authorities of both parties were 
allowed free access to exercise their jurisdiction through- 
out the zone. IJetwcen Spain and Morocco a treaty 
of March 5, 18M, established between the camp of 
Mel ilia and Moroccan territory a zone within which no 
new roads were to be niad(% no lierds to be allowed to 
graze, no land to be cultivated, no troops of either party 
or even private persons carrying arms to set foot, no 
irduibitants to dwell, and all habitations to be razed. 
The zone between Burmah and Siani, estal)lished by an 
agreement between Great Britain and France, dated 
January 1.5, 180(5, declared "the portion of Siam which 
is comprised within the drainage basin of the Menam, 
and of the coast streams of a corresponding longitude" 
neutral as between them. Within this area the two 
Powers undert(jok not to "operate by their military or 
naval forces, except in so far as they might do so in concert 
for any ])urpose requisite for nuiinlaining the independence 
of Siam." They also undertook not to acqiiire within 
that area any privileges or commercial facilities not ex- 
tended to both of them. 

"Buffer" zones might fulfil a useful purpose even in 
Europe. They would obviously react against the well- 
known feeling known as "esprit de fronticre" , and diminish 
the danger of incidents arising out of this feeling, and 
might attenuate the rivalry of neighbouring counter- 
armaments. 

These considerations no doubt led the Swedish and 
Norwegian governments in their settlement of September, 



224 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

1905, to establish a "buffer" zone of fifteen kilometres on 
either side of the frontier between the two States in 
question. Within these thirty kilometres all existing for- 
tresses are dismantled,^ no new ones are to be erected, 
and no armed troops to be maintained ; any question 
between the two States relative to the provisions respect- 
ing the "buffer" zone to be decided by arbitration. 
There are other provisions in the Swedo-Norwegian 
Treaty the object of which is to render armaments as 
between them unnecessary. 

* It was stipulated that the dismantling should be controlled by a 
technical Commission of three officers of foreign nationality, to be 
chosen, one by each of the contracting powers, and the third by the two 
officers thus appointed, or. in default of an agreement on their part, by 
the President of the S^nss Confederation. The dismantling of the forts 
in question has now been carried out. The Commission was composed 
on the part of Sweden of an engineer on the staff of the Austrian army, 
and on the part of Norway of a Colonel in the German army, and, by 
agreement of these, of a Colonel in the Dutch army. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTENTIALITIES 

To sneer at the Hague Court, at arbitration, 
at peace methods generally because the most terrible 
war the world ever saw broke out in spite of them, 
is just about as reasonable, as I have said of Inter- 
national Law, as to sneer at engineering, archi- 
tecture and the science of building generally, because 
an earthquake has destroyed some of man's finest 
work. There is no reason to suppose that the trea- 
ties relating to Arbitration and the Hague Court 
and to International Law, as established by the 
Hague conventions and by treaties between and 
with our Allies and with neutrals, just as they 
stood before the War in spite of violations on all 
hands by belligerents of almost every rule which 
had been laid down by statesmen and jurists for 
the humanising, so far as it can be made human, 
of so insensate a survival of barbarism as war, have 
lost their cogency and effect. And a stroke of the 
pen can revive their cogency and effect as regards 
our late enemies. It is certain that the Congress 
of Peace will see in an extension of its scope and 
effect, without expecting from it realisation of any 
of the dreams of a millennium in which some of its 
more ardent apologists have indulged, a part of the 



226 COLLAPSE AND KFCOXSTRITTIOX 

work to be done for the promotion of law and order 
tliroughont the worhi. 

The Hague Court owes itj; oriiiiu to the Peace 
Conference of 1S90. but to understand its true 
nature and objects we nuist go back to an earUer 
period in the liistory of International Arbitration. 
International Arbitration means simply the refer- 
ence of disputes between independent States to 
arbitrators chosen by the parties themselves. It 
is this voluntary and agreed seltvtion of the judges 
that distinguishes arbitration from adjudication 
in disputes in ordinary Courts of Justice. Arbi- 
tration is no new tiling in the settlement of disputes 
between nations. All cases, however, down to 
the great one about which I shall speak presently, 
had been decided by an arbitrator or arbitrators 
without regard to any particular procedure and 
without any attempt to assimilate the forms of 
any national judicature. There was no question 
of deciding international ditferences as ditVerences 
between individuals are decided in Law Courts. 
It was due to the statesmen of the two great Anglo- 
Saxon communities that the first attempt was 
made to deal with grave international ditVerences 
in accordance with the forms of national justice. 
In spite of the violent opposition of excited patriots 
the two governments signed a treaty at AYashington 
in 1S7T referring the Alabama and several smaller 
analogous cases to the decision of arbitrators.^ 

''The AlaUiiua was a vo,-v-;ol Iniilt in Uritisli waters for use as a war 
vessel iu tlie service of the Southern Coufeilerotes duriug the great 



HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTENTIALITIES 227 

For the first time in the history of arbitration a 
system which has now become almost common 
practice was adopted. The Court was constituted 
of three foreign arbitrators, viz. : Count Sclopis, 
an ItaUan, M. Stoempfli, a Swiss, and Baron D'lta- 
juta, a Bra/iHan. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn 
sat on the Court on behalf of Great Britain and 
Charles Francis Adams on behalf of the United 
States. Count Sclopis presided. This Tribunal 
met at Geneva in 1871, and after sitting for nine 
months delivered an award condemning the British 
Government to pay a sum of, in round figures, 
three and a quarter million pounds, as an indemnity 
for the damage done in particular by the Alabama 
in the capture of Northern or Federal ships for the 
benefit of their ultimately defeated adversaries, 
the Southern or Confederate States. The result 
eventually came to be regarded as highly satis- 
factory, and excited patriots were obliged to admit 
that high as the indemnity was, it was an infinitely 
better solution than submitting the question to 
the arbitrament of brute force; and we cannot 
at the present day but rejoice that the Government 
had the foresight to resist the combative instincts 
of those who regarded acceptance of a peaceable 
settlement as the abdication of England's proud 
independence and an acceptance of foreign dicta- 
tion in a matter governed by no then existing rules 

American Civil War. That the vessel was bein^ built for this purpose 
was notorious, and the attention of the IJritish Government was called 
to this fact by the United States Minister in London. The vessel was, 
nevertheless, allowed to sail, and at the Azores she was equipped for 
active service in the then pending war. 



2iS COIXAPSE .VND RECONSTRUC lU^X 

of international practioo. So truo is it that thore 
were at that time no sneh rules that the Treaty 
of ^Vashington had to lay down eertain prineiples 
of h^w which were stated in the treaty not to lie of 
general acceptance but only to have been aiiopted 
for the purpose of the case in question. Theso 
prineiples. however, in spite of the British reserva- 
tion, have become the law of eivilisetl nations. 
and are now incorporated as such in one of the 
HaiTue conventions. The precedent of the Geneva 
Court, however, remained a solitary exception 
among the numerous arbitrations which followed it 
for thirty years. 

Meanwhile, in both England and the I'nited 
States, the idea that arbitration might some day 
become a standing international institution never 
ceased to occupy the minds of pacitic reformers. 
It became almost a commonplace to advocate the 
principle of arbitration in every ease of international 
difficulty, and in 1S0.5 lAtrd Alverstone, at a meet- 
ing of the International Law Association at Brussels, 
stated that "arbitration was now regarded as so 
fully recognised by all civilised nations that it 
had become unnecessary to argue in its support." 
Schemes of procedure were drawn up by ilitTerent 
international bodies, and towards the close of the 
last century men began to talk seriously about 
general and standing treaties of arbitration and 
the possibility of a permanent Court for its applica- 
tion without that ironical undercurrent which until 
then had marked the expression of the practical 
man's feehngs towards arbitration. It had, in 



HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTENTIALITIES 220 

fact, been made slightly ridiculous by the exagger- 
ated hopes expressed l)y some of its more injudicious 
advocates. At lenglh the idea of a standing treaty 
of arbitration si ruck the highly practical mind 
of the late Lord Salisbury as feasible, at any rate, 
between the United States and Great Britain, 
and in 18!)() he was personally directing negotiations 
for this purpose with the Department of State at 
Washington. The negotiations resulted, in 1897, 
in ihc signing of such a treaty for five years. I 
cannot heli) thinking that the principles of that 
treaty were full of wisdom. It did not attempt to 
do the impossible but only to meet different con- 
tingencies which could arise between two nations 
in the way best adapted to avoid national susct^pti- 
bilities. 

'J'here were to be three classes of arbitration tri- 
bunals. For questions of indemnity up to £100,000, 
three arbitrators were to be necessary. When 
more than that sum was in dispute, five arbitrators 
were to be called in. For territorial or national 
questions of supreme importance the number of 
arbitrators was increased to six. In case of the 
arbitrators finding it impossible to form the re- 
quired majorities, a friendly Power was to be called 
in to mediate.' 

* The chief clauses in the Treaty were Article VI and Article VII. 
Article VI was as follows : 

"Any controversy which shall involve the determination of terri- 
torial claims shall he siibmittcd to a tribunal composed of six members, 
three of whom shnll be Judges of the British Supreme Court of Judica- 
ture, or members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to be 
nominated by Her Britannic Majesty, and the other three of whom shall 



250 COLLAPSE A\P I^ECOXSTRITTTOX 

The essential point in this project was that for 
these qnestions of snpreme national import anee 
the arbitrators were to belong exehisively to the 
two contracting States. The idea which had pre- 
vailed until then in tlie constituting of Courts 
of Arbitration was that the arbitrator or umpire, 
if more than one, was ntvessarily a person who. 
by his independence and entire detachment from 
the interests involved, had the requisite in\partiality 
for the pure and simjile application of principles 
of justice. It was thought that nations could only 
apply as between themselves the same principles 
as regulate litigation between citizens. And indeed 
the assimilation is reasonable and perftM:tly practi- 
cable for questions of indenmity, which constitute 
the majority of international dit^'erences. 

The use of the word "arbitration" in connection 
with this proposed mode of dealing with such vital 
issues is therefore to some extent misleadhig. The 

be Judges of the Supremo Court of ttio rnitoil States, or Justiees of the 
Circuit Courts, to Ix^ nominatetl by the Pix'sidout of the United St.ntes. 
whivse awarvi by a majority of not K^ss than tive to one shall be tiual. 
In case of an awan.1 made by loss than the prt^sorilxxl majority, the 
awani shall also Iv final, unless either Power shall, within thrvv months 
after the award has bcxni ri^portixi, prvHest that the sjune is errvrntXHis. in 
which ease the awani shall be of no validity. In the event of an awanl 
made by less than the prescribed majority and prv^tosteti .is aK>ve pro- 
vided, or if the members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be equally di\-ided, 
there shall be no ixxxnirse to h^.^stilo measures of any description until 
the moviiation of one or mon^ friendly Powers has Ixxmi iuN-itcd by one 
or Ix^th of the high cvntractiug j^varlios." 

Article Vll prvnidod for decision by a tribunal similarly composed 
of all questions "of principle of grave general importamv atTocting the 
national rights" of either State, "as distinguished frvnn the private 
rights whereof it is merely the international representative." 



HAGUE COURT ANJ> ITS rOTENTIATJITICS 2.'?1 

Court provided for that treaty was called an "Arbitral 
Trihmial.'" In realily it was a "Joint ('omrriission." 
'J'liis Joint Commission, then, was instituted to meet 
the (lifTioulty of bringing grave national issues within 
the operation of the Arbitration Treaty in question. 
'Ilie draftsmen of tlie Treaty of 18!)7 knew that no 
Great Powers would dare to leave the decision of 
any vital issu(\s between them to the hazard of 
any indei)endent judgment, however great and 
unquestioned the impartiality of the judge. It 
lias always been felt that such issues coidd never 
be committed to the decision of foreign arbitrators, 
or of a foreign umj)Ire, jui um])Ire being, for obvious 
reasons, necessarily a foreigner. 'J'lu^ negotiators, 
therefore, provided that there should be neither 
outside arbitrators nor any umpire at all. Furtlier- 
more, to allay fears that any great national interest 
might be exi)osed to quixotic or unpractical views 
taken by any single judge, it was provided that, 
to be binding, the decision should require the con- 
currence against it of two out of three of the judges 
appointed by either j)arty. This precluded, by 
a simple and practical method, for both countries, 
any danger of decisions which might excite national 
distrust. The object of the two governments was, 
manifestly, not so much to create a substitute for 
war, as to provide a further stage of negotiation, 
and enable Governments to issue from any dead- 
lock into wliich they might have been drawn in the 
heat of controversy or by pressure of public opinion. 
They consequently limited their efforts to the 
creation, without the introduction of any third 



232 COIXAPSE AND llKCOXSnUC HON 

or indopondont olomont, of an automatic system, 
calculated to remove questions betwtvn the two 
States from irritating discussion by irresponsible 
politicians who can seldom l>e sutHciently conversant 
with the facts to deal ethciently with them. They 
hoped thereby to arrest the development of those 
vague hatreds, created by prejudice and ignorance, 
which grow no one knows how. and soon break 
away from their initial cause. Unfortunately this 
Anglo-American Treaty was not adopted by the 
United States Senate, although there was a majority 
of sixteen in its favour, owing to the fact that the 
United States Constitution requires a two thirds 
majority for the adoption of a treaty. There were 
4'^ votes for and C(.> against it. A transfer of four 
votes from the negative to the atHrmative would 
have suthced to ratify it. 

At lenglh came the Czar's famous rescript of 
1808. Count ^luravietT, his Foreign ^linister. in- 
cluded among the subjects for discussion the estali- 
lishment of a uniform practice in reference to good 
offices, mediation and facultative arbitration, but 
the proposal of a Court of Arbitration once more 
came from the representatives of the two Anglo- 
Saxon conmumities. It was more particidarly, in 
fact. Lord Pauncefote, the British Delegate, who 
had signed the Anglo-American Treaty when British 
Ambassador at Washington two years before, to 
whom the proposal of the Permanent Court was due. 

There is something colossal in the very idea of 
a permanent Court of Justice for tlie decision of 



HAGUE COlJirr AND ITS POTENIIALITIES 233 

differtMiccs between States. One thinks of the 
graduation of our national Courts, of how our judi- 
cial organisation provides an ever higlier rank and 
greater function, as it ascends from rung to rung 
in the hiiM'areliy, and yet tlie higliest rung only 
deals wilh very small matters conii)ared with the 
inunense inlerests involved in the decision of an 
international issue. Our sense of proportion asks 
where we should find the judges great enough to 
inspire awe and confidence in the mighty litigants 
who are to humbly subnu't their differences to this 
highest jurisdiclioM of mankind. 

States shrank from making recourse to the new 
Court comi)uls()ry. In fact they re])udiated the 
idea of compulsion in every provision of the Con- 
vention of 1895), and much to the disappointment 
of many of the more ardent votaries of arbitration, 
it contains s])eciric warnings of its ])urely optional 
character. Thus the signatory Powers un(K>rtake, 
in case of grave disagreement or conflict, before 
appealing to arms, *' as far as circvnnstances jdlow", 
to have recourse to the good offices or mediation 
of one or more friendly Powers, and, "as far as 
circumstances allow", the Powers may tender their 
good offices, and the exercise of this right can never 
be considered as an unfriendly act. Provision is 
made "as far as circumstances allow", and where 
involving "neither national honour nor vital inter- 
ests", for international commissions of inquiry 
which are to have no binding character for the 
parties. 

The Convention on the subject states that the 



234 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

object of the Permanent Court was to facilitate 
immediate recourse to arbitration for international 
differences which it had not been possible to settle 
by diplomacy. It was to be at all times accessible 
and to operate, unless otherwise stipulated by the 
parties, in accordance with the rules of procedure 
inserted in the Convention. The Conference, it 
is seen, left it to the Powers themselves to organise 
the Permanent Court, but it made a suggestion of 
what might be the composition of the Court failing 
direct agreement of the parties, viz. : that each 
party should appoint two arbitrators and that these 
together should choose an umpire. 

It was also agreed that each signatory Power 
should select four persons of known competency 
in questions of international law and of the highest 
moral reputation to form a panel of members of 
the Court from which the Arbitrators could be 
selected. The panel was duly created, but for 
some time it seemed as if the Court was destined 
to remain a mere pious wish, if not an ironical 
demonstration of the absurdity of "pacifism", 
a term which had been invented by the adversaries 
of pacific methods generally. For three years 
no recourse was had to the new institution. To 
the English judicial mind in particular it merely 
appeared as a sort of concession of the practical 
man to popular sentiment, even perhaps to popular 
ignorance which it would be safe to ignore. At 
length the United States and Mexico, less suscep- 
tible to the ridicule of the ignorant, gave it its first 
case, and "gave a lesson to the Old World." 



HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTENTIALITIES 235 

The lesson had its effect. It was le premier pas 
qui coute, and since then the Hague Court has had 
many cases. I do not say that they have all 
been cases which would not have been settled by 
arbitration without the existence of the Hague 
Court, but I do say that the existence of this Court 
has facilitated recourse to arbitration, that irritating 
discussion preliminary to the adoption of its pro- 
cedure has been avoided, and that it has had a 
suggestive influence generally which has relieved 
States from any need of public justification of 
recourse to its peaceful agency. Its utilisation, 
moreover, may be the means of proceeding further 
in the development of arbitration by the broaden- 
ing of the area of its jurisdiction, so to speak, and 
by the adaptation of its methods to the varying 
requirements of international controversies.* 

International Law is not backed up with a police 
force to carry out its fiats. It depends for its 
observance upon the reasonableness of its rules. 
Diplomacy, the chief agency by which, in time of 
peace. International Law is applied, on the other 
hand, like the procedure of our domestic courts 
of justice, is largely a congeries of devices which 
have grown up to provide for requirements shown 
to exist, owing to the inherent intellectual short- 
comings of the men who resort to law or even of 
those who have to apply it. In our domestic 

' See a full analysis of the cases which have been dealt with by the 
Hague Court: Barclay, "New Methods of Adjusting International Dis- 
putes and the Future", chap. VII. London, 1917. 



236 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

courts we distrust leaving irrevocable decisions to 
the judgment of one man or prescribing finality 
either to arguments or to evidence. And, to a 
great extent, circumstances have also led in diplo- 
macy to the employment of many different forms 
to enable governments in a similar way to avoid 
the calamity of deadlocks. Yet deadlocks do 
occur, and we had, before the diplomatic break- 
down of 1914, recently been more than once brought 
to the verge of war with powerful neighbours by 
practical deadlocks. Our diplomatic machinery, 
in spite of its arsenal of forms, failed for want of a 
further jurisdiction, which, by operation of law, 
without further discussion, should become neces- 
sarily possessed of the question at issue. We can- 
not disregard the natural weaknesses of mankind 
in the relations of nations with one another. Pa- 
triotism, ignorance, "bluff", improvidence, thought- 
lessness, courage, love of excitement, conceit, con- 
viction (right or wrong), misunderstanding, exagger- 
ation, all affect the course of international questions, 
when public opinion is appealed to or allowed to 
take any part in their decision. This is the danger, 
and successful as our diplomacy usually is, we can 
no longer rely, in the circumstances of the present 
age — with a vigilant and enterprising press ruth- 
lessly day by day dissecting every international 
incident, and a nervous, overstrained democracy 
which, especially in overcrowded cities, claims its 
say in all public matters — on the quiet settlement 
of diflBculties, which the accredited diplomatists 
have not solved, without the aid of some further 



HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTENTIALITIES 237 

dilatory amicable procedure by which governments 
can at least gain time. 

Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to 
the mode in which arbitration can be best adapted 
to cover such and all cases of international difficulty, 
we have the great, if only, precedent of a general 
arbitration treaty between great Powers, the unrati- 
fied Anglo-American Treaty of 1897. It cannot be 
denied that that treaty is based on a reasonable 
view of the difficulties which beset arbitration, 
where national questions of vital importance are 
involved. It embodies, at any rate, as President 
Cleveland said of it, a "practical working plan" 
for bringing these delicate matters within a general 
treaty. On the other hand, the Hague Conven- 
tion has dealt with all matters but this very class, 
which was excluded from the purview of the Con- 
ference, and as regards all others but this class, 
reference to the Hague Court is fast being made 
compulsory. Then what is wanted, to complete 
the work done at the Hague, is to graft upon it 
some such provisions as those contained in the Anglo- 
American Treaty, confining the choice of the arbi- 
trators, where the question is of vital importance, 
to persons exclusively of the nationality of the 
States concerned. 

There are three great landmarks in the history 
of systematic arbitration, that is, arbitration as a 
judicial method of adjusting international differ- 
ences. The first was the Anglo-American Alabama 
arbitration at Geneva in which the forms and pro- 



•288 COLL.\PSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

cediire of law courts wore followed. Tlie stx\Mul 
was tlie constitution of a permanent court of arbi- 
tration at the Haiiue uiodelled more or less upon the 
principles of the Geneva arbitration court. The 
third was the tirst standing treaty of arbitration, 
under which two great Powers determined to submit 
all ditl'erences of a judicial cliaracter to the decision 
of this court. That treaty was signed by Lord 
Lansdowne. the British Secretary for Foreign AtTairs, 
and M. Cambon. the French Ambassador, on Octo- 
ber 14, 1903, a treaty for ever memorable btH.\uise 
it was the first of the series of agreements which 
consolidates! the Entente between England and 
France. It provided that ditferences "of a judicial 
order, or relating to the interpretation of existing 
Treaties between the two Contracting Parties, 
which may arise, and which it may not have betni 
possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be submitted 
to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established 
by the Convention of July ^^i), 1809, at the Hague, 
on condition, however, that neither the vital interests, 
nor the independence or honour of the two Con- 
tracting States, nor the uiterests of any State other 
than the two contracting States, are involved." 

The terms of agreement as adopted by Great 
Britain and France became a sort of common form, 
and in the course of a few years there were but a 
few States in the world which had not concluded 
with each other similar treaties. The Hague Court, 
in fact, was now universally rtM?ognised as an inter- 
national institution with a definite function. 

A fact which has probably been forgotten by 



HAGUE COURT AND ITS rOTENTIALITIES 239 

most iK'oplc by lliis liiiic is lliul, I lie Russian original 
[)roject of a general treaty ol" arhilralion provided 
that it should l)e ohligiilory. Tlie then famous 
ArLiele 10 ol" that projcel provided as follows : 

"From the ratification of the present Act by all 
the sigujitoiy powers, arbitration is obligatory in 
tlie followiug cases, in so far as they do not afl'ect 
eilher vilal interests or the national honour of 
the contracting States : 

"1. In cases of difficidty or contention relating 
to ])eeuniary damage sulfered by a State; or its 
citizens, in consequence of illegal acts or negligence 
of another State or its citizens. 

"2. In cases oF difference relallug to the inter- 
pretation or jipi)li(;ili()n of the treaties or conven- 
tions herein mentioned, 

"(a) Treaties and conventions relating to posts 
and ielegraphs, railways, protection of submarine 
cables; ])reventi(m of collisions on the high seas; 
navigation of international rivers and inter-oceanic 
canals. 

"(/>) Conventions relating to copyright and indus- 
trial property (patents, trade-marks, etc.) ; to 
money and weights and measures ; to sanitary 
and veterinary matters and the phylloxera. 

"(c) Conventions relating to successions, cartel 
and mutual judicial assistance. 

"(c?) Conventions relating to boundaries, in so 
far as of a purely technical and nonpolitical char- 
acter." 

To the first class in this enumeration some excep- 
tion was taken, but the conference was practically 



240 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

agreed on the general principle of the article, 
viz. : that the signatories should oblige themselves 
to refer to arbitration all matters not involving 
a vital interest or the national honour. After 
recasting the Russian project to meet different 
objections of detail, the idea of making reference 
to arbitration obligatory, even on these minor 
matters, had to be abandoned. One Power alone, 
but a very great Power, refused to agree to obliga- 
tory arbitration in any case whatsoever. That 
Power was Germany, who ''did not consider that 
she could enter into any treaty binding herself 
beforehand to submit new cases to arbitration." 
But for Germany's persistent obstruction, arbi- 
tration might by now have reached a point at 
which even "national honour and vital interests" 
could be included in its jurisdiction. 

At the time it seemed as if this opposition on the 
part of a leading State on an essential point would 
made the whole work of the conference in reference 
to arbitration a mockery, and there was general 
disappointment, not confined to those who had 
hoped that, though the Russian Emperor's original 
idea of disarmament had not found favour with 
any of the chief participants in the conference, 
at any rate some sort of obligatory arbitration would 
be adopted which would largely compensate for 
its rejection. Obligatory arbitration, in fact, had 
become for many the chief object of the conference, 
and it seemed to them as if without it no headway 
in the cause of peace would have been made at all. 
When the conference came to an end the stormy 



HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTENTI.VLITIES 241 

petrels of the press and magazines were jubilant 
at this apparent failure of the conference to do 
anything but put in the form of an agreement the 
rules already practised. There could be little 
doubt, however, that thenceforward the statesmen 
of the Western nations intended to treat the Hague 
Court seriously and, with a recognised Court to 
apply it, there was no longer anything Utopian 
in the idea of a code of international law. For all 
cases of a judicial character the Hague Court had 
become as much the appropriate jurisdiction as 
any national court for similar cases. We heard 
no more about the futility of a Court which had 
no means of enforcing its decisions. Universal 
public opinion afforded the necessary sanction. 
Although as many as thirteen cases have now been 
decided by the Court, and two at the outbreak of 
the War were still pending, and the Powers which 
have submitted differences to it number seventeen,^ 
including some States which have even been regarded 
as unruly, not a single instance has occurred of a 
State showing even the slightest disrespect for 
the decision given. 

We must, however, remember a point which is 
often overlooked, that the parallel in national justice 
to an international court of arbitration is a civil 
not a criminal court with powers of punishment. 
It is a jurisdiction which is essentially a court for 

1 The States which have agreed to references are as follows : Great 
Britain, France, Russia, Germany, the United States of America, Japan, 
Mexico, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, 
Portugal, Turkey, Peru, Venezuela. 



242 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

the decision of points of law and the assessment 
of damage. Whether we are likely ever to reach 
a stage in which such a court can deal with any but 
questions of judicial right is a different point. 

The Anglo-French treaty contained the proviso 
that it should not apply to questions involving 
vital interests, the independence or the honour of 
either State. This was the class of questions which 
in the Anglo-American treaty of 1897 corresponded 
to questions of "grave general importance affecting 
the national rights " reserved for a joint commission 
as distinguished from a court of arbitration. This 
exclusion of the very matters which seem the only 
kind capable of inflaming public opinion to a dan- 
gerous point shows the limit to which in both 
America and Europe statesmen are prepared to go 
so far as arbitration is concerned. 

"Vital," seems to mean some difficulty which can 
only be solved by reversion to the status quo ante 
or the reversal pure and simple of the act committed. 
If, for instance, the English port authorities had 
declined in time of peace to allow a French man- 
of-war to leave Gibraltar until a case arising out of 
a collision were tried, France would probably have 
refused to submit the question of the detention to 
arbitration, but might have agreed to the deter- 
mination by arbitration of the liability of the vessel 
and assessment of the damages. The freedom of 
movement of her vessels of war she would have 
considered as a vital interest, the other as a differ- 
ence of a judicial order. 



HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTENTIALITIES 243 

The determination of what is a question involv- 
ing "national honour" is less easy. An insult 
to an ambassador or to the national flag may be 
regarded as examples. Though an indemnity may be 
paid by way of damages, it is obvious that no State 
would willingly agree to an arbitration in which 
it might be competent to the tribunal to declare 
that no damages were payable or would allow a 
third party alone to assess the payment which 
would repair an insult. It is only where there 
may be a doubt whether a certain act is an insult 
or not that conceivably arbitration would be ac- 
cepted by a State which felt some doubt itself. 
On the other hand the overheated discussion of 
any question or the difficulty of receding from an 
erroneous or one-sided view of a question may be 
regarded as involving a national honour conspicu- 
ously absent in most such cases from the contro- 
versy. 

It has been proposed by the United States Govern- 
ment that the Court should be assimilated even 
in its composition to a national court, that judges, 
as in the case of national judicatures, be appointed 
and sit in rotation, and that a special selection of 
arbitrators ad hoc should become unnecessary. An 
exhaustive scheme was submitted by the American 
delegates at the conference of 1907 for the purpose 
of creating this "Court of Arbitral Justice." Out 
of the panel forming the court three judges were 
to be selected to form a special delegation, and 
three more to replace them if the former were 



244 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

unable to act. They were to meet in session once 
a year on the third Wednesday in June, the session 
to last until all the business on the agenda had 
been transacted. The difficulty of an annual 
selection by all the powers involved might, no doubt, 
be overcome and probably the scheme of the United 
States with some minor modifications will before 
long bring the court into a closer harmony with 
existing judicial systems.^ 

What, then, are the potentialities of the Hague 
Court? Since it came into existence in 1899 there 
have been six wars — the South African, the Russo- 
Japanese, the Turco-Italian, the Turco-Balkan, 
the Inter-Balkan, and the recent gigantic conflict. 
In none of these cases has there been matter for 
arbitration. They have all been wars of conquest, 
deliberately undertaken with a view to conquest. 
In the Turco-Italian and the recent War no time 
was left after the declaration of war for any media- 
tion which might have led to arbitration, if there 
had been, in either, any arbitrable matter. In the 
Inter-Balkan War the hostilities broke out without 
even a declaration of war. In the Turco-Balkan 
War even the disguise of a grievance was dispensed 
with, and in the South African War, in which griev- 
ances were alleged and there was time for arbitra- 
tion, it was firmly declined. 

It is obvious that where one of the parties is 
decidedly in the wrong, he will not agree to arbi- 
tration. We may therefore eliminate from among 

^ See Barclay's "International Law and Practice", chap. VIIL 
London and Boston, 1917. 



HAGUE COURT AND ITS POTENTIALITIES 245 

the potentialities of the Hague Court recourse to 
it where one of the parties to the difference has an 
unavowed object or an avowed object which accord- 
ing to the principles of justice would have to be 
condemned. It is a court for the determination 
of cases in which there are disputed questions of 
right and damages, questions in which rules of law 
and justice are applicable, and in which the parties 
seek in good faith an honest solution. 

And yet there are powers which might be given to 
it, even in cases like the recent terrible War. It 
might sit as a sort of court for grievances before 
which all alleged violations of international treaties 
or usages might be laid ; by which all cases of futile 
cruelty might be judicially examined. It might 
not only condemn such violations of law and human- 
ity but it might offer recommendations and help 
to prevent the growth of illegality. 

It may be a dream but one wonders whether out 
of the Hague Court and its further developments, 
some institution may not be evolved in which men 
of different nations may be elected by civilised 
mankind to possess in common the citizenship of 
all nations and relinquish patriotism or political 
attachment to any one of them, an institution en- 
titled to express its opinions and give its advice 
with all the sanctity of the oracles of antiquity. 
Or perhaps, a special State may some day be created 
like the District of Columbia, created to fulfil the 
purpose of securing independence among the States 
of the World, or it might be a special college of 
jurists having an existence as independent as the 



246 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Vatican. In any case, some such body of "super- 
men" who have nothing to gain and nothing to lose 
might come to wield a power over the minds of man- 
kind not unlike that at present wielded by the Holy 
Father at Rome or by the Caliph over Moham- 
medans. President Wilson's proposal of a Society 
of Nations may lead to the realisation of some such 
greater moral force than the world at present pos- 
sesses to protect men against their own cruel and 
rapacious instincts and to set a higher tone of human 
sympathy and fraternity among mankind generally. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER XII 

Draft Suggestions of a Convention for Improved 
Organisation of Hague Conferences ^ 

The plenipotentiaries of the following H. C. P. . . . 
who signed at the Hague . . . 1907, the Conventions 
and Declarations established by the second Hague Peace 
Conference, 

Considering that it is desirable to try to profit by ex- 
perience acquired and facilitate, as far as possible, the 
convocation, preparation, and preliminary work of 
future Conferences; 

Whereas it is necessary to make a distinction, and in 
fact a distinction has been made, between questions of a 
general character in which all the States are interested 
and those which are fundamental only to the greater 
Powers ; 

Whereas Article XXII of the Convention for the 
Peaceful Settlement of International Differences of 1899 
(Article XLIII of the revised Convention of 1907) 
created an International Bureau at The Hague which 
serves as Registrar and Record OflBce for The Hague 
International Arbitration Court, and Article XXVIII 
of the said Convention (Article XLIX of the re- 
vised Convention of 1907) has constituted a Permanent 

» From Sir T. Barclay's "International Law and Practice." London 
and Boston. 1917. 



'24S COIJArSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Aih)tiui{<tratiir Council, composed of the cliploinnlii" ropro- 
seutatives of the Signatory Powers aeeredileil to The 
Hague and presided over by the Dutch INliuisler of 
Foreign AtYairs : 

AVhereas these two bodies art" in existence and have 
fultilled their otiice to the satisfaction of their respective 
principals, and wheivas it is desirable to centraHse the 
work of The Hague as far as possible; 

Whereas it is expedient to constitute further a body o( 
international jurisconsults to whom the Powers can have 
recourse upon all judicial matters as well as to assist the 
Intcniaiional Biirt'aii and the Admitiiiffrafitr Council 
as legal experts, and to act as a Consultative Conunittee 
able to take charge, i)itcr alia, of the preparation of the 
work of future Hague Conferences, and within the scope 
of its capacities deal with such matters as the said Inter- 
7iational Bureau shall be instructed by the Consultative 
Council to require of it ; 

With a view to dealing with above objects, tlie pur- 
poses and duties of the several bodies above referred to 
shall be as follows : 

1. The Ifttcrnational Bureau shall discharge the follow- 
ing duties outside its ordinary functions as registrar 
of tlie International Arbitration Court : 

(a) To preserve and classify all tlie documents relat- 
ing to the Conferences ; 

(b) To keep the H. C. P. informed of all questions 
concerning the work of the Conferences; 

((•) To constitute, improve, and catalogue a library 
of International Law and accessory knowledge; 

(rf) To draw up an annual report of its work for sub- 
mission to the Administrative Council: 

(e) To serve as intermediary for all conununications 
between or among the Signatory Powers; 



HAGUE COLU'i' AND ns I>rri'ENTIAJJ'nES 249 

(J) 'Jo transmit immediately all f-ommunications re- 
ceived U> tl)e Adminwtrative (jmnc/d; and 

(^j 'i'o be, in if(',ii<:rii\ U;rms, under the direction of the 
Bureau of the Adminidrative (Umncil, and to p<;rforrn all 
.secretarial and executive duties committed to it hy such 

2. The, Adminidrative Cf/uncil remains fxjmposed of 
the dii>Iomatic repres<!:ntative.s of Contracting i'owers 
at 'J'lie Hague, who .sliall every year elect two Vice- 
presidents, not eligible for more than two successive 
years of offif.e. The President and the two Vice-presi- 
dents shall form the liureau of the Adminiftrative (Jrmncii. 

Outside its functions in connection with the adminis- 
tration of the International Arbitration Court, it shall 
discharge the following duties : Assemble on convoca- 
tion })y its liureau to discuss the matters submitt^id in the 
agenda drawn up by the said Bureau, or such matt/;rs 
suggestefl \>y any member of t[ie Council of which due 
notice shall have been given ; to take note of all communi- 
cations received from the Jnternalvmal Bureau; give the 
necessary instructions to the said Inlernatvmal Bureau 
and receive the annual report of that Bureau. Minut/;s 
of the meeting of the Council shall Ik; kept, but they shall 
only be }>inding upon the Signatories thereto. Two 
copies shall F>e given to eaf:h member. 

3. Apart from the Adrrdnidrative dfmnry'd and Inter- 
national Bureau, a Consultative Committee shall be 
created and composed as follows : 

(a) Four meml>ers selected by the Institute of Inter- 
national Law; 

(6) Four members selected by the Administrative 
Crmncil; and 

(c) Four members selected by the Committee as thus 
far constituted. 



250 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

One of each category shall retire on expiry of every 
two years, and not be re-eligible for two years after five 
years' tenure of office. 

The Consultative Committee shall be entrusted with the 
preparation of the work of future Conferences and with 
the examination of all questions which have been sub- 
mitted but not solved at previous Conferences. It 
shall also examine all matters submitted to it by the 
Administrative Council or by any member of the said 
Council individually. 

The International Bureau shall be entrusted with the 
secretaryship of the Committee. 

The Bureau of the Administrative Council may, if the 
Committee so desires, invite specialists in military, mari- 
time, or other matters to give the Committee the benefit 
of their expert advice. 

It shall fix the remuneration of the members of the 
Committee and of the said occasional specialists. 

4. The Bureau of the Administrative Council may call 
a general meeting of the Consultative Committee to discuss 
any questions it may deem desirable to submit to it, 
or recommend States to send representatives to any 
Conference to be held at The Hague or elsewhere to 
deliberate upon any matters it may deem of sufficient 
importance. 



CHAPTER XIII 

BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 

One of the profoundest fallacies of contemporary 
statecraft, as past events have consistently proved 
and as has once more been demonstrated by the 
present complete breakdown of the theory, is that 
the balance of power makes for peace or is a means 
of preserving it. Events, on the contrary, have 
shown that the balance of power merely makes 
the issue of an armed struggle doubtful. What 
really makes for peace is such an overwhelming 
combination interested in its preservation that 
any one State would be naturally discouraged 
from any attempts to break the peace. 

The overwhelming power of the Roman Empire 
was able to keep peace in the then world for several 
centuries, as Great Britain has been and is able to 
do in India. But empires are not emanations of 
political freedom. While they impose the sway of 
a directing executive, free countries exercise their 
executive power by delegation. The one is oper- 
ated from above, the other from below. The one 
has an independent interest of self-preservation 
apart from that of the people governed, the other 



252 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

draws its breath from its constituents and it is 
they who have the interest of self-preservation. 

Free countries are necessarily unwieldy for pur- 
poses of aggression and therefore less able to bring 
the moral effect of "preparedness" to bear on the 
promotion of political purposes in foreign relations 
than empires, that is to say strongly centralised 
States. To resist the tendency of such States, 
they have to resort to combination or federation. 
Hence federation is the reverse of empire, the one 
receiving its powers from its constituents, the other 
delegating powers to its dependents. 

The break-up of the three greatest instances of 
empire may result in eventual federation of all 
three as a League of Nations for defence against 
the reaction which may be in course of evolution 
in countries which have hitherto been the home 
of political freedom, for seldom if ever in history 
has victory been of advantage to popular liberties. 
This union for self-preservation against external 
neo-aggressive tendencies may present material 
features of great importance for the future of democ- 
racy throughout the world. 



NOTES ON CHAPTER XIII 

Note on the Problem of Austria-Hungary 

It was a diplomatic platitude to speak of Austria- 
Hungary as a geographical necessity. The Empire- 
Kingdom had survived the break-up of the Holy Roman 
Empire as wreckage and out of the wreckage came a 
composite structure due to requirements of self-preserva- 
tion and because this was a necessity it survived. Well- 
informed persons thought it would not outlive the reign 
of the late Emperor-King. It did not long survive him, 
but its break-up was followed by consequences which 
seemed destined to show that remedy by break-up for the 
grievances of her peoples may be worse than the complaint. 
The weakness of Austria-Hungary lay in the attempt 
to rule by a dual system instead of through a general 
federation. The salvation of small communities and 
nations is not isolation, as they generally begin by think- 
ing, but cooperation or federation which enables them 
to preserve their respective liberties at home while ob- 
taining the security and strength union gives to those 
too weak to assert their rights against external dangers 
singly. 

Federation, moreover, while assuring strength for 
defence, creates none of those aggressive tendencies 
which seem inseparable from the centralisation of power. 
Nothing has proved more conclusively the strength of 
even a tie of unorganised federation, when a conscious 



254 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

common interest is at stake, than the support England 
has had from her self-governing colonies not only in 
spite of the wealoiess of the bond of union between the 
component parts of the empire, but in spite of domestic 
government in each of them being as little centralised 
as is compatible with government of any kind. 

President Wilson saw the importance of preserving 
Austria-Hungary, and, wiser than those who demanded 
its destruction, he asked that its place among nations 
should be safeguarded and assured. The peoples com- 
posing it should be given, he said, the first opportunity 
of autonomous development. It is not clear why he 
weakened his recommendation by qualifying it in the 
words "first opportunity." The present opportunity 
was the first and the Allies have in fact recognised the 
courageous "elan" of the Czechs as a ground for giving 
Bohemia that domestic autonomy for which she has agi- 
tated and sacrificed life and liberty so amply. 

None knows better than the President, however, how 
often in the course of history the achievement of freedom 
has meant freedom for those who fought for it and has 
degenerated into freedom to oppress others. Guaran- 
tees will assuredly be asked of the peoples concerned that 
all the benefits and franchises of autonomous govern- 
ment shall be enjoyed by the inhabitants of the territory 
placed under autonomous government without distinc- 
tion of race, origin or religion of any kind whatsoever. 

The President's utterances and the whole tenor of 
Anglo-Saxon civilisation of the principles of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man require this affirmation 
of racial and religious tolerance. 

The difficulties of Austria-Hungary were largely due 
to the rival influences of Germany and Russia, especially 



BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 255 

to that of the latter, which, true to the tradition of autoc- 
racies, kept Slav grievances in a smouldering condition 
ready to be fanned into flame whenever domestic diffi- 
culties grew out of hand and exposed the existing regime 
or dynasty to serious trouble. The overthrow of the 
Russian dynasty delivered Austria-Hungary from its 
chief tormentor. It is doubtful if the Russian interest 
in the Slav communities had any protective effect against 
persecution in Hungary, where it seemed merely to excite 
hostility against Slav population and communities. 

The Emperor Karl, a pupil of the late Count Aehren- 
thal, Count Burian and Professor Lammasch, had been 
inoculated with the federative ideas of these enlightened 
men. It was Aerenthal who sent him at a time when 
he never dreamt that he would succeed so shortly, if 
ever, to the throne, to Prague, as a handsome, genial 
and open-minded young Prince, whom he wished to 
understand the Czechs and eventually perhaps to become 
the champion of their aspirations. I met him there in 
1908, doing his best without funds to make himself popu- 
lar and successful in doing so to a certain extent. 

Count Burian is a believer in federation. A Hun- 
garian endowed with all the political genius of a gifted 
people, a keen observer of the conditions and potentialities 
of all the races and provinces of the Empire-Monarchy, 
he was joint Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance and 
Administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina when the crisis 
connected with the annexation of that province took 
place. Europe was utterly misled over this crisis, owing 
to the prevalent ignorance in Western Europe of Balkan 
and Austro-Hungarian conditions, by an astute but 
unscrupulous Russian diplomacy. I was at the time 
close to events and was privileged to play a part in the 
settlement which Baron Burian, as he then was, with 



256 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

consummate ability and energy brought to a peaceful 
issue. 

Thus in the new sovereign and in Count Burian, his 
most trusted adviser, President Wilson would have had 
a congenial soil for the planting, acceptance and applica- 
tion of those federative and democratic principles for 
the vindication of which America entered the war on the 
side of the Allies. 

A federation in which there would have been but one 
central government instead of two, constitutional equality 
for each of the provinces, and a general parliament repre- 
senting them all granting its powers of government to 
ministers of its own choice is the sort of settlement I pre- 
sume Count Burian contemplated. The geographical 
position and economic requirements of South Central 
Europe which led to grouping of States into an empire 
are permanent factors which will operate whatever 
the form or forms of government chosen by the peoples 
concerned. We may, therefore, expect that the compo- 
nent elements of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, as 
soon as their domestic conditions of autonomy are assured, 
will readjust their mutual relations in the sense of a feder- 
ation to which a powerful neighbour may not be favour- 
able. Any active opposition on her part, however, may 
force the speed of the process of a reunion which is a 
necessity of self-preservation and involves economic 
interests of supreme importance. 

Note on the Ottoman Empire 

There is nothing more pathetic in history than the 
failure of the "Young Turks" to rescue their country 
from the barbarous yoke of the Serail. It is orthodox 
to attribute the failure to the Young Turks themselves 



BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 257 

and to abuse them as a pack of adventurers who, on get- 
ting possession of power, used it in the same way as the 
Hamidian regime they had superseded. 

This is not the opinion of all disinterested observers, 
certainly not of some of those who were in close contact, 
like myself, in the winter of 1908-1909, with the moving 
spirits of the Young Turk movement. 

The leaders were all comparatively young men, most 
of them intellectuals, Arabs, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, 
a galaxy of all the kinds of men Macedonia and Asia 
Minor produce — a microcosm of the Ottoman Empire 
just as little Turkish as Turkey itself, for in reality 
there are few, if any, genuine Turks in the world at all. 
Where there is a difference it is between Mohammedan, 
Christian, and Jew. And when those who are familiar 
with the Near East speak of the superiority of the Turks 
as the "only true gentlemen" among the near Eastern 
peoples, they mean the genuine Mohammedans whose 
integrity, independence, dignity and generosity in thought 
and in deed is just as marked in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where the whole population is Serbian, as at Constanti- 
nople and in the Levant. 

When, therefore, President Wilson stipulates that the 
Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured 
a secure sovereignty it is not easy to determine to which 
part of the Turkish population he refers. 

Religion, not race, determines the different tendencies, 
ideals and polity of the different sections of the population 
of Turkey. 

The Young Turkish movement was as genuinely 
Turkish as any action on the part of Turkey can be. If 
it failed, it was not from anything intrinsically wrong 
in its composition but because, as most revolutions neces- 
sarily are, it was under the leadership of men who had 



258 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

had no experience of government and because as upstarts 
and adventurers, which as revolutionaries they necessa- 
rily were, they were not encouraged, in fact were more or 
less discouraged, by those who ought to have been their 
friends. 

In spite of the almost open hostility of Western diplo- 
macy, the Young Turks endeavoured to bring about bene- 
ficial reforms, but these implied taxation, and under the 
old regime, taxes mainly took the form of exactions from 
those whom it was worth while to coerce. The poor, 
incapable of yielding either tribute or baksheesh, bore 
little or none of the burden of taxation, and when the 
Young Turks began to introduce Western methods into 
the raising of revenue, it was easy for their enemies to 
arouse hostility on the part of those for whose emanci- 
pation they were working by representing them as oppres- 
sors — only showing that the Eastern feeling towards 
the "publicans" had changed little in the course of two 
thousand years. 

Deserted by those who ought to have been their friends 
the Young Turkish movement was exposed to all the 
vicissitudes of political and social upheavals. As soon 
as the empire seemed to be settling into a stable condi- 
tion, the first blow at its integrity was struck and Italy 
began the series of wars which have followed one another 
in such close sequence and interconnection that the 
historian would be justified in lumping them together 
as one war and calling it in accordance with its duration 
which may still be long, in so far as the coming settle- 
ment is not based on the geographical and economic 
requirements of the peoples concerned. 

The only diplomacy which showed any sympathy 
with the Young Turkish movement was the German. 
The still young and inexperienced men who were at the 



BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 259 

helm, when the crisis of 1914 came, preferred the German 
to the Russian lead as the lesser evil, especially as the 
German clutch was upon their shoulders and it was 
easier to let it remain than to shake it off. 

The question of Turkey's preservation, it is seen, is 
not one of race and it cannot be one of religion, for except 
among the Arabs, far from the real seat of interest for 
Europe, the religions are as scattered as the races. Ex- 
pediency alone can dictate a settlement in which the 
Allies have interests almost as scattered. In fact, a 
self-denying protocol will almost necessarily have to 
precede any discussion to eliminate non-interests and 
reduce the question to specific areas and points. The 
device of determining "spheres of interest" which has 
averted conflict in two or three parts of the world already 
will probably be resorted to once more. Temporary, 
unsatisfying and undemocratic as such a method of 
picketing and impounding an independent country and 
its people may be, the predatory traditions of Western 
Europe are still so persistent and the ''interests" of 
the European Allies in the Near East and the Levant 
have become so interlocked that the greatest delicacy 
will be required to prevent conflict over the spoil. Reli- 
gion, geographical necessity and political exigencies 
will leave little room for the assertion of those democratic 
principles which in Western Europe it is to be hoped 
will be an immediate and inalienable result of the War. 

There is a proverb that warns men against discussing 
trouble before it arises. In any case the time has not 
yet come to argue in public questions on which the Allies 
themselves may be exposed to serious disagreement. 
Perhaps to prevent its taking an acute form consideration 
will be shown for the requirements, feelings and intelli- 
gence of the inhabitants of the countries concerned. 



260 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Allies' Agreement Relating to Constantinople and 
THE Straits and for Partition of Asia Minor 

The following statement is taken from the Pravada, 
a Maximalist organ from which it had been translated 
into French, from which in turn it is now translated into 
English ; ^ 

"On the 19th February /4th March, 1915, the Tsar's 
Minister for Foreign Affairs transmitted to the Ambassa- 
dors of France and Great Britain a memorandum wherein 
the wish was expressed that, as a result of this war, the 
following territories should be united with Russia : 

"The city of Constantinople, the western shore of 
the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, 
Southern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line, the shores 
of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the river 
Sakaria and certain points in the Ishmid Gulf, the islands 
in the Sea of Marmora and the Imbros and Tenedos 
Islands. The special rights of France and England in 
the said territories to remain safeguarded. 

"The French and English Governments gave their 
consent to our requests provided the war should be finished 
rapidly and successfully and that satisfaction should be 
granted to a whole series of claims by France and England 
in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere. 

"These claims as far as they concern Russia result 
as follows : 

"The recognition of Constantinople as a free port 
for the transit of goods not coming from or going into 
Russia and the free passage of the Straits for merchant 
vessels. 

"The recognition in Asiatic Turkey of the rights of 
Great Britain and France which require to be exactly 
determined by a special agreement between France, 
Great Britain and Russia. 

"The preservation under independent Mussulman sover- 
eignty of Arabia and the Mussulman Holy Places. 

"The inclusion, in conformity with the Anglo-Russian 

1 Translated from the French by Mr. A. Wright. 



BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 261 

Convention of 1907,^ of the neutral zone of Persia within 
the British sphere of influence. 

"Acknowledgement that these claims shall be granted. 

"The Russian Government however made some reser- 
vations : 

"In view of our wishes concerning the Mussulman 
Holy Places, it is necessary immediately to decide whether 
these places shall remain under Turkish sovereignty, 
the Sultan keeping the title of Caliph, or is it proposed 
to create a new independent State? In our judgment 
it is desirable that the Caliphate be separated from Turkey. 
In any case, freedom of pilgrimage must be assured. 

"While agreeing that the neutral zone in Persia should 
be subject to British influence, the Russian Government 
nevertheless considers it just to ask that the towns of 
Ispahan and Yezd be left to Russia and also that the 
part of the neutral zone which forms the corner between 
the frontiers of Russia and Afghanistan and abuts on 
the frontier of Russia at Zoulfagar be included in the 
sphere of Russian influence. 

"At the same time the Russian Government considers 
it desirable to settle the question of the contiguity of 
Afghanistan and Russia in accordance with the wishes 
expressed in the pourparlers of 1914. 

"On the entry of Italy in the war, our claims were 
communicated to the Italian Government and the latter 
gave their consent thereto, subject to a victorious con- 
clusion of the war giving satisfaction to the wishes of 
Italy in general and in the East particularly, and granting 
her the same rights as granted to France and Great 
Britain in the territories ceded to us." 



Note on the Question of Asia Minor 

"As a result of the pourparlers which took place in 
the spring of 1916 in London and Petrograd, the allied 

1 This is probably a mistranslation from the Russian text. It reads 
in the original probably: "The inclusion within the British sphere of 
influence of the neutral zone as determined in the Anglo-Russian agree- 
ment of 1907." 



262 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

governments of Great Britain and France and Russia 
came to an agreement relating to the future division of 
zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic 
Turkey and in reference to the formation within the 
limits of Arabia of an independent Arabian State or of 
a confederation of Arabian States. 

"In its principal heads the agreement may be summed 
up as follows : 

"Russia acquires the provinces of Erzeroum, Trebi- 
zond. Van and Bitlis, as well as the Southern Kurdistan 
territories as per the line Moucha-Sert-Ihn-Omar- 
Amalia, Persian frontier. The terminus of the Russian 
territorial acquisitions on the shores of the Black Sea 
would be a point to be ultimately settled west of Trebi- 
zond. 

"France receives the strip of the shore of Syria, the 
vilayet of Adana and territory bounded on the south by 
the line Aintab-Kharput up to the Russian frontier and 
in the north by the line Ata-Dagh-Kessaria-Ak-Ladge- 
Vildiz Dagh-Zara-Orguine-Kharpout.^ 

"Great Britain acquires the southern portion of Meso- 
potamia with Bagdad and reserves to herself in Syria 
the ports of Haifa and Acre. 

"According to a convention between France and Eng- 
land, the zone between the French and English regions 
will constitute the confederation of the Arabian States 
or one independent Arabian State whose zones of influ- 
ence shall be then determined. 

" Alexandretta is declared a free port. 

"For the purpose of guaranteeing the religious inter- 
ests of the Allied Powers, Palestine and the Holy Places 
are excluded from Turkish territory and shall be governed 
under a special regime to be settled by a convention 
between Russia, France and England. 

"As a general rule the Contracting Parties agree to 
recognize the concessions and prerogatives which existed 
before the war in the districts acquired by them. 

"They accept a part of the Ottoman debt in propor- 
tion to the territories acquired. 

* Probably Ata Dagh, Kaisarieh (Caesarea Mazaca), Ak Dagh, Yildiz 
Dagh, Zara, Arabgir, Kharput. 



BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 263 

"N.B, As for the zone of influence almost exclu- 
sively inhabited by Mussulmans, in accordance with the 
Franco-English agreement, it was to be divided between 
the Arab Sultanates which, in the districts of Damascus, 
Aleppo and Mossul were to seek from France the political, 
technical and financial assistance which they would 
need from abroad, whereas in the Mesopotamia districts 
they were to seek such assistance from England. The 
King of Mecca, Master of the Holy Places of Islam 
which interest a large number of the ressortissants of the 
three Powers, was to be independent." 



Note on Imperial Federation and India 

The following preambles to the Acts of Parliaments 
providing for federation of the three great British self- 
governing Colonies restrict their development as polit- 
ical units to their respective geographical areas : 

An Act for the Union of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick and the Government thereof ; and for Purposes 
connected therewith (March 29, 1867). 

"Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, 
and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be 
Federally united into One Dominion under the Crown 
of the IJnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
with a Constitution similar in Principle to the United 
Kingdom : 

"And whereas such a Union would conduce to the 
Welfare of the Provinces and promote the Interests of 
the British Empire : 

"And whereas on the Establishment of the Union by 
Authority of Parliament it is expedient, not only that the 
Constitution of the Legislative Authority in the Dominion 
be provided for, but also that the Nature of the Executive 
Government be therein declared : 

"And whereas it is expedient that Provision be made 
for the eventual Admission into the Union of other Parts 
of British North America." 



264 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

An Act to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia (July 

9, 1900). 

"Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, 
South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly- 
relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed 
to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under 
the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby established: 

"And whereas it is expedient to provide for the admis- 
sion into the Commonwealth of other Australasian Colo- 
nies and possessions of the Queen." 

An Act to Constitute the Union of South Africa (September 
20, 1909). 

"Whereas it is desirable for the welfare and future 
progress of South Africa that the several British Colonies 
therein should be united under one Government in a 
legislative union under the Crown of Great Britain and 
Ireland : 

"And whereas it is expedient to make provision for the 
union of the Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, 
the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony on terms and 
conditions to which they have agreed by resolution of 
their respective Parliaments : and to define the executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers to be exercised in the 
government of the Union : 

"And whereas it is expedient to make provision for 
the establishment of provinces with powers of legisla- 
tion and administration in local matters and in such other 
matters as may be specially reserved for provincial legis- 
lation and administration : 

" And whereas it is expedient to provide for the even- 
tual admission into the Union or transfer to the Union of 
such parts of South Africa as are not originally included 
therein." 

It may be doubted whether federation is a feasible 
method of government except where the geographical 
situation and economic interests of the constituent parties 



BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 265 

are such as to make union for self-defence or the promo- 
tion of common commercial interests desirable. Patriot- 
ism and the link of common origin no doubt have their 
effect where the interests are not divergent. 

"The case of India," says the Earl of Cromer, "differs 
very materially from that of the self-governing Domin- 
ions. . . . That some reforms will have to be made 
after the war in the methods under which India is at 
present governed," he adds, "is both possible and prob- 
able." 

The general direction which reform may take was in- 
dicated in the dispatch of the Government of India dated 
December, 1911, which contains the following passage : 

" The only possible solution of the difficulty would 
appear to be gradually to give the Provinces a larger 
measure of self-government, until at last India would 
consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in 
all provincial affairs, with the Government of India 
above them all and possessing power to interfere in case 
of misgovernment, but ordinarily restricting their func- 
tions to matters of Imperial concern." 

"I am very clearly of opinion," again says Lord Cro- 
mer, "that India is not yet ripe for complete self-govern- 
ment in the sense in which that term is used in the Domin- 
ions. The same may be said of Egypt and the Soudan. 
It would at present be altogether premature to discuss 
the desirability of bringing either of these two countries 
within the full scope of a general scheme for the Federa- 
tion of the Empire." 

In the luminous article from which I have quoted 
above ^ Lord Cromer asks : 

'See "After- War Problems", edited by W. H. Dawson. London, 
Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1917, 



^66 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

"How is Nationalism, which is based on the right 
to autonomy, to be reconciled with Imperialism, which 
is often dictated by economic interests or geographical 
considerations and which need not necessarily but may 
often be irreconcilable with the assertion of autonomous 
rights? Democratic political thinkers answer, almost 
with one voice, 'By the adoption of the system of Feder- 
ation'." 

In Lord Cromer's opinion they are unquestionably 
right in principle. 

It would, he thinks, be a mistake to be unduly daunted 
by the obvious difficulties which will have to be en- 
countered in devising a plan of federation. 

Looking at the extreme complexity of the subject 
and the great importance of avoiding a false step, it 
would be wise for all concerned, he observes, to proceed 
tentatively, to be satisfied for the time being with deal- 
ing with the comparatively easy subject of a somewhat 
closer association in executive matters, and then to see 
how the revised system works before proceeding to re- 
forms of a more drastic and far-reaching description. 

In any case it seems desirable, even if more important 
changes be made, to arrange that the Imperial Confer- 
ence should, for the future, meet every two years instead 
of, at present, at intervals of four years. "Thus, the 
statesmen both of the United Kingdom and of the Domin- 
ions would more frequently be brought in close contact 
with each other. They would be able mutually to 
exchange views." 

However, remarks Lord Cromer in the same article, 
broadly speaking, there are two methods by which 
consultations with the Dominions can be secured. One is 
to associate them to a greater extent than at present 
with the executive action of the British Government. The 



BALANCE OF POWER AND FEDERATION 267 

other is to go farther afield, to change the whole consti- 
tution of the British Empire, and by some kind of legis- 
lative amalgamation to enable the people of each sepa- 
rate imperial unit to make their voices heard by adopting 
the normal and habitual proceedings common under all 
democratic forms of government. 

" Obviously, the former of these two alternatives 
possesses the advantage that it involves, relatively 
speaking, a far less degree of radical change and that it is 
much less difficult to carry into execution than the latter." 

Colonials are fully aware, says Lord Cromer, that 
no sane British stateman would for one moment propose 
that coercion should be exercised in order to oblige them 
to maintain a connection which had become irksome or 
distasteful to them. But they are far from desiring sev- 
erance. They hold that both self-interest and sentiment 
point to the conclusion that, if any change is to take 
place, it should be in the direction, not of separation, 
but of closer union, which must never, however, in any 
degree impair local autonomy. 

Recent events, adds Lord Cromer, have enormously 
tended to strengthen the force of these considerations. 
"Never did the short-sighted and defective states- 
manship of Berlin err more conspicuously than when it 
thought that national peril would exercise a dissolving 
effect on the component parts of the British Empire. 
The very opposite has taken place. The event which 
it was thought would sunder the colonial connection has 
tended to solder it together to the extent of imparting 
to it a strength and rigidity which has astonished the 
world. To the amazement of all absolutists and coer- 
cionists the link was found to be so tough because it 
was so slender. Never have democratic principles 
achieved a greater triumph." 



268 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

These judicious remarks of a man combining, as Lord 
Cromer did, the experience of a man of action and of a 
well-read and thoughtful observer apply not only to 
federation within the British Empire but to the principle 
of federation generally. 



CHAPTER XIV 

A SOCIETY (or league) OF NATIONS 

The pre-Congress of Paris has placed before the 
world its draft of a constitution of a "League of 
Nations." There is matter in it to keep the public 
opinions of all the races, nations and governments 
of mankind occupied for some time to come. 

The French edition of the draft uses the term 
"Societe" — the English, "League." 

The basis of the draft is President Wilson's 
fourteenth proposition which is as follows : 

"A general association of Nations must be formed 
under specific covenants for the purpose of affording 
mutual guarantees of political independence and 
territorial integrity to great and small states alike." 

In his July Fourth speech the President enlarged 
on this proposition. The fourth proposition of 
that speech set out that "the establishment of an 
organization of peace which shall make it certain that 
the combined power of free nations will check every 
invasion of right, and serve to make peace and jus- 
tice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal 
of opinion to which all must submit and by which 
every international readjustment that cannot be 
amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly con- 
cerned shall be sanctioned." 



270 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

In his letter to the German Government of No- 
vember 5, 1918, Mr. Lansing wrote : 

"The Allied Governments . . . declare their will- 
ingness to make peace with the Government of 
Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the 
President's address to Congress of January 8, 
1918, and the principles enunciated in his subse- 
quent addresses." 

In the same letter Mr. Lansing on behalf of the 
Allies added : 

"Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in 
his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the 
President declared that invaded territories must 
be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The 
Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to 
be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. 
By it, they understand that compensations will 
be made by Germany for all damages done to the 
civilian population of the Allies and their property 
by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and 
from the air." 

This agreement between the belligerents is the 
foundation to which the Society of Nations will 
owe its existence. 

It has been seen that the French rendering of 
"Society" is correct. The agreement is to create 
a society not a league of nations and it will be for 
the Peace Congress when it meets to decide whether 
it shall be the one or the other. 

The terms of peace offered by the Allies on which 
hostilities were brought to a termination are the 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 271 

basis. We now have a draft elaborated by the 
Allies as a formulation of the details of these terms 
in so far as the Society of Nations is concerned. 
But we must not treat it as a final statement or 
forget that the real basis is still the enunciation of 
principles forming the terms of peace agreed to by 
the belligerents and to which all the Allies' drafts, 
whether relating to the proposed Society of Nations 
or to other matters, are subordinate until the con- 
tracting parties determine otherwise. 

Meanwhile it is a draft submitted for public 
criticism and as such is only different from other 
drafts in having been drawn up, as President Wil- 
son intimated, by the official representatives of the 
different governments represented.^ 

It leaves intact President Wilson's propositions 
which critics may interpret differently, but which 
even he has no power to alter without the consent 
of all the Parties to the agreement they constitute. 

The President's fourteenth proposition precip- 
itated quite a deluge of interesting suggestions 
from both sides of the belligerent frontier. Not 
only were societies of an incidental character formed 
for study of the details it implied but Parliamentary 
and Extra-Parliamentary Committees were entrusted 
with the consideration of its form and potentialities. 
In fact it was one of those generous, though rather 
vague ideas which appeal to men and women of 

1 The President in his address on the draft said : "Inasmuch as I am 
stating it in presence of official representatives of the various govern- 
ments here present, including myself, I may say that there is a universal 
feeling that the world cannot rest satisfied with merely official guidance." 



272 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

ideals and lend themselves to a great deal of com- 
ment without need to alight on the terra firma of 
fact or to descend into the subsoil of traditional and 
historical political development. 

The President himself rather tentatively used 
the expression "must be formed." "A general 
association of Nations," he said, "must be formed 
under specific covenants." Did he mean by "gen- 
eral" open to all nations in opposition to any idea 
of exclusiveness, that is, in opposition to a League 
of Nations which historically would rather have the 
nature of a "combine" operating to some extent 
aggressively? Why "specific"? Does this add 
any qualification to the sense of "covenant " ? These 
"specific" covenants, he adds, are to "give mutual 
guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small states alike." 

It seems as if the President had dealt with two 
different suggestions in one proposition, the one 
being a general association of nations to be formed 
after foundations had been laid by special agree- 
ments among the different High Contracting Parties 
in the several treaties between them which will 
determine their respective peace relations for the 
future. 

In what sense does the President use the term 
"mutual guarantees"? I presume that he uses 
it in its diplomatic sense of a deliberate written 
undertaking in treaty form. 

In his July Fourth statement of the "ends for 
which the associated peoples of the world are fight- 
ing" President Wilson seems to explain his meaning. 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 273 

In the fourth proposition of that statement he 
speaks of "the estabhshment of an organization 
of peace which shall make it certain that the com- 
bined power of free nations will check every invasion 
of right." 

If only "free nations" will be admitted to the 
organisation, the term "free" requires definition 
and the "Society of Nations" is no longer a gen- 
eral one. 

What is the criterion of freedom ? 

Mr. H. G. Wells, to make the matter pro tanto 
clearer, dropped the term Society and adopted the 
term League. "The Western Allies know to-day," 
says this distinguished writer, "what is involved 
in making bargains with governments that do not 
stand for their people." In further explanation 
he adds, it must be clearly in the President's mind 
that "no mere 'scrap of paper' with just a Kaiser's 
or a Chancellor's endorsement is a good enough 
earnest of fellowship in the League. It cannot be 
a diplomatists' league. The League of Nations, 
if it is to have any such effect as people seem to 
expect of it, must be ' understanded of the people'; 
that is to say, it must be supported and sustained 
by deliberate explanation and teaching by School 
and Church and Press of the whole mass of all the 
peoples concerned." 

This explanation of Mr. Wells' did not lighten 
the burden of seeking to work out details for giv- 
ing practical effect to the President's suggestion ! 

Lord Grey of Falloden followed the example of 
Mr. Wells in speaking at all times of a League of 



274 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Nations. The latter, as we see, takes a rather 
idealistic view of the possibilities of united moral 
and intellectual effort. Lord Grey belongs by 
recent experience to diplomacy. It does not follow, 
he observes in his pamphlet on the subject, that a 
"League of Nations to secure the peace of the 
world" will remain impossible because "it has not 
been possible hitherto." 

The term "League of Nations to secure the peace 
of the world" does not necessarily imply "free" 
nations. It is obvious that if an autocrat like the 
late Russian Emperor, France and the British Em- 
pire formed a league to preserve the peace of the 
world, they were a League of Nations. It was as 
such that they gave effect to their bond. Practi- 
cally all the nations of the world joined their League, 
and in actual practice we have at this moment what 
is contemplated by a league. Moreover this League 
is in action for the punishment of defaulters ; it 
surrounded the brigand who attacked his neighbour, 
pursued him by hue and cry till he could escape no 
longer and surrendered to justice. 

The tragically self-revealing German apology 
for the invasion of Belgium, — that Germany's 
strength lay in the superior speed with which she 
could bring her forces against her enemies and 
defeat them before they were ready, — her admission 
that any attempt to settle a difficulty by negotia- 
tion deprived her of that superiority, in other words 
that she made war to prevent her adversary from 
becoming better able to defend himself, shows where 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 275 

the danger is. When President Wilson speaks of 
"the combined power of free nations" does he not 
contemplate the power to do the very thing the 
Allies have just been doing ? 

A League of Nations, then, will necessarily restrict 
national independence to the extent requisite for 
mutual assurance against the renewal of the condi- 
tion of things which culminated in a world war. 
It will place a limitation on the free action of the 
participating nations. 

It is in this sense that Lord Grey of Falloden 
regarded it, as explained in the pamphlet from which 
I have already quoted. 

The obligation implied in joining in the League, 
he says, "is that if any nation will not observe 
this limitation upon its national action ; if it breaks 
the agreement which is the basis of the League, 
rejects all peaceful methods of settlement and resorts 
to force, the other nations must one and all use their 
combined force against it. The economic pressure 
that such a League could use would in itself be 
very powerful, and the action of some of the smaller 
States composing the League could perhaps not 
go beyond economic pressure, but those States 
that have power must be ready to use all the force, 
economic, military or naval, that they possess. 
It must be clearly understood and accepted that 
defection from or violation of the agreement by 
one or more States does not absolve all or any of 
the others from the obligation to enforce the agree- 
ment." 

It seems also to be the view of Mr. A. J. Balfour, 



276 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

the present British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
who, when forwarding the British war aims in 
answer to President Wilson's request, stated on 
behalf of his Government that "behind all treaty 
arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, 
some form of international sanction should be 
devised which would have a deterrent effect on 
aggressive purposes." 

Just what is set out in the passage from Lord 
Grey's pamphlet we have been doing during the 
last four and a half years. 

We have used all the combined force, — economic, 
military and naval, — of some fifteen States, includ- 
ing five out of the seven great Powers, against 
practically one delinquent. 

I do not suppose that President Wilson or Lord 
Grey or Mr. Balfour contemplates the possibility 
of having to begin such a war over again to insure 
observance of the agreement entered into by the 
associated nations as "the basis of this League." 
Has this occurred to President Wilson and is it 
this which accounts for his having added to his 
fourth July Fourth proposition an apparent quali- 
fication? In that proposition speaking of the 
''establishment of an organization of peace" he 
adds, "which shall . . . serve to make peace and 
justice the more secure by affording a definite 
tribunal of opinion to which all must submit." 

What is a definite tribunal of opinion ? Does the 
President mean a permanent Hague Court such as 
the United States plenipotentiaries proposed at 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 277 

the Conference of 1907, with salaried judges sitting 
as in national courts ? 

Then the President concludes his July Fourth 
proposition by giving the tribunal jurisdiction over 
every "international readjustment that cannot be 
amicably agreed upon by the people directly con- 
cerned." I presume that by "readjustment" the 
President meant that he proposed to turn over to 
the new "tribunal of opinion" all questions unsettled 
by the Treaty of Peace. 

By this tribunal, he says, such readjustment shall 
be "sanctioned." This seems from the context 
to be merely a loose employment of the word. I 
take it that he merely meant sanctioned by a 
decision. 

The use of the word "readjustment", if the 
above interpretation of the President's meaning is 
not correct, may imply that he has perceived the 
difficulty of bringing claims not based on purely 
juridical grounds within the scope of an Inter- 
national Court of Law, claims for instance against 
the closing of thinly populated areas to immigration, 
against discriminating tariffs, protective port and 
canal dues, etc., disproportionate colonial dis- 
tribution, the right to coaling stations commen- 
surate with maritime expansion, in fact those 
readjustments which the varying and respective 
developments of different nations require to pre- 
vent hardship, grievances, and eventually those 
shocks which lead to the display of force and even 
war. 



278 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Analysed and reduced to its constituent parts 
the President's July Fourth proposition seems to 
include the four following elements : 

1. Establishment of an international organisa- 
tion for the preservation of international peace; 

2. That organisation to impose such sanctions 
as it may devise for preventing any invasion of the 
rights of members thereof ; 

3. A tribunal to be established by the organisation 
for the trial of any such invasion of right, but at the 
same time, 

4. Power to be given to the tribunal to deal with 
claims having the nature of a readjustment, that 
is, claims not based solely on juridical right. 

If this was the President's meaning, he has placed 
his finger on what has hitherto been the weak point 
in all treaties of arbitration, nay, in the very system 
of arbitration, as at present conceived, as a method 
for the solution of any really dangerous international 
disputes, viz. : those involving material interest, 
traditional policy or national pride, 

I can say this with some reason having, as Con- 
vener of the Arbitration Committee of the Institute 
of International Law, endeavoured in my different 
reports and draft provisions to meet the difficulty. 
The reader will, I hope, pardon me the vanity of 
quoting the following passage from my report of 
1912, as it preceded the War and which, perhaps 
better than any suggestions I might make in exist- 
ing contingencies when a certain amount of reticence 
is necessary, serves to illustrate what I take to have 
inspired President Wilson's meaning: 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 279 

The difficulty for States to include in an arbitra- 
tion treaty all differences without exception arises 
from the fact that there exist no rules, except the 
ordinary juridical rules, which arbitrators can 
apply. 

Thus how would it be possible to frame rules 
enabling States to have recourse to arbitration in 
cases of preponderating interest without any real 
juridical basis : for instance when it is a question 
of the disrupted and disordered condition of a 
neighbouring country and the actual or alleged 
danger resulting from this condition for the State's 
own territory (the case between France and Tunisia, 
between France and Morocco, Russia and Persia) 
or where the claim is for colonial territories in pro- 
portion to the needs of an emigrating population 
(the case alleged between Germany and France 
and between Germany and Portugal — a possible 
case between Russia and Japan for Eastern Siberia, 
between Germany and Australia, between Japan 
and the United States for the Philippines), or, again, 
in questions of rectification of frontiers to bring 
them into line with a reasonable geographical situa- 
tion on racial grounds (the case alleged between 
Italy and Austria-Hungary for the cession to Italy 
of the Italian portions of the Empire, the case 
alleged between Greece and Turkey for the cession 
to Greece of islands having Greek populations, the 
cases between Serbia and Austria-Hungary as 
regards Bosnia-Herzegovina and between Bulgaria 
and Greece and Turkey as regards districts in 
Macedonia), or treatment on racial grounds (a 
possible case for Japan and China respecting their 
subjects in the United States, Canada and Aus- 
tralia). 

There is no juridical rule capable of application 
to any of the problems in this list, among which 
there is sufficient material for a dozen possible wars. 



280 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

One alone might be the signal for all to break out at 
once. . . . 

To enable arbitration to settle such questions 
it would be necessary to allow the judges to take 
their stand alongside the god of battle, to appraise 
the fortune of war, and calculate the issue of armed 
conflicts. They would have to take into account, 
as I have said, preponderating interests, the balance 
of power, strength so overwhelming that the issue 
of a war could leave no possible doubt. In vain 
one searches in the arsenal of law for rules for arbi- 
tration which could provide solutions in cases 
where justice plays little or no part at all. For 
such cases, there is only mediation which in cer- 
tain contingencies might take the form of a threat 
of intervention. Generally speaking, all that can 
apparently be done at present is to stimulate public 
reprobation of interested acts of violence, of all 
violations of treaty engagements, of all the inter- 
national immorality which still pollutes the age 
in which we live. 

President Wilson had, no doubt, as a historian, 
perceived the gravity of the problem of applying 
principles of law or justice in most of the troubles 
which have eventuated in war. Choice of the 
lesser among evils, expediency, and a genuine desire 
for the preservation of peace, even the attitude 
which a common French saying adopts as regards 
recourse to law, that "a poor compromise is better 
than a good judgment", may be of help within the 
Society of Nations proposed by the President. 

I have pointed out some of the difficulties and 
suggested others in creating a Society of Nations. 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 281 

The greatest of all is the creation of the new political 
entity itself and the curtailment of the individual 
legislative independence of the federating States 
which it implies, not because peoples may be unwill- 
ing to curtail power of their own governments to 
plunge them into international ventures without 
their consent, but because any power of coercion 
possessed by the executive authority of the federated 
States would entail extension of the very power 
in question in each individual State which it is 
sought to restrict and release from that legislative 
control which is now universally acknowledged to 
be inherent to the possession of political freedom. 

Still as President Wilson said in his speech lay- 
ing the draft on the table of the pre-Congress "a 
living thing is born." "It is not in contemplation", 
he added, that it should be "merely a league to 
secure the peace of the world. It is a league which 
can be used for co-operation in any international 
matter." These were very significant words, the 
full meaning of which is apparent when we bear 
in mind that the greatest cares of modern statecraft 
are economic and that the greatest problems which 
face modern parliaments are financial — that the 
so-called labour question includes both and that it 
is essentially international, because on the efficiency 
of labour and practically labour alone depends the 
prosperity of the masses of mankind and they 
cannot live on domestic exchanges in countries 
which do not supply the raw materials of life and 
industry within their own boundaries. 



282 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

The preamble, therefore, starts off with the 
statement that the covenant is entered into "in 
order to promote international co-operation" and 
only secondly "international peace and security", 
which may or may not be a consequence of any 
effort to interfere with the independence of adhering 
or non-adhering States. 

The text of the draft "covenant", as laid before 
the world for consideration at the sitting on February 
14 of the pre-Congress, gives rise to different observa- 
tions, a few of which are appended to the text set 
out below : . 

Covenant 

(1) Preamble — In order to promote international co- 
operation and to secure international peace and security 
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by 
the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations 
between nations, by the firm establishment of the under- 
standings of international law as the actual rule of con- 
duct among Governments, and by the maintenance of 
justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations 
in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, 
the Powers signatory to this covenant adopt this Consti- 
tution of the League of Nations : 

Article 1. The action of the high contracting parties 
under the terms of this covenant shall be effected through 
the instrumentality of a meeting of a body of delegates 
representing the high contracting parties, of meetings 
at more frequent intervals of an Executive Council 
and of a permanent international secretariat to be es- 
tablished at the seat of the League. 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 283 

(1) President Wilson, in presenting the plan of 
the League of Nations at the full sitting of the 
Peace Conference at the French Foreign Office said : 

*'I have the honour, and, as I esteem it, the very 
great privilege of reporting in the name of the Com- 
mission constituted by this Conference on the 
formulation of a plan for the League of Nations. 
I am happy to say that it is a unanimous report, 
a unanimous report from the representatives of 
fourteen nations — the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, China, 
Czecho-Slovak, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Rumania 
and Serbia." 

Article 2. Meetings of the body of delegates shall 
be held at stated (1) intervals and from time to time, as 
occasion may require, for the purpose of dealing with 
matters within the sphere of action of the League. Meet- 
ings of the body of delegates shall be held at the seat of 
the League, or at such other places as may be found con- 
venient, and shall consist of representatives of the high 
contracting parties. Each of the high contracting parties 
shall have one vote, but may have not more than three 
representatives. 

(1) The word "stated" is too vague to afford 
any security for the adhering Parties. The words 
*'from time to time" and "as occasion may require" 
suggest that the word "stated" does not mean 
regular. Then what does it mean ? 

Who, moreover, is to determine when the occasion 
for meeting has occurred or where the meeting shall 
be held.?^ The wording of the clause excludes the 



284 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

interpretation that the Body of Delegates decides 
when or where it shall meet. 

Article 3. The Executive Council shall consist of 
representatives of the United States of America, the British 
Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, together with repre- 
sentatives of four other States, members of the League. (1) 
The selection of these four States shall be made by the 
body of delegates on such principles and in such manner 
as they think fit. Pending the appointment of these 
representatives of the other States, representatives of 
shall be members of the Executive Council. 

Meetings of the Council shall be held from time to 
time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, 
at whatever place may be decided on, or, failing any such 
decision, at the seat of the League, and any matter within 
the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace 
of the world may be dealt with at such meetings. 

Invitations shall be sent to any Power to attend a 
meeting of the council at which such matters directly 
affecting its interests are to be discussed, and no decision 
taken at any meeting will be binding on such Powers 
unless so invited. 

(1) The majority is to consist at all times of the 
five States named. The four appointments to be 
made by the body of delegates are of States, not 
persons. This means that if, let us say, Belgium, 
Switzerland, China and Argentine were appointed, 
these four Powers would represent on the Executive 
Council the interests and control over Holland, 
Portugal, Sweden, Norway, etc., in Europe and 
over Brazil, Mexico, etc., on the American Con- 
tinent. 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 285 

"Niis is not likely to be agreed to in view of the 
enormous powers given in the draft to the Executive 
Council, and the article will probably have to be 
recast on quite different lines. 

The provision that this Council of nine may cite 
before it any State with whose interests it may intend 
to deal and that unless it is so cited decisions are 
not binding on it does not attenuate the interference 
with national autonomy. 

Article 4. All matters of procedure at meetings of the 
body of delegates or the Executive Council, including 
the appointment of committees to investigate particular 
matters, shall be regulated by the body of delegates or 
the Executive Council, and may be decided by a majority 
of the States represented at the meeting. 

The first meeting of the body of delegates and of the 
Executive Council shall be summoned by the President 
of the United States of America. 

Article 5. The permanent secretariat of the League 

shall be established at , which shall constitute the 

seat of the League. The secretariat shall comprise such 
secretaries and staff as may be required, under the general 
direction and control of a Secretary General of the League, 
who shall be chosen by the Executive Council. The 
secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General 
subject to confirmation by the Executive Council. 

The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at 
all meetings of the body of delegates or of the Executive 
Council. 

The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the 
States members of the League, in accordance with the 
apportionment of the expenses of the International 
Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. 



286 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Article 6. Representatives of the high contracting 
parties and officials of the League, when engaged in the 
business of the League, shall enjoy diplomatic privi- 
leges and immunities, and the buildings occupied by the 
League or its officials, or by representatives attending 
its meetings, shall enjoy the benefits of extraterritori- 
ality. 

Article 7. Admission to the League of States, not 
signatories to the covenant and not named in the protocol 
hereto as States to be invited to adhere to the covenant, 
requires the assent of not less than two thirds of the 
States represented in the body of delegates, and shall be 
limited to fully self-governing countries (1), including do- 
minions and colonies. 

No State shall be admitted to the League unless it is 
able to give effective guarantees of its sincere intention 
to observe its international obligations and unless it 
shall conform to such principles as may be prescribed 
by the League in regard to its naval and military forces 
and armaments (2). 

(1) What is a fully self-governing country? 

Is a country in which women are excluded from 
representation and government fully self-governing ? 

Is a country in which a government has powers 
in conjunction with a hereditary sovereign to plunge 
it into war without the consent of parliament a fully 
self-governing country ? 

Is a dominion or colony in which a governor 
not appointed by it has a right of veto a self-govern- 
ing country ? 

(2) What is meant by effective guarantees of 
sincerity or intention? An example of such a 
guarantee and a definition of sincerity are necessary 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 287 

as telsquels; the words have the appearance of a 
contradiction of terms. 

Article 8. The high contracting parties recognize 
the principle that the maintenance of peace will require 
the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point 
consistent with national safety, and the enforcement 
by common action of international obligations, having 
special regard to the geographical situation and circum- 
stances of each State, and the Executive Council shall 
formulate plans for effecting such reduction. The Execu- 
tive Council shall also determine for the consideration 
and action of the several Governments what military 
equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in pro- 
portion to the scale of forces laid down in the program 
of disarmament; and these limits, when adopted, shall 
not be exceeded without the permission of the Executive 
Council (1). 

The high contracting parties agree that the manu- 
facture by private enterprise of munitions and imple- 
ments of war lends itself to grave objections, and direct 
the Executive Council to advise how the evil effects 
attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, 
due regard being had to the necessities of those countries 
which are not able to manufacture for themselves the muni- 
tions and implements of war necessary for their safety. 

The high contracting parties undertake in no way to 
conceal from each other the condition of such of their 
industries as are capable of being adapted to warlike 
purposes or the scale of their armaments, and agree that 
there shall be fidl and frank interchange of information 
as to their military and naval programs (2). 

(1) The first paragraph of the article taken in 
conjunction with Article 3 implies that each Power 



288 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

will be summoned before the Executive of Nine 
and be heard on the subject of its disarmament. 
The Executive only determines for the considera- 
tion of the respective Powers what is fair and 
reasonable. With whom rests the final decision 
in case of disagreement between the Executive 
and such Powers ? 

(2) The second and third paragraphs seem to 
favour the munition industries of the Executive 
Powers. As this subject of private arsenals will 
probably be one of the chief questions for the decision 
of the Peace Congress the weakness of the wording 
of the paragraph does not necessarily imply tender- 
ness for these powerful enterprises. 

Article 9. A permanent commission shall be con- 
stituted to advise the League on the execution of the 
provisions of Article 8 and on military and naval ques- 
tions generally (1). 

(1) Will the Permanent Commission be appointed 
by the Executive Powers? It is supererogation 
to criticise the article which ought really to form 
part of Article 8 till this is made clear. 

Article 10. The high contracting parties shall under- 
take to respect and preserve as against external aggression 
the territorial integrity and existing political independence 
of all States members of the League. In case of any such 
aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such 
aggression the Executive Council shall advise upon the 
means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled. 

Article 11. Any war or threat of war, whether immedi- 
ately affecting any of the high contracting parties or not. 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 289 

is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League, 
and the high contracting parties reserve the right to take 
any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations. 

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly 
right of each of the high contracting parties to draw the 
attention of the body of delegates or of the Executive 
Council to any circumstance affecting international 
intercourse which threatens to disturb international 
peace or the good understanding between nations upon 
which peace depends. 

Article 12. The high contracting parties agree that 
should disputes arise between them which cannot be 
adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy they 
will in no case resort to war without previously sub- 
mitting the questions and matters involved either to 
arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive Council, 
and until three months after the award by the arbitrators 
or a recommendation by the Executive Council, and 
that they will not even then resort to war as against a 
member of the League which complies with the award 
of the arbitrators or the recommendation of the Executive 
Council. 

In any case under this article the award of the arbitra- 
tors shall be made within a reasonable time, and the recom- 
mendation of the Executive Council shall be made within 
six months after the submission of the dispute. 

Article 13. The high contracting parties agree that 
whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between 
them, which they recognize to be suitable for submission 
to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled 
by diplomacy, they will submit the whole matter to 
arbitration. For this purpose the court of arbitration 
to which the ease is referred shall be the court agreed on 



290 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

by the parties or stipulated in any convention existing 
between them. The high contracting parties agree 
that they will carry out in full good faith any award 
that may be rendered. In the event of any failure to 
carry out the award the Executive Council shall propose 
what steps can best be taken to give effect thereto. 

Article 14. The Executive Council shall formulate 
plans for the establishment of a permanent court of 
international justice, and this court shall, when established, 
be competent to hear and determine any matter which 
the parties recognize as suitable for submission to it for 
arbitration under the foregoing article. 

Article 15. If there should arise between States, 
members of the League, any dispute likely to lead to 
rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above, 
the high contracting parties agree that they will refer 
the matter to the Executive Council ; either party to 
the dispute may give notice of the existence of the dis- 
pute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary 
arrangements for a full investigation and consideration 
thereof. For this purpose the parties agree to communi- 
cate to the Secretary General as promptly as possible 
statements of their case, all the relevant facts and papers, 
and the Executive Council may forthwith direct the 
publication thereof. 

Where the efforts of the council lead to the settlement 
of the dispute, a statement shall be published, indicating 
the nature of the dispute and the terms of settlement, 
together with such explanations as may be appropriate. 
If the dispute has not been settled, a report by the council 
shall be published, setting forth with all necessary facts 
and explanations the recommendation which the council 
think just and proper for the settlement of the dispute. 
If the report is unanimously agreed to by the members of 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 291 

the council, other than the parties to the dispute, the high 
contracting parties agree that they will not go to war 
with any party which complies with the recommendations, 
and that if any party shall refuse so to comply the council 
shall propose measures necessary to give effect to the 
recommendations. If no such unanimous report can 
be made it shall be the duty of the majority and the 
privilege of the minority to issue statements, indicating 
what they believe to be the facts, and containing the 
reasons which they consider to be just and proper. 

The Executive Council may in any case under this 
article refer the dispute to the body of delegates. The 
dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party 
to the dispute, provided that such request must be made 
within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute. 
In a case referred to the body of delegates, all the pro- 
visions of this article, and of Article 12, relating to the 
action and powers of the Executive Council, shall apply 
to the action and powers of the body of delegates.^ 

* After reading the second paragraph of Article 15 the President 
said: "I pause to point out that a misconception might arise in con- 
nection with one of the sentences I have just read : 'If any party shall 
refuse so to comply, the Coimcil shall propose the measures necessary 
to give effect to the recommendation.' 

" A case in point, a pm-ely hypothetical case, is this : Suppose that 
there is in the possession of a particular Power a piece of territory or 
some other substantial thing in dispute to which it is claimed that it 
is not entitled. Suppose that the matter is submitted to the Executive 
Council for a recommendation as to the settlement of the dispute, diplo- 
macy having failed, and suppose that the decision is in favour of the 
party which claims the subject matter of dispute as against the party 
which has the subject matter in dispute. 

" Then if the party in possession of the subject matter in dispute merely 
sits still and does nothing, it has accepted the decision of the Council 
in the sense that it makes no resistance; but something must be done 
to see that it surrenders the subject matter in dispute. In such a 
case, the only case contemplated, it is provided that the Executive 



292 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Article 16, Should any of the high contracting 
parties break or disregard its covenants under Article 
12 it shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have com- 
mitted an act of war against all the other members of the 
League, which hereby undertakes immediately to subject 
it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the 
prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals 
and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the 
prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal 
intercourse between the nationals of the covenant- 
breaking State and the nationals of any other State, 
whether a member of the League or not (1). 

It shall be the duty of the Executive Council in such 
case to recommend what effective military or naval 
force the members of the League shall severally contrib- 
ute to the armed forces to be used to protect the cove- 
nants of the League. 

The high contracting parties agree, further, that they 
will mutually support one another in the financial and 
economic measures which may be taken under this article 
in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting 
from the above measures, and that they will mutually 
support one another in resisting any special measures 
aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking 
State and that they will afford passage through their terri- 
tory to the forces of any of the high contracting parties who 
are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League. 

(1) This would be difficult to apply, if the de- 
faulter were a country on which others were depend- 
ent for food or raw materials. The draftsman tries 
to meet the difficulty in the third paragraph, but 

Council may then consider what steps may be necessary to oblige the 
party against whom judgment has gone to comply with the decisions 
of the Council." 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 293 

the one clause is positive and the other merely 
potential. 

Article 17. In the event of dispute between one 
State member of the League and another State which is 
not a member of the League, or between States not 
members of the League, the high contracting parties 
agree that the State or States, not members of the League, 
shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership 
in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon 
such conditions as the Executive Council may deem 
just, and upon acceptance of any such invitation, the 
above provisions shall be applied with such modifications 
as may be deemed necessary by the League. 

Upon such invitation being given the Executive Council 
shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances 
and merits of the dispute and recommend such action as 
may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. 

In the event of a power so invited refusing to accept 
the obligations of membership in the League for the 
purposes of the League, which in the case of a State 
member of the League would constitute a breach of 
Article 12, the provisions of Article 16 shall be ap- 
plicable as against the State taking such action. 

If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse 
to accept the obligations of membership in the League 
for the purpose of such dispute, the Executive Council 
may take such action and make such recommendations 
as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settle- 
ment of the dispute. 

Article 18. The high contracting parties agree that 
the League shall be intrusted with general supervision 
of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries 
in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the 
common interest (1). 



294 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

(1) This article seems to regard Article 8 as of 
no effect and in any case Articles 18 and 8 belong 
together. 

Article 19.^ To those colonies and territories which, 
as a consequence of the late war, have ceased to be under 
the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed 
them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able 
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions 
of the modern world, there should be applied the prin- 
ciple that the well-being and development of such peoples 
form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities 
for the performance of this trust should be embodied in 
the constitution of the League. 

The best method of giving practical effect to this 
principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be 
intrusted to advanced nations, who by reason of their 
resources, their experience, or their geographical position, 
can best undertake this responsibility, and that this 
tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories 
on behalf of the League. 

The character of the mandate must diflPer according 
to the stage of the development of the people, the geo- 
graphical situation of the territory, its economic conditions 
and other similar circumstances. 

Certain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire, have reached a stage of development where 
their existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative 
advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such 

^ Before reading Article 19, the President said: "Let me say before 
reading Article 19, that before being embodied in this document it was 
the subject matter of a very careful discussion by representatives of 
the five greater Parties, and that their unanimous conclusion in the 
matter is embodied in this Article." 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 295 

time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of 
these communities must be a principal consideration in 
the selection of the mandatory power. 

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are 
at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible 
for the administration of the territory, subject to condi- 
tions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or 
religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order 
and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave 
trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the pre- 
vention of the establishment of fortifications or military 
and naval bases and of military training of the natives 
for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, 
and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade 
and commerce of other members of the League. 

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and 
certain of the South Pacific Isles, which, owing to the 
sparseness of the population, or their small size, or their 
remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geo- 
graphical contiguity to the mandatory State and other 
circumstances, can be best administered under the laws 
of the mandatory States as integral portions thereof, 
subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the inter- 
ests of the indigenous population. 

In every case of mandate, the mandatory State shall 
render to the League an annual report in reference to 
the territory committed to its charge (1). 

The degree of authority, control, or administration, 
to be exercised by the mandatory State, shall, if not 
previously agreed upon by the high contracting parties 
in each case, be explicitly defined by the Executive Coun- 
cil in a special act or charter. 

The high contracting parties further agree to establish 
at the seat of the League a mandatory commission to 



296 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

receive and examine the annual reports of the mandatory 
powers, and to assist the League in insuring the observ- 
ance of the terms of all mandates (2). 

(1) This provision might be generalised with 
advantage, publicity being obviously a safeguard 
against combinazione of all kinds. 

(2) Does this mean that the Mandatory Com- 
mission will be composed of members of the Execu- 
tive Council or of the delegates, or of both or of 
neither? What is the effect of the words "at 
the seat of the League?" Do they mean that the 
Commission is to be a mere Bureau? Are the 
reports of the Commission or the mandatories' 
reports to be made public? Will it be a sort of 
Ministry with a chief responsible to the Executive 
Council — perhaps a member of it ? 

Article 20. The high contracting parties will endeavor 
to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of 
labor for men, women, and children, both in their own 
countries and in all countries to which their commercial 
and industrial relations extend; and to that end agree 
to establish as part of the organization of the League 
a permanent bureau of labor (1). 

(1) The same observations in general apply to 
this article as to the final clause of the previous 
one. 

Article 21. The high contracting parties agree that 
provision shall be made through the instrumentality 
of the League to secure and maintain freedom of transit 
and equitable treatment for the commerce of all States 
members of the League, having in mind, among other 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 297 

things, special arrangements with regard to the necessities 
of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 (1). 

(1) This article is obscure, seeming to apply to 
some difference of opinion of the drafting Powers 
which is not obvious. 

Article 22. The high contracting parties agree to 
place under the control of the League all international 
bureaus already established by general treaties, if the 
parties to such treaties consent. Furthermore, they 
agree that all such international bureaus to be constituted 
in future shall be placed under control of the League (1). 

(1) Does the control of the League mean of the 
Executive Council? Will the control be exercised 
by an official reporting to it and (or) the delegates ? 
Will there be a ''Ministry of International Conven- 
tions" with a chief responsible to the Executive 
Council and (or) delegates ? 

Article 23. The high contracting parties agree that 
every treaty or international engagement (1) entered into 
hereafter by any State member of the League shall be 
forthwith registered with the Secretary General and as 
soon as possible published by him, and that no such 
treaty or international engagement shall be binding until 
so registered. 

(1) Should this not read "every international 
treaty or engagement .^^ " Is not the word "engage- 
ment" vague? Is not "obligation" or "under- 
taking" meant? The sense of the word "conven- 
tion" in diplomacy has come to mean a treaty 
among a number of Powers, though it is also used 



298 COLLAPSE AND REC0X5TRUCTI0N 

for agreements relating to commercial and indas- 
trial as distinguished from political matters. 

Article 24. It shall be the right of the body of dele- 
gates from time to time to ad\Tse the reconsideration 
by States members of the League of treaties which have 
become inappHcable and of international conditions of 
which the continuance may endanger the peace of the 
world (\). 

(\) This seems to be an inversion of procedure. 
Did not the draftsman mean: "It shall be the 
right of any State member of the League to submit 
for consideration by the delegates any treaty which 
has become inapplicable and demand release from 
its terms .^" The article is obscure. An instance 
of what is meant is desirable. 

Article 2.5. The high contracting parties severally 
agree that the present covenant is accepted as abrogating 
all obUgations inter se which are inconsistent %\-ith the 
terms thereof, and solemnly engage that they will not 
hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with 
the terms thereof. In case any of the Powers signatory 
hereto or subsequently admitted to the League shall, 
before becoming a party to this covenant, have under- 
taken any oVjligations which are inconsistent with the 
terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power 
to take immediate steps to prociu-e its release from such 
obligations. 

Article 26. Amendments to this covenant will take 
effect when ratified by the States whose representatives 
compose the Execiitive Council and by three fourths of 
the States whose representatives compose the body of 
delegates. 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 299 

Without wishing in any way to depreciate the 
draft thus submitted for consideration, I venture 
to remark that it shows the defects inherent to 
hasty drafting and to the compromising of different 
views there may not have been time to thresh out. 
Moreover, it seems influenced by the desire to 
assure the domination of the Great Powers while 
introducing a minimum of parHamentary restric- 
tion upon their supremacy through a Body of 
Delegates who are only vaguely brought into action 
if at all. Nevertheless, in spite of its defects, it is 
a very fair basis for discussion and as such, having 
the unanimous approval of the representatives of 
the Allies, it must be treated with respect. 

I venture to suggest, however, that the greatest 
deterrent from war would be public and unfettered 
discussion of any difficulties capable of leading to 
it in a "parliament of mankind" and that voting 
after such discussions would have the effect of divid- 
ing it into parties which would necessarily lead to 
strife as in domestic parliaments and accentuate 
the evil it is sought to avert. 

With this principle in view I have drawn up the 
following preamble of suggestions which may be 
useful for the further consideration of the Congress : 

Suggested Preamble to Constitution of a 
Society of Nations 

Whereas the idea of a Society of Nations has long 
been among the nobler aspirations of men. and the federa- 
tion of communities for specific purposes has been suc- 
cessfully essayed ; 



300 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

Whereas such a Society as proposed at the present time 
has for object the prevention of war ; 

Whereas the prevention of war seems attainable, if 
at all, by making its consequences so unlikely to insure 
success as to deter engaging in it, or by making clear 
to all mankind that solutions are less costly by pacific 
than by violent methods ; 

Whereas an overwhelming combination of Powers 
for its prevention seems capable of serving as a deterrent, 
but neither history nor the practice of men in civil com- 
binations affords any instances of such combinations hav- 
ing endured beyond an immediate common interest ; 

Whereas, on the other hand, the better understanding 
of each other's objects, necessities, ideals may in itself 
be a preservative against the employment of violence 
as a means of obtaining satisfaction to just demands ; 

Whereas, this better understanding depends upon 
statesmen meeting each other and being able to con- 
verse with each other ; 

Whereas, resolutions dependent on the decisions of 
a majority would necessarily tend to division instead of 
harmony ; 

^Tiereas to make such meetings effective and inde- 
pendent of passing events and currents of public feel- 
ing, it is desirable that they should be periodical and 
automatic ; 

Whereas for the purpose of such meetings a country 
should be chosen which is permanently neutralised and 
where permanent officials and government authorities 
are likely to be less subject to international bias than 
countries not so detached from international controver- 
sies ; 

Whereas of the three countries which enjoy permanent 
neutraUty, viz.: Switzerland, Belgium and Luxemburg, 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 301 

Luxemburg alone is completely neutralised and her 
territory, in this respect recalling to some extent the 
position of the "District of Columbia" in the United 
States, is marked out as the headquarters of official efforts 
for the avoidance of warfare ; 

Whereas official must be distinguished from unofficial 
agencies for the avoidance of war, and it is desirable 
not to let them be confused in the public mind ; 

Whereas it is desirable that a parliamentary union for 
all purposes should be created and that there should be 
no restriction placed upon the free discussion of all mat- 
ters, and that a full report of the proceedings should be 
published; and 

Whereas it is undesirable that such a union should 
have power to adopt resolutions outside matters of its 
by-laws ; 

Whereas it is desirable to discom-age any spirit which 
can interfere with the free play of argument or with the 
revelation of facts and situations, the object of discus- 
sion being the enlightenment of public opinion and not 
coercion of a minority by a majority ; 

Whereas the periodical meetings of representatives 
of governments, though corresponding to meetings of 
a Senate, shall not be public and shall even be so secret 
that only matters may be divulged by specific authorisa- 
tion of the Parties affected ; 

Whereas it is desirable that both Houses possess the 
greatest possible independence in so far as being governed 
by their own by-laws, electing their own Presidents, 
Vice-presidents, and other officers and having their own 
officials, their own independent buildings with all facili- 
ties for general assemblies, committee meetings, libraries, 
writing rooms, etc., on the scale of a parliament of a 
first-class State; 



302 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

WTiereas it is desirable that meetings shall not be 
pressed for time and that every year the Session should 
open at a fixed date which it is proposed should be the first 
of June, the sitting to continue until the work is completed ; 

Whereas there is no reason why committees shoidd 
not make suggestions or adopt conclusions in reports 
submitted for discussion at plenary sittings ; 

WTiereas it is desirable that the equality of States 
should be observed as far as possible, but that in the 
discussions it would be falsifying the object of free and 
untrammeled discussion to disregard the universal char- 
acter of this parliament of mankind, and populations of 
the world should, as far as possible, be represented in 
such meetings and not the States to which they belong ; 

"Whereas, nevertheless, it is practically impossible 
as well as of no particular advantage to have a direct 
election for members and the election of parliaments 
can serve as the first stage of selection ; and 

Whereas, it is indispensable for their independence 
that the members should be freely chosen by the 
respective parliaments themselves and not by govern- 
ments or executives ; 

And, whereas, by way of limiting to a workable pro- 
portion the number represented, there should be two 
members for every independent State ; 

Whereas, also, it is desirable that all opinions should 
have a hearing, that all printed matter from whatever 
source and of whatever character should be admitted to 
the Library, classed and at the disposal of the public 
in the public Reading Room, which should be open to all 
persons of over twenty-one years of age; and 

No distinction should be made between the sexes in 
connection with these presents ; 

It is hereby agreed, etc. 



A SOCIETY (OR LEAGUE) OF NATIONS 303 

I have also drawn up the following further pre- 
amble to a suggested protocol dealing with matters 
apart from the constitution of the Society of Na- 
tions itself but closely correlated to its objects and 
scope : 

Suggested Preamble to a Protocol to be Annexed 
TO the Above 

Furthermore, having in view the universal interest 
attaching to all efforts to promote reduction of the burden 
of armaments, the peaceable adjustment of conflicts 
involving vital interests or national honour, and the 
amicable settlement of all questions dangerous for inter- 
national peace, and the hope that the ultimate futility 
of armed peace be rendered possible ; 

And whereas by special agreements the Powers in 
1899 and 1907 dealt with methods for the peaceable 
adjustment of all international conflicts ; 

But whereas conflicts arise chiefly out of matters of 
rivalry connected with territorial aggrandisement and 
expansion, or out of the possible exclusion, for the benefit 
of particular States, of the trade and enterprise of other 
States, from existing or possible markets ; 

And whereas in China, Central Africa, and Morocco 
the principle of equality of treatment, without distinction 
of nationality, has been permanently adopted as a funda- 
mental condition in connection with economic expansion 
in these regions, and whereas most of the Powers have al- 
ready expressed their attachment to this principle of 
equality ; 

And whereas the High Contracting Parties have agreed 
that when any such High Contracting Parties shall 
acquire dominion or any dominant influence over terri- 
tory outside Europe, by way of annexation, protectorate, 



S04 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

lease, sphere of influence, or otherwise, such acquisition 
shall be subject to the condition that absolute equality 
of treatment, whether by way of import or export duties, 
concessions, privileges, and economic matters of all kinds, 
shall be granted, maintained, or recognised, as the case 
may be, in regard to the subjects and citizens of all States 
without distinction ; 

And whereas it is desirable to generalise the application 
of the principle of "buffer" zones at present in actual 
practice as between Burmah and Siam, and as between 
Sweden and Norway and thus lessen the suspicious rivalry 
which leads nations to compete against each other in 
accentuation of their frontier defences. 

And whereas the High Contracting Parties have agreed 
to regard a zone on either side of their frontier as neu- 
tralized within which no fortification shall be erected 
or armed forces maintained, contiguous Powers to arrange 
the width of such neutralised zone between them in 
accordance with existing circumstances and the configura- 
tion of the soil ; 

It is hereby agreed, etc. 



CHAPTER XV 



AMERICA S MISSION 



President Wilson's peace propositions cannot, 
it has been seen, be regarded as a cut-and-dried, 
take-or-leave-it offer of peace. And even they do 
not lift the war out of a certain egotistic bHndness, 
which posterity may lay to the charge of our gener- 
ation. Vaguely many feel there is throughout 
mankind an inner Drang, an impulsion to which 
statesmen are not philosophic enough to give expres- 
sion. We would like to link it up, in the sequence 
of historic causation, with something more worthy 
of its bloodshed, and suffering, and irreparable 
destruction of the patrimony of generations to 
come, than a number of matters which could and 
can, be much better settled by leisurely negotia- 
tion than by violence, and some of which it may be 
difficult to settle at all while men's nerves are still 
trembling with anger and their hands still bear the 
blood stains of battle. 

We search in vain for its justification, and we have 
to fall back on excuses which will take it beyond 
the volition of statesmen. 

Changes are taking place which were never at 
the outset dreamt of. The conversion of Germany 



306 COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION 

by defeat from a powerful autocracy into perhaps 
a still more powerful republican commonwealth, 
a federation through defeat of Southern Europe 
into a geographical entity capable of giving scope 
to inner autonomy while outwardly uniting its 
different races for their common weal seem to be 
among its concrete impending results. On the 
other hand, victory possibly evolving into reaction 
for self-defence, with three of the great allied na- 
tions forming "pockets", as it were, on the map of 
Europe, seems to be another. 

The uncritical optimists, the Candides of our own 
time, turn their self-confident faces from the warn- 
ings of history. They condemn as impractical 
any distinction between causes and occasions. Like 
superficial administrators, they single out the occa- 
sion, the crime, the individual volition, and think 
that in surrounding and capturing the criminal 
they have quenched the source of the crime. 

Yet those who have watched the evolution of our 
own time see its effects without being able to dis- 
cern any stages in the process of its development. 
And when we cast our vision along the stream of 
ages, we seem to discern impulses, racial tendencies 
of mankind, which lie beyond the range of individ- 
ual volition, blind impulses that lead whole peoples 
to their doom, inner forces of destruction which con- 
sume some, outer forces of destruction which move 
masses of men against each other, as if they were as 
dependent on cosmic phenomena as inundations and 
earthquakes. Babylon, Athens, Carthage, Egypt, 



AMERICA'S MISSION 307 

Rome, in turn bear witness to the one, as the 
mysterious westward push of Celt, Saxon, Slav, 
Hun attest the other. Does not the present War 
present features not unlike a Vblkerwanderung, 
such as historians, sociologists and psychologists 
ascribe to over-population on the one hand, and 
to insuflBcient accessible food to feed it on the other. 
An island State possessing ships enough armed and 
unarmed to insure its ability to protect its overseas 
settlements has a safety valve through which its 
overflow can escape automatically, while the bal- 
ance of food necessary to feed its home population 
automatically flows in as required. A State which 
has not these advantages and which by sea and by 
land can be forced by its neighbour to rely on its 
own resources solely to feed its population and its 
industries, may be exposed, when its population 
and its industries reach a certain point, to the burst- 
ing of its valveless boilers, and once more we may 
have been witnessing the phenomenon of invading 
hordes moving westward as if in search of food, of 
populations as if grown out of proportion to their 
available resources, breaking through the frontiers 
which contained them. 

The aim of civihsed man is, or at any rate ought 
to be, to emancipate his existence from such 
cataclysms, to make himself independent as far 
as possible of physical phenomena. He clothes 
and houses himself against the rigours of climate 
and season. He is no longer dependent on the 
domestic harvest for his food. He is constantly 
overcoming obstacles of distance. He is eradicating 



308 COLLAPSE .\XD RECONSTRUCTION 

disease, crime and other dangers to life. And 
during the last half-century efforts had been made 
to bring about a similar betterment in the inter- 
national relations of mankind. 

Posterity will certainly wish for the enlighten- 
ment future historians may be able to give it with 
more detachment than can be expected from those 
who have lived through the great tragedy. 

Yet those who have been close to events can 
perhaps see later some of the seams and defects 
on the canvas of the panorama which may wear 
off under the erosion of time, and anyhow, one of 
the facts for posterity u^ll be the way this genera- 
tion \'iews and judges the War. 

This War has been described by one, if not more 
than one writer, as "a war to end war", and this 
idea seems to some extent to underiie President 
Wilson's idea of what the War means. A war to 
end war implies a peace from which the causes and 
dangers of future war will be eliminated. Cannot 
this devout ^-ish of all mankind be expressed with 
more psychological precision by saying that electors 
should choose as their representatives men who are 
responsible and that the object for which they are 
chosen should be to build up a more logical, more 
reasonable condition of things than that which failed 
to prevent the present War ? 

There is a current optimism about the "ending" 
of war which assumes that peace, not war, is natural 
to man. There is nothing in nature or in history 
to bear out such an assumption. Moreover, just 



MIERICAS ]VnSSION 309 

as a spark can start a conflagration, so any petty 
monarch or community can fire the first shot that 
sets the world ablaze. The monarch of Montenegro 
has played the part of the spark in at least two wars ! 

Still, if the spark does not alight on inflammable 
material, it does or may do no harm. 

Inflammable material mifortunately is scattered 
everywhere, and is largely beyond the scope of 
international arrangement. 

International ill-feeling begotten of heated contro- 
versy and fanned in the press is one form of it. 
Munitions factories dependent for dividends on 
the fear of unpreparedness for war are another. 
Protective tariffs directed against particular coun- 
tries are a third. Politicians m quest of sensa- 
tional publicity are a fourth. And so on. 

An optimist delusion is that war is the handi- 
work of statesmen and that, as it is the poor who 
with their lives pay the price of it, it is necessarily 
unpopular. Evidence tends quite the other way. 
There seems at all times to be a sufficient latent 
leaven of hatred at the core of every nation to 
insure popularity to any war a responsible govern- 
ment is likely to wage. 

President Wilson is evidently quite alive to 
the danger of the inflammable material, seeing 
that he asks States to reform themselves and exacts 
as a primary condition of peace the suppression of 
"militarism ", which means nothing if not an aggres- 
sive policy, a policy of threatening or hinting at 
war as an alternative for argument and reason. 



310 COLL\PSE AND RECOXSTRUCTIOX 

Some forms of inflammable material can be dealt 
with by legislation. Others are dependent on 
enlightenment, on the growth and promotion of 
reciprocal knowledge of the geographical conditions, 
economic requirements and social ideab of different 
nations. Closer international contact than hereto- 
fore between statesmen, by personal meetings 
for the joint discussion of the problems arising out 
of conflicting interests which are as unavoidable 
in the hfe of nations as in that of indi\'iduals, may 
become one of the most effective methods by which 
danger of war can be averted. If the proposed 
Society or League of Nations went no further than 
to bring about the organisation of periodical meet- 
ings of such a kind, the boon to the world would 
largely contribute to redeem the War from the 
charge at any rate of futihty. 

President "Wilson's statement of the principles 
which should govern a hberated Europe for the 
future is an afterthought which has arisen during 
the War and has no connection with its causes. 
It is so big with potentialities that, li\'ing in the 
detail of our daily controversies, we hardly reahse 
its immensity. Yet it is but the contemporary 
expression of the same impuLse which animated the 
champions of Freedom who shook off the Roman 
yoke, who met at RunnjTnede, who flocked to the 
banner of Cromwell, who signed the Declaration 
of Independence, who proclaimed les droit's de 
VhorarM, who fought Napoleon and who are now 
fighting Napoleon's imitators, an impulse of reac- 



AMERICA'S MISSION 311 

tion which will always resist those who endeavour 
to assert a mastery. In this expansion of the im- 
pulse to a wider area of mankind the spokesman of 
the greatest free community in the world is only 
delivering a time-honoured message of freedom 
to fellow-men still under the yoke of unchosen 
masters. His message has been like the battle 
cry of the Crusaders, who crossed the then ocean 
to liberate Palestine and deliver Christendom from 
the yoke of Islam. But if it is to remain a crusade, 
the President must remain true to the jorinciples 
he has enunciated and apply them with the justice 
and universality of a Gospel. God grant that he 
avoid the temptation to descend into the arena of 
revenge or conquest, and that the people of the 
United States, conscious of their gigantic mis- 
sion and influenced by the lofty and eternal prin- 
ciples of Washington, will back their leader in the 
stern determination with which they entered the 
War to put an end not only to it, but, as far as 
possible, to causes and possible causes of war in the 
future, for the benefit of Mankind generally. The 
principles inscribed on behalf of the United States 
have been adopted by all the Allied governments 
as a promise to the Peoples whom they have 
the good fortune to ride — good fortune of wealth, 
good fortime of birth or even good fortune of in- 
tellect. They are a gospel of perpetual application 
and woe betide the classes, oligarchies or kings who 
on selfish, patriotic or revengeful grounds defraud 
them of the right for which they have been told they 
shed their blood and impoverished the future. 



NOTE TO CHAPTER XV 

Some Extracts from President Wilson's Messages 
(January to April, 1917) 

Why We Are At War 

January 22, 1917. I only take it for granted that 
mere terms of peace between the belhgerents will not 
satisfy even the belligerents themselves. 

Mere agreements may not make peace secm-e. It 
will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a 
guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much 
greater than the force of any nation now engaged in any 
alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, 
no probable combination of nations, could face or with- 
stand it. 

If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must 
be a peace made secure by the organized major force 
of mankind. 

Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There 
must be not only a balance of power, but a community 
of powers not organized rivalries, but an organized com- 
mon peace. 

It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, 
at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a 
resentment, a bitter memory, upon which terms of peace 
would rest, not permanently but only as upon quick- 
sand. 



AMERICA'S MISSION 313 

February 6, 1917. I do not desire any hostile conflict 
with the Imperial German Government. We are the 
sincere friends of the German people and earnestly 
desire to remain at peace with them. We shall not 
believe that they are hostile to us until we are obliged 
to believe it; and we purpose nothing more than the 
reasonable defence of the undoubted rights of our people. 
We wish to reserve no selfish ends. We seek merely to 
stand true alike in thought and in action to the immemorial 
principles of our people which I sought to express in my 
address to the Senate only two weeks ago. We seek 
merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and 
an unmolested life. There are the bases of peace not 
war. 

February 26, 1917. It is not of material interest 
merely that we are thinking. It is rather of fundamental 
human rights, chief of all, of the right to life itself. I 
am thinking not only of the rights of Americans to go 
and come about their proper business by way of the sea, 
but also of something much deeper, much more funda- 
mental than that. I am thinking of those rights of 
humanity without which there is no civilization. My 
theme is of those great principles of compassion and of 
protection which mankind has sought to throw about 
human lives, the lives of noncombatants, the lives of 
men who are peacefully at work, keeping the industrial 
processes of the world quick and vital, the lives of women 
and children, and of those who supply the labor which 
ministers to their sustenance. 

I cannot imagine any man with American principles 
at his heart hesitating to defend these things. 

April 2, 1917. Our object now as then is to vindicate 
the principle of peace and justice in the life of the world 



314 COLLAPSE AXD RECONSTRUCTION 

a5 against selfish and autocratic povrer and to set up 
amongst the reallv free and self-governed peoples of the 
world such a concert of purpose and of action as will 
henceforth insure the observance of these principles. 

We are at the beginning of an age in which it will 
be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of 
responsibihty for wrong done shall be observed among 
nations and their governments that are observed among 
the individual citizens of civilized States. 

We have no quarrel with the German people. We 
have no feeling toward them but one of sj'mpathy and 
friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their 
government acted in entering upon this war. It was not 
with their previous knowledge or approval. 

We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil 
of false pretenc-e about them, to fight thus for the ultimate 
peac-e of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, 
the German people included; for the rights of nations 
great and small and the privilege of men everj*where to 
choose their way of life and of obedience. The world 
must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be 
planted upon the trusted foundations of political Uberty. 

We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no con- 
r4uest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for our- 
selves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we 
shall freely make. We are but one of the champions 
of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when 
those rights have been made as secure as the faith and 
freedom of the nation can make them. 

Just because we fight without rancor and without 
selfish objects, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we 
shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel 
confident, conduct our operations as belligerents with- 
out passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio 



AMERICA'S MISSION 315 

the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be 
fighting for. 

We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the 
German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the 
early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual 
advantage between us — however hard it may be for 
them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken 
from our hearts. 

But the right is more precious than peace and we shall 
fight for the things which we have always carried nearest 
our hearts — for democracy, for the right of those who 
submit to authority to have a voice in their own govern- 
ments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a 
universal dominion of right by such a concert of free 
peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and 
make the world itself at last free. 

To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our for- 
tunes, everything that we are and everything that we 
have, with the pride of those who know that the day has 
come when America is privileged to spend her blood and 
her might for the principles that gave her birth and happi- 
ness and the peace which she has treasured. God help- 
ing her, she can do no other. 



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